Talks in the Egyptian capital between Palestinian factions underscored the political weight of Hamas. Khaled Meshal, head of the movement's politburo, spoke to Amira Howeidy in Cairo about current dangers and the need for a 'frame of reference' The fact that Hamas's politburo chief Khaled Meshal and the Palestine Liberation Organisation's (PLO) second man, Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazin), recently met for the first time was very telling of the political map that shapes Palestinian decision-making today. The pair came together last week in the Egyptian capital within the framework of Cairo's three-month-long effort to convince Palestinian resistance factions to unilaterally declare a cease-fire for one year. The efforts culminated last month when 12 representatives of the main Palestinian factions gathered during 24-27 January for the first time in 20 years to discuss Egypt's proposal. By default, Abu Mazin, who headed the Fatah delegation (Palestinian President Yasser Arafat's faction) and supported the cease-fire initiative, also represented the PLO. But that wasn't enough. Cairo knew it, the Palestinian Authority (PA) knew it and the rest of the factions knew it. Hamas and the equally radical resistance group, Islamic Jihad, had to approve. They didn't, and the talks "failed". This might have been bad news for Cairo and the PA, but not quite so for Hamas, which is enjoying a new status that has been in the making over the past two years. Recent polls show that the resistance movement's popularity has surged with the Palestinians over the past year to 29 per cent from only nine per cent during Oslo. Hamas is increasingly being acknowledged as a major force in Palestinian decision-making -- as demonstrated in the recognition it's receiving from Arab regimes and even the Europeans. In the background, a weakened PA is forced to accept this new reality, which it had denied in the past, hence the significance of Abu Mazin's first face-to-face encounter with Meshal. The fact that Abu Mazin quickly departed Cairo when the talks wrapped up, while Meshal stayed for an additional two days and met with some members of the media as well as various official and independent Egyptian figures is probably no less significant. Meeting the 47-year-old Hamas leader proved difficult, but possible. His media-friendly delegation was receptive to persistent requests to meet the politburo chief, whose ultra hectic schedule coupled with high-level security precautions meant that I had to wait more than two hours in a Heliopolis hotel lobby until I was able to conduct my scheduled interview. Meshal, who survived an assassination attempt in Amman in 1997 by Israeli Mossad agents, is predictably security conscious and his Egyptian hosts made sure his protection was secured. In order to conduct his meetings, Meshal was taken from an undisclosed location in Cairo to the hotel in Heliopolis for a few hours, where he held meetings in a room full of young bearded members of Hamas. Egyptian intelligence officers secured the entire floor and searched Meshal's visitors in an adjacent room. In a 20-minute interview with Al-Ahram Weekly, Meshal outlined his view of why he thinks the Cairo talks were not actually a failure, the need for a Palestinian "point of reference" in "political decision-making" and why the resistance will continue. Meshal insisted that progress was achieved in the Cairo talks, although he expressed regret that this progress was not translated into a document of final communiqué. Much was achieved, the Hamas leader said, "in the bilateral talks, or the Palestinian-Palestinian talks, in the three main spheres: the political programme; managing the struggle; Palestinian unity and rearranging Palestinian affairs and finding or agreeing on a frame of reference to manage Palestinian political decision-making." "We didn't agree on all the details, nor did we develop a joint vision", the politburo head said, "Yet we did go a long way, and our brothers in Fatah felt this progress more than anyone." Meshal blamed the failure to produce a communiqué on ambiguous "considerations related to the internal Palestinian structure and the divergent positions of the factions that attended the meeting." Asked if Hamas would meet the Egyptians again on 4 February, as had been scheduled, in order to provide a final response to the Egyptian initiative for a one year truce, Meshal avoided a clear answer. Instead he explained that during Hamas's bilateral talks with Cairo that preceded the 24-27 January meeting, "Egyptian officials showed an understanding of our position [regarding the truce]. In return, we are highly appreciative of the motives behind the Egyptian position in taking this initiative [but] the dialogue was based on the idea [of a truce] itself; its feasibility and implementation. In light of the previous talks and the recent Cairo talks last week, we found -- as did the Egyptians -- that there is need for more time to allow this issue to mature. What will be the outcome of all this? Only God knows. I can't rush into the outcome now." The 4 February meeting didn't come to pass, having been "postponed". In any case, he stressed, "We are keen to hold on to the rights of our people, the resistance and our right to defend ourselves. We are keen on the Palestinian-Palestinian understanding in combating the Zionist danger, the occupation and defending our people. We are also very keen on Arab coordination, at the lead of which is Egypt, because this is necessary to face the dangers that threaten our cause." But why is Hamas negotiating a truce it knows it won't accept, given that Israel showed no willingness to reciprocate? "Well, we weren't the ones who initiated the [cease-fire] negotiations," Meshal was quick to reply. Nonetheless, Hamas did agree to participate. "Yes, we responded to a dialogue with Egypt on that issue, for two major reasons. First, there is, obviously, our sense of danger, and we agree with Egyptian officials that there is a danger. There is a danger now, which is the Zionist danger and [Israeli Prime Minister Ariel] Sharon's violence against our people, and there are imminent dangers -- and these are grave. So we're aware of the danger at this stage. This in itself is an impetus for us to conduct a dialogue with the others [Palestinian factions]. We don't have to agree with them, but dialogue is essential -- especially in difficult times. "Second, the Palestinian question requires a Palestinian-Palestinian understanding, as well as a Palestinian-Arab understanding, and Egypt is the gateway for the Arabs, because of its weight." This