With notable achievements behind it, it is now time for the Intifada to look honestly at its failings as well as its strengths, writes Samir Ghattas* Had this year's commemoration of the anniversary of the outbreak of the Palestinian Intifada been less noisy and more contemplative it may well have been less emotive, but it would certainly have been more effective. That a historic phenomenon such as the Intifada should enter its fifth year without the slightest reflection on the lessons of the past four is strange. And while it is self-evident that if the Intifada does not take advantage of occasions of these sorts to engage in an earnest process of introspection it may be no worse off, neither will it acquire the strength necessary to progress. The task of introspection is not easy. There is insufficient space in the press for the necessary exchange of ideas and, more significantly, a notable lack of self-criticism in Palestinian and Arab political life. Yet I would suggest that one of the major causes of the Palestinians' current plight resides in the persistency with which their leaderships have avoided this process of introspection, not just now but throughout the history of the Palestinian resistance movement. They were too busy engaging the enemy, they always claimed. Or worse: critical re-assessment would weaken the commitment to the Palestinian cause and play in the hands of Israel. Such contentions blur the distinctions between the cause and its leadership, and between the task of revision and retreat. It is up to the Intifada, as it embarks on its fifth year, to shed this particular legacy, or even rise up against it, in the interests of establishing a tradition of honest, unreserved and unapologetic introspection. This should not be taken as refuting the right of the Intifada, as it engages in a process of self-assessment, to boast of its victories and take pride in its achievements over the past four years. These have, indeed, been many. The Intifada has demonstrated an indefatigable ability to sustain itself against overwhelming odds in its confrontation with an Israeli occupation that has thrown its military might into a relentless attempt to break the will of the Palestinian people. It is useful, here, to recall the ultimatum former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak delivered to Yasser Arafat to end the Intifada within 48 hours. The Intifada continued, while it was Barak -- the most highly decorated general in the history of the Israeli army -- who was consigned to the annals, or should we say waste bin, of history. Sharon has fared no better. His "100 days" plan, followed by his "Gates of Hell" assault, and then dozens of other schemes and military campaigns have all failed in accomplishing their objective, which was to break the Intifada and force the Palestinians to wave a white flag. The importance of the Intifada's durability does not reside in its boosting of morale: it forms the cornerstone of a political process that has engaged itself in a life-and- death struggle requiring the highest levels of self-sacrifice in the process of wreaking the greatest possible attrition upon the enemy. The Intifada has also succeeded in producing profound changes in Israeli concepts and attitudes, especially on the far right. The shifts in Sharon's positions are an example of the effect the Intifada has had on that body of opinion in Israel: they were not the product of flashes of inspiration that struck Israel's prime minister during moments of contemplation on his farm. Rather, they were the product of reality staring him in the face after four years of the Intifada, ceaseless bloodshed and hundreds upon hundreds of victims. Sharon was one of the staunchest proponents of the trend in Israel that rejects out of hand the partitioning of "Eretz Israel". He was originally opposed to the construction of any separating wall on that land, and pitted his full weight behind the construction and expansion of Jewish settlements in the hope of forestalling the creation of a Palestinian state. It was Sharon who said that to dismantle the Natzarim settlement in Gaza was to dismantle Tel Aviv. Four years down the line and Sharon has publicly recognised the need to create a Palestinian state alongside Israel. And it is Sharon who built a wall which, regardless of its illegality, constitutes an admission on his part that it was "time to share this land" and that there had to be fixed geographical limits to Israel, a state that since its foundation has refused to promulgate a constitution so as to avoid having to set borders and halt its expansion into Palestinian territories. In addition, Sharon is the first Israeli leader to have issued a decision to dismantle all the Jewish settlements in Gaza. Throughout Israel, voices demanding disengagement from the Palestinians and the dismantling of settlements have grown bolder. Because of the Intifada the settlers are now more isolated than ever, whatever the clamour and disturbances they are causing in the face of the enormous setback in their expansionist drive. According to the latest opinion poll conducted in Israel (24 September), 69 per cent of the Israeli public supports the plan to vacate all Jewish settlements in Gaza. Contrast that with the time when Golda Meir infamously wondered whether there was really such a thing as a Palestinian people. If the upheavals that have occurred in Zionist thinking are the result of a lengthy process there is no denying that the past four years have intensified this upheaval. The Intifada has also inflicted unprecedented losses on Israel. In terms of human life Israel has sustained more than a thousand dead -- more than during the Six-Day War in 1967. Because of the Intifada the Israeli economy is teetering, with a growth rate of less than one per cent. Its tourist industry has ground to a halt while other sectors of the economy are reeling as a result of plummeting foreign investment. Unemployment is soaring. Israel is more isolated than ever in the international community and even relations with many European countries are severely strained. For its part, Israel complains of a rise in anti-Semitism in many parts of the world, a euphemism for increasingly vehement international criticism of its repressive policies against the Palestinians and its aggressive attempts to suppress the Intifada. But however important the above-mentioned accomplishments over the past four years, it is also necessary to take stock of a number of failures or shortcomings that have yet to be rectified. For example, while the general spontaneity that characterised the first phase of the Intifada was understandable, there was no excuse for allowing this to persist in subsequent phases. Spontaneity breeds chaos, and its offshoots are disintegration and fragmentation. The Al-Aqsa Intifada opened with waves of popular participation, suggesting that it would revive the spirit that had