Variations on a vision

Egyptian-American friendship is fraught with areas of tension. Abdel-Moneim Said* explores the dynamic in the light of Mubarak's visit to the US
For the last 25 years, President Hosni Mubarak has paid annual visits to the United States -- first as vice president and then as president. While his early visits were intended to foster the strategic relationship established by his predecessor, President Anwar El-Sadat, in the wake of the October War in 1973, Mubarak made his own mark with his subsequent visits as president.
Certain visits -- such as those which took place, for instance, in the wake of Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 -- stand out as particularly significant, having coincided with critical junctures and thereby testing the durability of the US-Egypt strategic relationship.
President Mubarak's most recent visit to the United States (2-6 March) was no less outstanding, being his first to Washington since 11 September. True, much has happened in the interim, a period which witnessed intensive US- Egyptian interaction on both the governmental and non-governmental levels. A presidential-level meeting, however, remained of special significance, not least in view of the crucial role of the presidential office in both countries, particularly where their major foreign policy and strategic interests are concerned.
The composition of the delegation accompanying President Mubarak attests to the strategic nature of his summit meeting with his American counterpart. Unlike recent visits, the president was not accompanied by Egyptian businessmen, suggesting that economic matters were a secondary focus of the visit.
This was only to be expected in view of the ramifications of the terrorist attacks in America, particularly within the US itself. Indeed, such was the US reaction to this horrific tragedy that it seemed as if the US was dealing with terrorism for the first time. However, the US was well aware that terrorism had spread violence far and wide and at levels beyond which the international community, and the US in particular, was willing to admit or address. Such reluctance on the part of the US was among the complicating factors in Egyptian- American relations before 11 September. Be that as it may, there is little doubt that both countries agree that the question of terrorism touches on their vital interests, though they may diverge in terms of how they perceive it and, hence, on the various avenues available for dealing with it. In this way, the issue of terrorism is similar to other top issues on the Egyptian-American agenda such as Arab-Israeli peace, Gulf security and regional stability.
Egypt has had to contend with terrorism for many years. What began in the late 1970s as a terrorist campaign directed against state officials was transformed into a general wave of terror that claimed, in the period between 1992 and 1997, some 1,300 lives, as well as causing enormous material damage. During that decade, Egypt viewed terrorism as a grave threat to its national security, dealing with it as such in its foreign relations. While the US, at the time, expressed sympathy for Egypt's concerns in this regard, Washington was, nevertheless, unresponsive to Egypt's attempt to create an international anti-terrorism front, as proposed by President Mubarak. The proper vehicle for the establishment of such a front, Mubarak felt, was to convene an international conference on terrorism.
Egypt's call was grounded in the assessment that terrorism had become an international phenomenon, feeding on the disintegration of certain states, most notably Afghanistan, which had become a base for the training and priming of Egyptian terrorists. Washington, while aware of Al- Qa'eda's mounting strength prior to 11 September, nevertheless continued to underestimate the danger posed by this terrorist network and to insist that Egyptian terrorism was homegrown.
The events of 11 September produced a mixed bag in terms of Egyptian-American relations. On the one hand, there has been a measure of rapprochement in the views of the two countries regarding Afghanistan and the danger it posed to international security, and to the security of Egypt and the United States, in particular. The events of last September highlighted the potential threat posed by terrorist organisations operating outside Egypt as well as putting paid to the notion that terrorism was bred on Egyptian soil. Egypt's relentless warnings about the threat of terrorism were shown to be well-justified, and the events of 11 September might have been avoided if Egypt's advice had been heeded. The intensive cooperation between the two countries in the campaign against terrorism, including the war in Afghanistan, has been quite substantial; indeed, considerably more so than either Egyptian or American official sources are willing to admit.
However, as is customary in similar situations, the consolidation of Egyptian-American relations as a result of developments on certain issues opens the way for differences on other aspects. Egypt has continued to focus on the need to detain members of Al-Qa'eda and the Taliban -- whether inside Afghanistan or elsewhere, including on US soil. But the US's approach is different. Some of its objectives are directly related to terrorism, as is the case in the search for terrorists in Afghanistan and the Philippines, but others are not. For instance, the US is also pursuing other goals that have always been on its agenda, specifically, launching a strike against Iraq.
Another matter linked to terrorism is the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, which has reached new heights since the Al-Aqsa Intifada erupted on 28 September 2000 -- that is, almost a year before the attacks on the US.
Egypt perceives a close relation between the two issues: the continued repression of the Palestinian people by Israel provides Islamist groups with the opportunity to recruit extremists and direct them to commit acts of terrorism -- regardless of whether they serve the Palestinian cause. Consequently, solving the Palestinian problem would not only help to overcome a major area of contention that has divided Egypt and the US for the past 25 years, but would, according to Mubarak, reduce the threat of terrorism by as much as 50 per cent.
However, the US insists that any attempt to identify the root-causes of terrorism is tantamount to legitimising it. It also refuses to distinguish between terrorism and legitimate acts of resistance to foreign occupation, as in the case of the Palestinians. According to Washington's thinking, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is a separate issue that predates the terrorist threat currently faced by the US. In addition, the US, for domestic political reasons, is unwilling to undermine its relationship with Israel.
For the US and Egypt to agree to fight terrorism and to cooperate in such a war does not necessarily mean seeing eye to eye at the strategic or overall level. Clarifying this point was quite likely the motive for Mubarak's latest visit to Washington.
So far little has been disclosed about the discussions that took place in Washington, or about the extent of strategic agreement that the two sides reached regarding terrorism and other matters of shared interest. It seems, however, that nothing spectacular happened and that the meetings comprised the usual exchange of viewpoints, where each party gains a better understanding of their counterpart's basic assumptions, interests and approaches.
While the two parties may have come to the meeting with different motives, they face similar challenges. This situation allows for the possibility that they might accept that each should take different measures to achieve ends that are in their mutual interests.
The fact that both sides are committed to moving forward in the fight against terrorism serves to strengthen their ties. Although both sides continue to approach the Arab-Israeli conflict differently, their agreement to launch a joint effort based on the Saudi initiative has the potential to provide them with greater scope for manoeuvre. Mubarak's suggestion for holding a meeting between Ariel Sharon and Yasser Arafat was a well- calculated proposal by a seasoned statesman. In proposing the meeting, Mubarak was putting Sharon to the test before international public opinion, fully aware as he is of the Israeli premier's determination to get rid of Arafat. Sharon's rejection of the meeting would thus expose his rejection of the peace option.
As it happened, Sharon's rejection of Mubarak's invitation obliged Washington to issue stronger statements criticising his policies and to send US special envoy Anthony Zinni to the region.
Finally, the US and Egypt differed on the question of Iraq, although they agreed that the Gulf country should comply with international resolutions for the return of UN inspectors.
Because some of the perpetrators of the 11 September attacks were Egyptians, the attacks tarnished Egypt's image in the eyes of the American public, media and Congress. This problem was further exacerbated by certain research centres and writers who alleged that the Egyptian regime's actions were a cause of terrorism. Mubarak's visit not only explained Egypt's role in combating terrorism and in helping the US in its war against Al- Qa'eda and the Taliban, but shed light on the collective responsibility of all countries to stand up and fight terrorism.
* The writer is director of the Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies.
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