Regime change in Syria is both a challenge and an opportunity for Iraq, depending on which course the uprising is taking, writes Salah Nasrawi While Sunni Arab governments in the Gulf have been increasing the pressure on Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad, even recalling their ambassadors from the country, Iraq's Shia-led government has decided to stand with the embattled Syrian leader, accusing his foes of trying to divide the country. As indications rise that Al-Assad's tenure in power is drawing to a close, the dispute is threatening to spark a new regional crisis, deepening the sectarian divide and increasing tensions between Al-Assad's main ally, Shia Iran, and its Arab Sunni neighbours. Nothing illustrates the divide in this renewed Middle East conflict better than the sharply divergent stances taken by Sunni Arab countries, led by heavyweight Saudi Arabia and Shia-led Iraq. On the one hand, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar have withdrawn their ambassadors from Damascus after the Arab League and Egypt called for an end to the bloodshed in the country, increasing the regional isolation of Al-Assad's regime. The Gulf nations and Jordan also backed the referral of Syria to the UN Human Rights Council, the moves following a rare public statement by Saudi King Abdullah, who demanded a stop to Syria's "killing machine". On the other hand, Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki has warned that the anti Al-Assad protests "will lead to a new Sykes-Picot", a reference to the 1916 Anglo-French agreement that effectively divided the Arab provinces of the former Ottoman Empire into areas under the two countries' control. Since the uprising in Syria began in March, Al-Maliki has displayed unwavering support for Al-Assad. "The Zionists and Israel are the first and biggest beneficiaries of this whole process," Al-Maliki warned in a speech last Thursday. On Monday, Al-Maliki hailed the takeover of the Libyan capital Tripoli by opponents of the country's leader Muammar Gaddafi as a "revolution", insisting that Libya would not "face sectarian strife" as a result. This was believed to be a reference to the situation in Syria, which is an ethnically and religiously divided country, and a warning to the Arab League not to interfere in the uprising. Last month, Al-Maliki promised a visiting Syrian delegation to Iraq that he would work to cement economic ties between the two countries. Iraq tops Syria's trading partners, with exports totaling some $3 billion last year. Iraq has also invested some $400 million in more than 30 economic projects in Syria. On 2 August, the Saudi-owned Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper quoted Iraqi sources as saying that al-Maliki had offered $10 billion in an economic aid package to Syria, which is facing US-led sanctions, though this was quickly denied by Iraqi officials. However, Al-Maliki's tilt towards Al-Assad has raised questions about the motives behind his backing for the crumbling Syrian regime, which is being deserted by Arab Sunni governments and is facing increasing international pressures to end its violent crackdown on protesters. Many of the Iraqi politicians in power today, including Al-Maliki and the Kurdish president of the country, Jalal Talabani, lived for decades in exile in Syria after being forced to flee Iraq under the regime of former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein. Since the 2003 US-led invasion of the country that toppled Saddam's Sunni-dominated regime and empowered the Iraqi Shias, Syria has sheltered thousands of remnants of the Saddam regime and facilitated the Sunni insurgency in Iraq in order to frustrate US purposes in the country and use Iraq as a trump card in regional conflicts. Hundreds of thousands of Iraqi Shias have been killed, and nearly four million Iraqis have been forced to flee their homes, nearly one million of them to Syria, as a result of the Syrian-backed insurgency which aimed at toppling Baghdad's Shia-led government. Al-Assad reluctantly supported Al-Maliki for a second term in office last year after strong interference from Iran. Al-Maliki's approach towards the crisis in Syria appears to be a pragmatic one, while without completely ignoring its religious and ideological motivations. Syria's disintegration must be a major concern to Iraq, as Baghdad worries that Al-Assad will be replaced by chaos in the country that could spill over the border into Iraq and further destabilise the country. However, Al-Maliki's, and, indeed, the Iraqi Shias', response to Syria's turmoil seems to go beyond concerns at Iraq's increasing destabilisation and reflects growing fears of a geopolitical shift in the region that could undermine