much-needed dialogue, Meshal explained, "doesn't necessarily have to be on the basis of us saying 'yes' or 'no', but needs to start from an understanding of what we agree on and what we don't. This allows the dialogue to focus on areas of agreement and will be in the interests of the Palestinian people. Ultimately it should allow for a clearer vision and clearer decision-making." But Hamas's participation in all the stages of the dialogue, from bilateral talks with Fatah and Cairo last November to the all-factions January meeting, prompted some criticism about its motives. Did Hamas, as some observers contend, take part in the dialogue to improve its position within the Palestinian factions? "This is not true. The Palestinian-Palestinian dialogue has been going on for years," Meshal said. "We are, of course, keen on our relations with Egypt. Part of Hamas's philosophy is maintaining good relations with Egypt and all Arab and Islamic countries because the Palestinian question cannot be separated from the Arab and Islamic nation." He shrugged off widespread speculation that Hamas was poised during the talks to agree to one of the three formulas presented for a cease- fire arrangement under which Palestinian groups would not target citizens inside the 1948 borders of Israel. "This was proposed by the movement itself and by others in the past, but the Zionist enemy did not respond with any level of seriousness. The enemy treats the Palestinians like they're a people that doesn't deserve to live -- that has to be excluded and expelled from its land. This is why we stopped including this in our initiatives or programmes. But in the course of a dialogue with Egypt, we will discuss all the options and choices, but this is within this context which means its not Hamas's platform." Although the truce was the most important item on the table, at least as far as Cairo and Fatah were concerned, other issues were discussed at length, perhaps for the first time. Topping these was what participants called the "Palestinian frame of reference" -- the euphemism for the legitimate and elected leadership of the Palestinians, as contrasted with the de facto leadership by the PLO. During the talks, the issue of whether Hamas would be willing to join the PLO was discussed, but never resolved. Asked if Hamas had made up its mind on this matter, Meshal wouldn't give a 'yes' or 'no' answer. He was willing to point out the "progress" made on that front, but wouldn't describe his group's reluctance as "reservations" about the PLO. "We don't have reservations per se, but rather a different vision. We need a point of reference for the Palestinian political decision- making. No one should have the exclusive right to Palestinian decision-making. Decision-making has to include all the factions and express a real Palestinian decision. And we are keen to be part of this Palestinian decision-making. It's true we are not part of the PA, and our position is to not be a part of it for obvious political considerations. We are insistent, however, about our right to be part of the frame of reference of Palestinian political decision-making." Hamas, however, expressed readiness to study the option of joining the PLO, as long as it rebuilds "on a political and democratic basis that allows the participation of all." In other words, "We haven't made a decision on the matter yet -- but we also haven't ruled out participation either." But how serious is the PA about making space or recognising Hamas's demand to be part of the decision-making, many are asking. As far as Meshal is concerned, "I assume everyone is serious and I don't question intentions." The "battle is fierce", he said, "and it's affecting everybody: the PA, the opposition, the resistance factions and Fatah, because we are facing an enemy that does not distinguish among factions in the end. We are, thus, in the same battle together, which is why we have to agree politically in order to pursue our path. Despite our political differences, we share almost the same goals. If you ask any Palestinian what he wants in the end, it will be regaining his land and rights, ending the occupation, having sovereignty over his land, establishing a free state on the land, living peacefully and in unity." But even if the PA accepts Hamas as a partner in decision-making, Israel and the US might not be so welcoming, observers warn. For Meshal, that's a problem for Israel and the US. "We won't be in the PA because we don't want to be. However, regardless of the views of the US and Israel, we are part of the Palestinian decision- making process. Yes, Hamas isn't officially part of the framework, but practically and because of its performance on the ground and its weight, it is represented in Palestinian decision-making. This was illustrated by the [recent] Palestinian- Palestinian dialogue and Hamas's relations with Arab regimes and the Europeans. The Europeans are now convinced that they can't overlook Hamas in any steps they pursue on the Palestinian track. In short, we are able to impose our will on others, because we don't impose it for political gains, but for the interest of our people." Meshal is worried, however, that the expected war on Iraq will impact heavily on the Palestinians. Sharon might be given a "free hand" against the Palestinians, and "he might carry out massacres, transfer the Palestinians or invade Gaza," he said. The Israeli army is expected to escalate its crackdowns on resistance factions, and tighten the curfew further so as to starve the Palestinians. "There is also the possibility of an impact on the PA itself -- perhaps even the expulsion of Arafat. All this is possible." But, he said, as he sat up in his chair and his voice became more assertive, "There is, however, a Palestinian will that will prevent Sharon from executing his plans. Transfer will fail because our people now are different from 1947 and 1948." He also cites other "indirect" threats emanating from a war on Iraq, such as the distraction of neighbouring countries like Saudi Arabia, Syria, Iran, Lebanon and "even Egypt" from their responsibilities towards the Palestinian question. "And we're warning of this." But Meshal, who has become a symbol of the Islamist resistance, is not remotely ready to compromise his group's "constants" under any circumstances, even if a war on Iraq is the worst war in modern Arab history. "Despite all this, we have the choice and the will. We are steadfast in our will to fight and resist and we won't succumb to this difficult reality that has been created by the US and the Zionist entity," he said just before rising from his chair to leave.
