The stories of Al-Hassan and Al-Hussein, major figures from Islamic history, have been made into a television drama for Ramadan, with mixed results, says Osama Kamal It took 22 Sunni Muslim religious scholars to make this work possible. The story of Al-Hassan wal-Hussein, great martyrs for Shiite Muslims, could not have made it to the screen without a religious edict from top Muslim authorities sanctioning the personification of holy figures. Among the scholars who gave their consent for the dramatisation of these major religious figures were Egypt's Sunni preacher Youssef al-Qaradawi and two Shiite scholars from Lebanon, the late Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah and Ali al-Amin. As a result, Al-Hassan wal-Hussein shows the grandsons of the Prophet Mohammad and other members of his family and close associates, including several of the mobassharun bel ganna, the ten men who the Prophet said would be allowed into paradise. This was the show's main claim to fame, and unfortunately it is also perhaps its only one. The show features al-Hassan and al-Hussein, grandsons of the Prophet Mohammad (sons of his daughter Fatema and his cousin Ali), as well as al-Zobeir Ibn al-Awwam and Talha Ibn Obeidellah. With a budget of US$8 million (48 million EGP) and a cast drawn from numerous Arab countries, the producers �ê" Qatar's Al-Nur and Kuwait's Al-Maha �ê" knew they were taking a risk. The topic of the show is controversial, dealing with the "Great Sedition" (al-fitna al-kobra) of 32 hegira (652 CE), which started when opponents of the third caliph, Othman Ibn Affan, surrounded his house and demanded his removal. Three years after this confrontation, Othman was killed and a bloody battle for succession followed, ending in the killing of Ali, the fourth caliph, and many members of his family. The battle in Karbala, today in Iraq, in 61 hegira (680), in which al-Hussein lost his life, is considered to be a turning point in the history of Islam, as well as a major pillar of Shiite doctrine. But even before that many battles had already been fought between the supporters of the fourth caliph (and Shiite hero), Ali, and his critics, who went on to establish the Damascus-based Umayyad dynasty. Such turbulent years can be interpreted according to different religious affiliations, political inclinations and sectarian loyalties. The Sunni narrative, as might be expected, differs a lot from the Shiite one. Therefore, scriptwriters for television might be expected either to take sides, choosing one narrative over the other, or to try to reconcile the two. Neither is a particularly easy task, and in this case it was one that was botched. For the most part, the drama's producers went for the dominant Sunni narrative, which says that the disciples of the Prophet did the right thing even when they were divided and engaged in fighting bloody battles. However, this narrative overlooks the nuances of history. It also accords the main actors of the present television version a bland saintliness that is the antithesis of good drama. Those with any knowledge of the early years of Islam admit that the story of the religion in its early years is one that intersects with inter-tribal and inter-clan politics. From the time of the revelation of the Qur'an to the Prophet Mohammad onward, and even before that in the period of jahiliyya (before Islam), clan rivalries were never far from the scene. The story of the early development of Islam is also the story of political rivalry between two major clans: the Bani Hashem, the Prophet's clan, and the Bani Umayya, the future founders of the Umayyad dynasty. The power struggle between the two surfaced with full force after the death of the second caliph, Omar Ibn al-Khattab. When Omar was on his deathbed, he named six of the mobassharun bel ganna, disciples whom the Prophet said would go to paradise, and said that the Muslim community should choose the next caliph from amongst them. The main contenders were Othman, later the fourth caliph, and Ali, later the third caliph. Othman was from the Bani Umayya, while Ali was from the Bani Hashem. Othman eventually carried the day, becoming caliph in 23 hegira (643) and soon starting a policy that would lead to his political demise and eventual death. Despite his piety, Othman had a tendency to favour his family and close friends over the rest of the Muslim community, and he ended up by making politically ill-advised decisions and appointing members of his clan to top government posts. As caliph, Othman named Marawan Ibn al-Hakam as ruler of Medina, and Moawiya Ibn Abi Sofian, the future founder of the Umayyad dynasty, as ruler of Syria. He made al-Walid Ibn Oqba ruler of Kufa, later replacing him with Said Ibn al-As. As governor of Egypt, he appointed Amr Ibn al-As, then Abdallah Ibn Abi al-Sarh. All of these men were members of the Bani Umayya clan. The scriptwriters of the present drama, Mohammad al-Yasari and Mohammad al-Hasayan, do not tell us much about the underlying reasons for the Great Sedition. We do not see a society divided by pre-Islamic rivalries or cursed by the power struggles that come with newly-achieved wealth. The social changes that transformed the lives of members of the early Muslim community are absent from the narrative, as is the sense of political disenchantment that set in when Othman took office. The men who had once fought for a message they believed in were