Western pressure on the Arab/Muslim world to reform is a thin veneer masking US-Israeli ambitions in the region, writes Hassan Nafaa As one follows the news these days, one cannot help but get the impression that reform of the Arab/ Islamic world is the most pressing concern on the international agenda. It seems that it has become so urgent that you can barely hear, see or read of an event occurring anywhere around the globe without there being some direct or indirect connection made to this issue, as though the fate of mankind now rests on the progress we make on reform. If 11 September 2001 was instrumental in making reform of the Arab/Islamic world an American, and hence global demand, events in Iraq on 9 April 2003 contributed to making it an urgent regional and domestic priority. Nevertheless, upon closer inspection of the current controversy over this issue one cannot help but observe how strongly opposed the American and Arab perspectives are, so much so that one fears a standoff that will bring reform efforts to an absolute standstill. On 11 September a little known, small and poorly equipped organisation managed to deliver a sudden and painful blow to the most important symbols of American might. Because the suspects in this operation were all Muslim and mostly Arabs, it was only natural that the strike would precipitate an upheaval in the way Americans perceive the Arab and Islamic worlds. Naturally, too, the growing power of American neo-conservatives was instrumental in shaping this new outlook, which coalesced around several fundamental tenets. To the formulators of this outlook, the conflict between despotic Arab regimes and their peoples became an American problem when the growing frustration of Arab youth -- whom their regimes had failed to educate and employ -- eventually exploded in the face of the United States on the grounds that it was the country that fostered and supported these regimes. They further held that the events of 11 September lay bare fundamental flaws in the structure of Arab/Muslim culture, and that the only way to remedy these at their roots was through a major modernisation process that could only be accomplished through enormous pressure, and perhaps military action, from the outside. Toppling the regime of Saddam Hussein would set into motion such a sweeping process, which would rid the Arab and Islamic worlds of the rampant corruption and tyranny that breed terrorism and pave the way for the comprehensive restructuring of their political, economic, social and cultural systems. Finally, the US was obviously the most qualified -- and should therefore have the greatest incentive -- to participate in realising this noble humanitarian aim. However, it quickly became apparent that this line of argument was a thinly veiled attempt to exploit the post-11 September climate to further the neo-conservatives' long cherished project for American global hegemony. Nor would the history of suspicious US meddling in the region and growing anti-Americanism due to the mounting tragedies in Palestine and Iraq allay Arab and Muslim scepticism and suspicion of the rhetoric coming out the US. The apprehensions were confirmed with the unveiling the plan for a "Greater Middle East" which Washington put to the G8 summit in Georgia, resulting in a "partnership for progress" and a "plan to support reform" in the "Greater Middle East" and North Africa. On 9 April 2003, US tanks rumbled into downtown Baghdad. One of those tanks hitched up to the towering statue of Saddam Hussein and brought it crashing down. The powerful image confirmed that one of the most brutal and stupidest regimes in Arab history had ended. For those here who had hoped, out of concern for the future of the Arab world rather than for the Iraqi regime, that Iraqi forces would hold out for a little while longer and claim a high enough toll of US soldiers through urban warfare to obstruct American plans, the rapid and reverberating fall of the regime came as a stunning shock. The tremours this sent through the Arab world also gave rise to a new outlook. Although ruling Arab regimes may not be as outwardly odious as Saddam Hussein's, they are similar in substance. These regimes, without exception, are no longer worthy or capable of performing their primary functions -- their failure to safeguard the security of the Arab world was no less dismal than their continued failure to attain a decent standard of living and democracy for their people. These regimes feed like parasites on foreign crises, which they deliberately exaggerate in order to justify their unruly military and security services, which have become their instruments for suppressing opponents at home and perpetuating themselves in power rather than for protecting their societies by deterring threats from abroad. According to this new outlook, it follows that these regimes are responsible for the state of weakness and degradation to which the Arab world has declined, and that change is now an essential prerequisite for the realisation of progress and stability. It also follows that democratisation is no longer a question of choice but an imperative that should be pursued voluntarily from within before it is imposed from abroad. Unfortunately, although at first it appeared constructive, the debate over the causes of what happened in and to Iraq quickly turned into a futile slinging match. On one side are the enthusiasts for change at any price, even if that entails cooperating with foreign forces. On the other are those who reject any foreign invention even if that means perpetuating the status quo. In this heavily charged climate, the former are branded as agents or another "Karzai" waiting for his moment to be catapulted into power from the backs of American tanks while the latter are regarded as political dinosaurs, incapable of fathoming the ABCs of modern government in the era of globalisation. In short, the debate has reduced the question of reform to the choice between local despotism and foreign occupation. Opponents to foreign intervention are painted as willing to tolerate despotism as the lesser of two evils while opponents to domestic despotism are painted as advocates of foreign intervention as the only way to get rid of the local despots. Against this "absurd" face-off, Arab governments opposed to the "Greater Middle East" scheme project themselves as standing in solidarity with the opponents to foreign intervention. In fact, however, they are desperate to forestall change at any price, even if it means bringing the entire temple down on all our heads. Meanwhile, sincere advocates of reform have retired into silence for fear of being accused as CIA agents and facilitators of the advancement of the "Greater Middle East". Perhaps this is exactly what the US wants, because it knows only too well that any true reform will work against its interests -- and against those of its ally Israel -- in the Middle East. One can only fear for the future of real reform in the Arab world when one takes a close look at the documents that came out of the G8 summit, especially the "Declaration of Partnership for progress and a shared future with the broader Middle East and North Africa" and the "G8 plan for supporting reform". These documents were much more focussed on re-assuring "cooperative" Arab governments -- especially those present in Sea Island -- than they were on addressing the actual and active proponents of change in the Arab world. Filled with quotes from statements issued by Arab official or semi-official conferences on reform, the G8 documents bent over backwards to affirm that the reform the G8 was seeking should come from within Arab countries and could not be imposed from outside. Nor did the documents offer much that was new, since the "cooperation" or "partnership" programmes they touted were almost word for word repetitions of previous programmes, such as that signed with the European Union. This and similar programmes have proven beyond doubt to work more towards perpetuating the current regimes' monopoly over power and wealth than they do towards opening the avenues for the type of reform their peoples aspire to. The only new element in these documents was the article providing for the creation of a "forum for the future", which was defined as a "ministerial framework for dialogue and sustained interaction on political, economic and social reform". This new element is even less re-assuring. Under this provision, Arab governments will be expected to present to the G8 an annual accounting of the "reforms" they instituted, in exchange for which the G8 will issue them certificates of good behaviour. In other words, Arab governments are now more accountable to the world's board of directors than they are to their own people. In view of the crisis of trust between the people of the Arab and Islamic worlds and the G8 and the US in particular, this development does not bode well. Such considerations confirm for me that Washington's clamour for the reform of the Arab world reveals an ulterior motive. By intimidating Arab and Islamic governments that are long passed their validity dates into accepting an American mandate, the US hopes to keep up the pressure to force them to make the necessary concessions in favour of Bush's project in Iraq and Sharon's project in Palestine. That some Arab leaders attended the conference in Georgia and others refused to go was only further proof that true reform in the Arab and Islamic worlds was the greatest, if not the only, loser in that conference. Those Arabs who went to the conference were hardly the greatest enthusiasts for reform and those who did not were hardly the staunchest opponents of American and Israeli designs in the region.
