The articles below are translated and abridged versions of two papers on reform in Egypt presented at a conference of the Centre for the Study of Developing Countries at Cairo University, 3-4 May 2004. The articles look at the issue of reform from both a Coptic and an Islamic perspective The Coptic idea United in agreement on the need for reform, expatriate and local Coptic communities remain split on how it should be pursued, writes Sameh Fawzi Political reform is the subject of extensive debate at present, with most people assuming it will lead to improved living conditions. But frequent talk of reform does not necessarily mean that we are heading in the right direction. The past few months make it clear that the concept of reform, despite the intensity of debate, is still ambiguous. Various intellectual and political currents adopt disparate interpretations of it. I fear that we're heading to a point where people are tired of talking of reform, even before they reach a clear understanding of what it means. The intellectuals speak of reform as if on behalf of the entire society, as if everyone has the same reform agenda. This is wrong. Businessmen do not have the same reform demands as workers, to give one example. We have to examine the alternative visions of reform. We have to look at how each section of society wants things to change. We have to know what are the points of agreement and disagreement. To do so, it is essential that we identify the way Coptic intellectuals see political reform. Do Copts have a specific vision of reform related to being Copt, for example? This is an admittedly sensitive matter, for some people are loath to admit that Muslims and Copts do not see eye to eye on all things. Do we need, some would say, to stir up disunity in a society that is politically divided as it is? A good point, but unfortunately unconvincing. Our society is already divided. For the past 30 years or so, it has witnessed an unprecedented sectarian polarisation that has affected the way our elite thinks and acts. There is so much being said about the sectarian dilemma, about the worries of the Copts, that there is no longer any point in overlooking the obvious. The Coptic issue is discussed in other capitals of the world, where Coptic activists speak openly about the legal demands and the problems of the Copts in Egypt. The issue is better examined than ignored. I drafted a questionnaire of 17 points and discussed it with 12 Coptic intellectuals of various ages and political leanings in Egypt and seven Copts living in Europe, Canada, the US and Australia. The questionnaire dealt with three topics: self-image, perception of problems and ideas for reform. Here is what I found. On self-image, my question was: Do you present yourself to the world as a Copt, or as a person with certain political views? Local Copts tended to stress their Egyptianness, refusing to be defined solely as Copts. Expatriate Copts thought of themselves primarily as Copts, or as Copts with certain political and intellectual affiliations. Local Copts were not only careful to stress their Egyptian sense of belonging. They made a point of refuting the charge that they think of themselves primarily as Copts. This is to be expected in the light of dramatic changes in Muslim-Coptic and state-Coptic relations over the past 30 years or so. Those who refuse to identify themselves as Copts first and foremost do not wish to see Copts acting as one solid group on the political scene. This is where local and expatriate Copts disagree. While local Copts refuse to bring forth a Coptic vision for political reform, expatriate ones insist on doing so. Their vision of political reform encompasses demands such as secularism and the separation of religion and state. The latter are issues that have been discussed in this country for quite a few decades. So why do expatriate Copts think of them as Coptic ideas? One answer is because they need legitimacy, they need an agenda that puts them back on the political scene. They have been disconnected from the local scene for too long and need a rallying point of reference. Both local and expatriate respondents agree that Copts suffer on account of being Copt. Copts have two fundamental problems. They are underrepresented in key political and administrative posts, as well as in vital agencies such as the security and intelligence services. Second, they want to see restrictions on the construction and maintenance of churches removed. These two problems have been around for decades. In 1897, a Coptic delegation handed a petition to the Egyptian prime minister and the British high commissioner complaining that Copts were underrepresented in key political and administrative posts. These same complaints were repeated in the statement issued by the 1911 Coptic conference. Despite the show of national unity in the 1919 Revolution, the situation remained unchanged. In 1934, El-Ezabi Pasha, undersecretary of the interior, signed what became known as the 10 conditions for building churches; what can only be described as an act of sectarian discrimination. Zugheib Mikhail wrote a book in 1950, with an introduction by Salama Musa, in which he criticised what many think of as Egypt's liberal era. Not only was church building restricted, radio had no programmes for Copts and when Coptic students applied for fellowships to study abroad they were often passed over, Mikhail noted. Sectarian tensions reared their head again in the 1970s. Since then, much has been written but little has been done. Both local and expatriate Copts agree that the church should not be the one to speak in their name. Secular Copts, acting as equal citizens, are entitled to present the Coptic case. Traditionally, the government tends to take up Coptic matters with the church. Most of the Copts I talked to do not see this as the right approach. The fact that state-run media never tires of speaking of national unity is less helpful than injurious. The sectarian problem has worsened. Before 1952, Coptic politicians were an integral part of the political scene. In the 1960s, Coptic technocrats were in charge of the Coptic dossier. This is no longer the case. Most Copts would like to see a return to the pluralist formula that existed in the country between 1923 and 1952, a formula in which Coptic politicians were visible, effective and part of the fabric of society. Local and expatriate Copts agree that no real reform is happening in Egypt. They demand an end to the state of emergency, freedom to form political parties, a maximum of two presidential terms, with the president elected through direct voting, among other things. The ones I talked to come from liberal as well as leftist backgrounds, but most agree that the Islamist current is incapable of introducing serious reforms. Most also agree that the web of corruption linking business and government is a substantial impediment to reform. The above were the points of agreement. The approach to reform was seen differently by locals and expatriates. The expatriates want the Coptic community to act as one in matters of reform. They see the West as an inspiration and wish to see the locals forge closer links with the outside world. They have little faith in Islamist currents, which is perhaps understandable. What is peculiar is that most do not see the Left as a reliable ally, although the latter has historically and ideologically fought against religious-based discrimination. The locals, meanwhile, do not endorse the idea that the Copts should act as one with regards to political reform. Each Copt, they believe, should act according to his or her own political and intellectual leanings. The locals see reform as mainly a domestic issue, but are not dismissive of outside help in this regard. As such, locals assume a middle position between the expatriates who focus on external factors and the regime that insists that reform is a purely domestic matter. Why do local and expatriate Copts differ on this point? When they speak of reform, local Copts focus on cultural specifics, autonomous momentum and the real needs of society. Expatriates, for their part, have little faith in the vitality of domestic reform, point to reluctance in introducing reform, and see the West as an example worth emulating. Expatriates seem to think that the West has become the sole reliable catalyst of change in the Arab region, from Iraq to Sudan and Libya. They see the current Egyptian regime as susceptible to foreign pressure. The fact that the regime has opened unofficial channels of communication with a number of expatriate activists gave them a sense of power and the impression that they can make a difference. The expatriates believe that they advocate Coptic problems effectively, either through published material or through the work of Coptic societies abroad. With the Internet providing closer access to domestic audiences, the expatriates see their role as one of considerable potential. Local Copts, aghast as everyone else by the course of events in the region since the US invaded Iraq, are weighing matters carefully. On the one hand, they are frustrated at the slow pace of domestic reform. On the other hand, they are sceptical about US ideas of reform. Many local Copts prefer to see internally generated rather than externally inspired reform. For them, the West should entice at best, not interfere.