now to be found conspiring against one another for power. Two of the main protagonists in this drama, Talha and al-Zobeir, became major landowners in the aftermath of Islam's early victories. However, the television version does not tell us much about these men's moods, their reactions to the changing fortunes of their society, and their alliances and backroom intrigues. Instead, they come across as generally saintly, vaguely above reproach, bland and emotionally distant. We are not given a good explanation for the fact that Talha, al-Zobeir and Aisha, the Prophet's widow, all rose up with such indignation and resolve against the fourth caliph Ali, or why they blamed him so ferociously, and somewhat unfairly, for the death of his predecessor. When the fighting breaks out, it seems to come out of the blue. There is no prior negotiation, no procrastination, no warning, even. When the two armies meet in what became known as the Battle of the Camel �ê" Aisha accompanied the troops, riding on a camel �ê" it can seem to viewers as if the whole thing was a mistake. Apparently the warring parties just had too much love for each other. At one point in the drama, we see the first Umayyad caliph Moawiya shedding tears over the death of the fourth caliph Ali. Moawiya mourns Ali's death even as he accepts the oath of allegiance from the inhabitants of Syria as caliph of all Muslim lands. The fact that others are swearing allegiance to one of Ali's sons elsewhere does not seem to bother him. The scriptwriters portray the Great Sedition almost as a kind of misunderstanding, a plot concocted by such unsavoury characters as Abdallah Ibn Saba, Harqus Ibn Zoheir al-Saadi and al-Ashtar al-Nakhei. The motivations of this evil group are not fully explained. What viewers see are blameless and well-intentioned people on the one hand and evil and shady characters on the other. Although the first are the major players, they are presented as just too good to err. So everything that goes wrong has to be blamed on the minor figures. To be fair, much of this uncertainly may be because the screen-writing process became overly complicated. The show comes across as if it had been written by a committee, with members seeking consensus above all and even at the expense of fact or fiction. The two scriptwriters are said to have rewritten the script six times, all the while being supervised by four scholars of Islamic history. These were apparently called in to keep the narrative acceptable to both Sunnis and Shiites. Despite the caution exercised by the producers, the show drew immense opposition, with some critics wanting it banned on the grounds that it allows the depiction of the Prophet's disciples on screen. Although the show was brave in that it challenged critics on this point, its extreme caution may nevertheless have deprived it of some of the attributes of a good drama. Syrian director Abdel-Bari Abul Kheir cast the show with great care, making sure that the physical attributes of the main characters matched the descriptions to be found in the historical accounts. He also used competent Iranian make-up artists with a solid track record in historical drama. The two main characters are played by Jordanian actors Khaled al-Ghuweiri (al-Hassan) and Mohammad al-Magali (al-Hussein). Both are at the beginnings of their careers, but their performances were quite acceptable. The Syrian actor Rashid Assaf's depiction of Moawiya was riveting, setting high standards for any future dramatisation of this major character from Islamic history. Tunisian actor Fathi al-Hadawi, playing Harqus Ibn Zoheir al-Saadi, was brilliant, and he managed to bring out some of this character's inner contradictions. Jordanian actor Mohammad al-Qabbani as Amr Ibn al-As brought flair to the role of a cunning military leader. He could probably have offered an even wider range of emotions with a better script. Playing Abdel-Rahman Ibn Meljem, the fanatical (khawarej) assassin of caliph Ali, Lebanese actor Pierre Dagher gave a terrific insight into the psyche of a religious fanatic. The Syrian veteran actors Talaat Hamdi and Riyad Wardani, playing pro-Umayyad rebels al-Zobeir and Talha, offered stilted performances in their roles as the two characters, which was a loss to viewers, considering that both are experienced and charismatic actors. Caliphs Othman and Ali were not shown on the screen, out of respect for the ban on depicting leading religious figures, but their voices were played by Hesham al-Heneidi and Karim Mohsen. Syrian actresses Taj Haydar and Lina Hurana played Zeinab and Fatemah, daughters of caliph Ali, in a saintly and subdued manner. Filmed in Morocco, Lebanon and Jordan and blessed with a cast of often brilliant actors, the show had immense potential. However, the producers' evident desire to avoid offending religious sensitivities backfired, and the drama could come across as emotionally stilted and intellectually disappointing. Too eager to please, it failed to nourish. Meanwhile, the company that produced the show has promised more religious biographies in the future. Among the names being contemplated for dramatisation are Hassan al-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, Ahmad Yassin, leader of Hamas, the Ottoman sultan Mohammad al-Fateh, and the Islamic scholar Ibn Taymia. It is to be hoped that these will be treated in a more enticing fashion than were al-Hassan and al-Hussein.
