The attempt by Arab intellectuals to forge a "new cultural discourse" focussed too much on reforming religious ones, writes Amina Elbendary Flipping through the programme on Tuesday, the first day of this three-day event that so characterises the mandate of the Supreme Council for Culture, it was impossible not to be struck by how many references there were to religious discourse. And indeed, the final resolution would point to "re-reading heritage" as a starting point of any new renaissance. The very fact that reforming/renewing religious discourse was on the agenda of the Arab Intellectuals' Conference is something that merits attention; indeed, it was among the objections of several intellectuals who attacked the conference, including the Algerian Al-Taher Wattar who issued a statement questioning why intellectuals, who are not jurisprudents, were being asked to discuss such matters. The irony was that the custodians of religious discourse, the clerics, jurisprudents and Azharites -- not to mention, priests, bishops and archbishops -- were excluded from the discussion. At the roundtable discussing "Renewing religious discourse" held last Wednesday and chaired by Minister of Awqaf (Religious Endowments) Hamdi Zaqzouq, the hall was brimming with participants and attendees. But Zaqzouq, representative of a quasi- secular government, was the only person with any contacts with the religious establishment. In response to a comment from one participant about just that point, the minister's only remark by way of elucidation was that the organisers had invited Islamist thinker and lawyer Mohamed Selim El-Awwa, and Professor of Political Science Heba Raouf to the roundtable but both had apologised. El-Awwa and Raouf would not, however, be the faces one would automatically expect as representatives of the religious establishment. Did these panels and roundtables, then, constitute an attempt to bypass the religious establishment in reforming religious discourse? While the idea that the religious establishment -- for years symbolised by Al-Azhar and its various institutions -- does not have a monopoly on religion or religious discourse, is to be hailed, just what benefit there derives from totally excluding them is far from clear. The participants -- secular intellectuals for the most part, peppered by those who might comfortably be called "Islamist intellectuals" such as Gamal El- Banna or even Hassan Hanafi, the philosopher and ideologue of the Islamic left -- seemed to see eye to eye on several matters. Firstly: the absent others were disastrous to the fate of the nation, they were responsible for the sorry state of thought. Mohamed Abdu, the 19th century reformer, was repeatedly invoked as a role model without really situating Abdu in his political, cultural and historical contexts. But, as Professor of Philosophy Anwar Mughith pointed out, religious reform is as old as history, not a product of modernity. For him, reforming religious discourse is not about bringing other disciplines within the folds of theology, but rather making use of various disciplinary approaches in addressing theology. Poet Ahmed Abdel-Moeti Hegazi's insistence on the separation between state and religion was seen as controversial; an impossible goal for some, an archaic concept for others. Others, like historian Khaled Fahmy, pointed out that the question of who is to reform religious discourse is important, and he was definite "it should not be the state. The state should keep itself out of this process." But can religious discourse be reformed by deconstructing the religious establishment? Equally controversial, perhaps, was Gamal El- Banna's call to resort solely to the Qur'anic text in this project of reform, taking it as a basis for a new jurisprudence. There is no need, he argued, to stick to fundamentals laid down centuries ago. Hassan Hanafi stressed the reintroduction of reason in religious discourse; reason, and not textual evidence, should be the basis of reform. Theology should also reprioritise social welfare and the interest of the community in deciding religious matters, while critic Faisal Darraj appeared to express a general consensus when he argued that religious reform can only come as part of more comprehensive political and cultural reform. Missing from the conference was any thorough discussion of popular religion in modern Arab thought in its Sufist and populist aspects. That is, none of the participants discussed contemporary Sufi thought and practice, even though Sufism, with its more tolerant spiritual worldview, could open new avenues for reviving Muslim thought as it embraces a globalist, post-modern world. After all, in the eras when Islam was expanding East, it was Sufism that more often than not introduced new converts to the religion, its tolerance and flexibility attracting many. Equally absent was any discussion of the concepts of populist religion. It is not enough to dismiss evangelical preachers like Amr Khaled as unlearned. Questions such as what intellectual, cultural, social and economic backgrounds produce such preachers and why they are popular among certain sectors of society were not addressed. As Mohamed Hakim pointed out, fundamental questions like who, what, when and how still need to be raised. What is religious discourse and who produces it; how many mosques are there in a particular country, how many religious tapes and books are produced etc... all are questions awaiting answers. Several participants pointed to the role of the state in encouraging the spread of populist preachers, especially by giving excessive air time to evangelical programmes and others discussing scientific miracles or the interpretation of dreams from allegedly religious viewpoints. Zaqzouq pointed out that upon his recommendation to the Egyptian Radio and Television Union one such programme has already been cancelled. The issue is, however, beyond the programming policies of national television channels given the advent of private satellite channels. Not only was popular Islam ignored; so too Shi'ite Islam, none of whose thinkers, secular or otherwise, were represented, even though a percentage of Muslim Arabs are followers of Shi'ism. Equally absent from the discussion was any reference to religious traditions other than Islam. Christian religious discourse was not on the agenda, though a significant percentage of Arabs are Christian. The only participant in the roundtable who could be representative of Christian discourse is Father Yuhanna Qulta: not one of the main speakers, the only remark he made was to question why Muslims should feel so threatened when Islam was the fastest growing religion in the world. It is sad that these intellectuals did not acknowledge the multiplicity of religious discourse in the Arab world. In so doing they were reproducing old Orientalist ideas that reduce Arabs to a certain definition of Islam and then look to Islam to find what is wrong, with the underlying assumption that when you understand (orthodox Sunni) Islam, you understand the Arabs, and when you reform Islam you can reform the Arabs. As one participant remarked recent calls to reform religious discourse, particularly Sunni Muslim discourse, originate in the US. While organisers such as Secretary-General of the SCC Gaber Asfour or Zaqzouq vehemently denied this "accusation", it formed the subtext of many comments. Professor of Sociology Mahmoud Ismail, in particular, was outspoken in pointing out that what was not acknowledged by the roundtable was that the call to reform religious discourse had come from above, from higher authorities within the state and higher authorities abroad, a direct allusion to US intervention in Arab affairs. Throughout the conference the idea of Arab culture being on the defensive and feeling under siege was pervasive. Critics who boycotted the conference, such as Abdel-Azim Anis, Radwa Ashour, Sonallah Ibrahim, Tarek El-Bishri, Mohamed El- Bosatie and Gamal El-Ghitani did so because of its hasty organisation, its exclusion of many intellectuals and also because it ignored the most pressing issues on the Arab agenda. "There is no mention of the occupation of Iraq, or the daily extermination of the Palestinian people, or the American military presence in the Gulf, or America's schemes to force its hegemony on the region, redraw its borders, culture, media and educational systems," their statement read. The same concern was also cited by Al- Taher Wattar in his statement. Yet even though the organisers chose not to highlight any of these issues by assigning them separate panels they were the subtext of issues such as "freedom of expression and creativity", "the Arab regional order" and -- particularly -- "renewing religious discourse". In limiting the circle of participants to this discussion Arab Intellectuals, presided over by the SCC, could easily stand accused of preaching to the converted. And what hope is there of such exercises initiating any serious reform? It is, however, encouraging that a certain, minimal consensus seems to have developed among the afore- mentioned intellectuals at least: some things have to change and religious discourse, being as pervasive as it is in contemporary Arab culture, must also change -- and fast. The conference, though, hardly suggested how.
