A new study charts how the Muslim Brotherhood largely pushed itself to the fringes of society, writes Galal Nassar from Alexandria A recent study of the Muslim Brotherhood suggests that the group is increasingly leaning towards more puritan interpretations of Islam. The author of this study, Hossam Tammam, argues that Wahhabism (the 19th century Islamic movement still popular in Saudi Arabia) and Qotbism (the militant ideas of mid-20th century Egyptian scholar Sayed Qotb) are now dominant in both the Muslim Brotherhood's thinking and organisational structure. His study, "The Brotherhood Embraces Salafism: The Erosion of the Brotherhood Thesis and the Ascendance of Salafism within the Muslim Brotherhood," appears in the first edition of Marased (Watchtowers), a periodical published by the Future Studies Unit of the Bibliotheca Alexandrina. The Brotherhood, Tammam says, has undergone the biggest organisational shift since the 1950s and 1960s, especially after the victory of conservatives in internal elections the group held in late 2009 and early 2010. With the conservatives in full control of the Brotherhood, the group's ideology is also undergoing a profound change. The Muslim Brotherhood has been drifting towards Wahhabism since the early 1950s, when the Salafi trend rose in reaction to the repression of the Nasserist campaign. One reason for this was that many Brotherhood members fled Egypt to Saudi Arabia, the historic hub of Wahhabi Salafism. The trend was to continue during the 1970s, when the growth in the Saudi economy led to the rise of religious conservatism around the region. It's not that the Brotherhood was against Salafism to start with. Hassan El-Banna, who founded the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1920s, described the group as "a Salafi appeal, a Sunni method, a Sufi experience, a political organisation, a sports gathering, a scientific and cultural association, and economic enterprise, and a social idea." The above definition makes it clear that the Brotherhood thought highly of Salafism. And yet, its original understanding of Salafism doesn't tally with today's definition of the term. The Brotherhood, let's not forget, was an inclusive group, one that sought to unite rather than to divide, inspire rather than dictate. Significantly enough, the group in its early days also advocated Sufism as part of its theoretical and educational practice. Tammam argues that the Brotherhood was inspired initially by the reformist ideas of Salafism as espoused by Sheikh Rashid Reda. This brand of Salafism was inclusive and flexible in its approach to religious rituals and textual interpretations. Also, in its early days, the Brotherhood was pan-Arab in its orientation, which meant that it was particularly respectful of non-Muslims, as they were an integral part of the country and the region. El-Banna was particularly clear on this point. The traumas of the Nasserist era, Tammam contends, contributed to the rise of Salafism. The first wave of Salafism occurred when the Brotherhood fled Egypt in 1954, following the first clash with the regime. Saudi Arabia offered them safe haven, and often enough passports. The second wave of Salafism occurred in the 1970s. As Brotherhood members became acclimatised to Saudi traditions, their brand of Islam became more puritan than was the case back in Egypt. And their ranks were soon to swell. For when Anwar El-Sadat released thousands of Brotherhood members from prison, many left for Saudi Arabia, where it was easy for them to find jobs and feel accepted. The rise of oil wealth, as it attracted a lot of workers from Egypt, reinforced this trend. The open-door policies of Sadat, with its stress on financial success, encouraged Egyptians to seek employment in Gulf countries, where religious conservatism was the norm. Egypt had its own Salafis for decades before that. The Ansar Al-Sunna (supporters of the prophet's traditions) group espoused a brand of thinking that closely resembled that of the Wahhabis. Hamed El-Fiqi, the group's founder, was the first to import Wahhabi thinking to Egypt. Eventually, Ansar Al-Sunna preachers became quite popular at university campuses. And the Salafi library of Mohebeddin Al-Khatib in Cairo offered ready material for many college students of this generation, who often reprinted the books and sold them at nominal prices. Having suffered at the hands of the Nasserist regime, the Brotherhood needed new blood, and began to court college students, especially the followers of various Islamist groups. The newcomers to the group brought their Salafi doctrines. So by the late 1970s, the Brotherhood's thinking became more puritan than any time before. In the post-Camp David Egypt of the 1980s, a fair amount of crossbreeding took place between the Brotherhood and the Salafi movement. Mostly, the Brotherhood brought organisational structure to Salafism, whereas the Salafis infused the Brotherhood with their newfound puritanism. Consequently, two sub-currents in Salafism surfaced. One is a Qotbi current espousing the Jihad strain of Salafism seen in the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood led by Abdallah Azzam. The other is the Sahawi (revivalist) current seen in the Syrian Brotherhood led by Mohamed Sorour Zein Al-Abidin. The latter, in particular, maintained the Brotherhood tradition of involvement in public work while borrowing liberally from the Salafi thinking of the Wahhabis. The rise of the Gamaa Islamiya and the Jihad also had their impact on the Brotherhood, reinforcing a militancy that was mostly short-lived and tentative. Tammam believes that the changes in the religious and political scene in Egypt in the 1990s left a lasting mark on the Muslim Brotherhood. The group was particularly weakened by a government clampdown on Brotherhood- led labour and trade unions and the confiscation of Brotherhood-run companies. Meanwhile, the Egyptian religious scene was becoming more tolerant of Salafism. As the mainstream largely embraced stricter forms of religiosity, the Brotherhood had to keep up. Salafi preachers became all the rage, and Brotherhood- affiliated preachers benefited from the Salafi-friendly media and the attendant boom in Islamist websites and television programmes. Some became talk show hosts, whereas others appeared regularly on cultural and religious programmes. As a result, the Brotherhood drew closer to Salafism. A Salafi component began to assert itself within the Brotherhood. This wasn't a development with which all Brotherhood members agreed, and some of them felt alienated as a result. This created some tensions within the Muslim Brotherhood, with the Qotbis demanding a stricter interpretation of the letter of Islam. As Brotherhood organisers tried to maintain unity within the group's ranks, the gap between the conservatives and the reformers continued to grow. In the Brotherhood's internal elections of 2008, reformists within the group expressed the concern that their organisation was being "hijacked" by the Qotbi current. Their evidence was not hard to see: the supreme guide and two of his three lieutenants are ultra-conservatives. The Brotherhood, the author argues, is becoming too conservative to be inclusive. The resurging Salafism, with its obsession with outward piety, is generally unappreciative of the arts and literature. According to Tammam, the Brotherhood has changed from a group that "wished to reclaim Islamic identity from the Wafd Party in the 1930s and 1940s to the concept of hakimia [theocracy] in the face of state and society in the 1970s, to a defender of public morality in the 1990s, to a proponent of exclusive orthodoxy today." The Salafis may not be dismissive of political participation, but they miss its point. As a result, Tammam says, they "will throw confusion into political doctrine... and hinder the progress of the Brotherhood in the coming years." Interestingly, Tammam doesn't blame the rising Salafism on the Wahhabis. He says the trend is a natural outcome of the course Egyptian society has been taking for years. The Egyptian brand of Salafism maintains certain traces of the pluralism, openness, and social vitality that are still alive in Egypt, despite setbacks. Tammam expects the Muslim Brotherhood to lose much of its flexibility due to its new orientation. In particular, it will be unable to maintain diversity in its ranks for long. As the Qotbi and Salafi doctrines prevail, the Brotherhood may have to spend much of its energy on cultural indoctrination. To put it briefly, the Brotherhood is drifting farther from its original goal. The organisation that once had an ecumenical appeal is now hindered by its own ideology.