Iraqi Shia gains after the downfall of Saddam. Realising that regional politics and the relations between Baghdad and Damascus are complex, Iraqi Shia politicians are trying to use a simple equation: hostile Sunni majority rule in Syria would exacerbate the ever-deepening regional sectarian divide and would certainly be directed against Shia control of Iraq. Over recent weeks, Iraqi Shia spokesmen have been increasingly talking of religious fundamentalists and radical Sunni extremists being behind the uprising in Syria, saying that the country would be divided if Al-Assad's regime falls. A similar warning has come from Tehran, with several Iranian officials saying that Iran will "contribute" to the defense of al-Assad's regime against what one Iranian official described as the "wolves" that are surrounding Syria. Neither Iraq nor non-Arab Iran is likely to want to lose an ally in Damascus, let alone see a hard-line Sunni takeover in Syria. If Al-Assad's minority Alawite-led regime is ousted, then the regional geopolitical balance would be tilted decisively against the Shias and would undercut Iran's growing regional power. The Alawites, a minority group in Syria that nevertheless controls much of the country's politics and military, are a branch of Shia Islam. For Iraqi Shias, the looming dangers are even greater. If Syria is divided into different ethnic entities after Al-Assad falls, a large chunk of the country is likely to go to the Sunnis, who might attract neighbouring Iraqi Sunni Arabs to join them in a larger Sunni state. Iraqi Shia officials dismiss suggestions that their strategy in Syria is based on sectarian considerations or pressures from Iran, and they point to efforts by key Sunni states, mainly Turkey and Saudi Arabia, to forge a broader regional Sunni alliance that can strike against the Shias' newly acquired empowerment in the Middle East. Such officials argue that Saudi Arabia and other Gulf governments do not share the democratic ideals that have been behind criticisms of Al-Assad's crackdown on the protesters in the country, and they accuse these governments of having helped Bahrain to crush a Shia-led pro-democracy uprising in the small Gulf state this spring. Meanwhile, Saudi officials have maintained the kingdom's traditional diplomacy of silence. However, some pro-government commentators have unveiled what may be the Saudi mindset on Syria's future, writing this week in Saudi-owned newspapers about the need to forge "a Sunni Crescent" following the downfall of Al-Assad's regime. Jamal Khashoggi, a columnist close to the Saudi royal family, said that regime change in Damascus should promote a new alliance that would include Turkey, the new Syria, Jordan and the six Gulf nations, all of which are Sunni dominated. The new grouping "will be showered by good [things], regional cooperation and free trade," he wrote in the Saudi-owned Al-Hayat newspaper on Sunday. This might not amount to a policy proposal, but if it is endorsed by planners it could be aimed at countering the much-talked-about emergence of a powerful "Shia Crescent" running from Iran through Iraq and Alawite-ruled Syria to Hizbullah-controlled Lebanon following the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq. However, the "Sunni Crescent" idea seems more of an attempt to address the Syrian uprising from a Sunni standpoint than of helping Syrian pro-democracy protesters to get rid of Al-Assad's regime. Isolating Iran, Arab Shias in Iraq and Shias in other parts of the region would also be a recipe for destruction. Two mutually suspicious crescents would add little light to the darkening spectrum of an ethnically divided Syria and Iraq. On the contrary, they would create a tide of geopolitical shocks that would invite the possibility of more disasters to come for the entire region. A meticulous reading of Al-Maliki's remarks reveals that the Iraqi Shias will not be prepared to pay the bill for deposing al-Assad and creating a Sunni-dominated regime in Syria or seeing the country divided along sectarian lines. On the contrary, they may still have some tricks up their sleeves, and they may be prepared to use them should they be pushed into a dangerous dilemma, especially one of choosing between Iran and the Arabs. For this reason, the Syrians should be left alone to decide the course of the anti Al-Assad revolution, and they should be allowed to pursue their aspirations for democracy without interference from outside. The Syrians should avoid being trapped in sectarianism, as happened in neighbouring Iraq after Saddam's ouster. Instead, they should be helped to introduce a genuinely democratic and pluralistic political system in the country that could serve as a model for the Iraqis themselves.