characterised its predecessor. Unfortunately, in the second Intifada mass participation declined with the increasing recourse to arms and reliance on quasi-military resistance tactics. In some Palestinian quarters it is held that this shift in approach was a natural response to the brutal onslaught by occupation forces against defenceless Palestinian civilians. As valid as this argument may appear, it does not explain many important questions raised by the fact that the shift in tactics occurred so early. Given the absence of any critical study of the dynamics of the first Intifada, which relied almost exclusively on non- military forms of civil disobedience and broad mass participation in the resistance, it is impossible to claim with any certainty that the second Intifada's rapid recourse to violence was the only alternative open to the Palestinian people. The Palestinian factions should hold an open forum, today rather than tomorrow, contrasting the aims, means and results of the two Intifadas, thereby laying before the Palestinian people the choices that are available to them in sustaining the resistance to the occupation. This is not to suggest that recourse to arms must be eliminated, but rather that it be subordinate to a clear overall strategy that, above all, rehabilitates the dynamics of popular participation in the resistance. A second issue that needs to be addressed concerns that reading of the Hizbullah experience in Lebanon which has given rise to the widely held notion that it can be cloned and transplanted to Palestine, regardless of the enormous differences between the two situations. On the same list of urgent issues is the question of identifying a front against the occupation. At the outset of the second Intifada the inclination was to give priority to targeting occupation forces and settlers in territories occupied since 1967, a trend voiced by Marwan Barghouti. Hamas and Jihad, on the other hand, prioritised suicide operations behind the Green Line and the targeting of Israeli civilians. In the absence of any commitment to a set of objectives and standards, and with the intensification of rivalries between the Palestinian factions, the distinctions between these two fronts have collapsed and all now appear to be rushing to strap on belts of explosives. The choice of front is not merely a question of military tactics, but raises more important questions that are essentially political. In practical terms, sanctioning the Israeli interior as a battle theatre has worked only to rally Israeli public opinion behind Sharon. Ideologically, it implies that the Intifada is not a means to promote the creation of an independent Palestinian state within the pre-1967 borders, but rather a war to liberate all of historic Palestine, which is not only a futile endeavour that will sap the energies and potential of the Intifada, but a wrong one. The factions would do well to re-assess the notion of targeting civilians from the perspective of purely internal Palestinian political considerations. After more than 125 suicide operations it is now apparent that their sole purpose has been to exact revenge. They are mounted randomly, with little or no thought given to the political objectives they are meant to accomplish. Many other liberation movements have mounted operations targeting civilians in the enemy camp. But such operations were always subject to certain conditions. Their purpose was purely tactical: they were never a general strategy, as has become the case with international terrorist organisations. These operations were strictly controlled by a central leadership which identified the targets, the means and the timing. They have always been linked with a clear political message that the leadership wanted to deliver to the enemy. It is a little known fact that Hamas at one point rejected targeting Israeli civilians and expressed its regrets over the deaths of "innocent people" who had fallen victim to its operations. This policy has fallen by the wayside in the rush of changes that have effected Hamas and other Palestinian factions. It is astounding that it was an Israeli, rather than a Palestinian or Arab leader, who felt compelled to offer the Palestinian resistance some practical advice. In an op-ed piece, Meretz leader Yossi Sarid wrote that Palestinians should concentrate their operations on soldiers rather than civilians, because in that way they will have a greater impact on Israeli society. Focussing solely on military targets would cause deep rifts in public opinion, whereas targeting civilians is counterproductive since it acts to consolidate support behind the rightwing coalition government. Sarid took the opportunity to remind Palestinians of how effective the "four mothers movement", spearheaded by the mothers of four Israeli soldiers killed in Lebanon, was in mobilising popular support for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon. The factions also need to ask themselves a number of questions over their use of paramilitary operations as a means to influence internal Palestinian politics. It is no secret that many operations were timed to undermine the PA rather than to further the objectives of the resistance. The factions should also reconsider the tone of the statements they issue in the wake of an Israeli assassination of one of their leaders, statements in which they usually proclaim they will burn all of Israel and assassinate all the leaders of the enemy. Instead of such ravings, it would be more productive if they examined the causes behind the sharp decline in the scope and scale of the resistance, and considered the possibility that the time has come to set it on a proper course. Similarly, they should also address the question as to why they have tended to ignore the dynamics of the messages conveyed to the international community, especially in light of the impact regional and international developments are having on the Palestinian cause. Suffice to say, the factions have given little heed to something as major as the ramifications of 9/11. It is difficult to join in with the band that is trumpeting the fourth anniversary of the Intifada when the factions have yet to furnish us with a logical and truthful answer as to why they have so far failed to reach a formula for the creation of a single, unified leadership. Are there irreconcilable differences over aims and general strategy or does the failure boil down to a vicious power struggle? It is difficult to imagine how the Intifada will be able to progress through a fifth year in the absence of the kind of unified leadership that is an indispensable condition for achieving any victory or progress. I will touch upon one final point -- the curious absence of any serious and responsible discussion of any plan or project for a political settlement. After four years of the Intifada the leaders of the Palestinian factions continue to react instead of act. That no thought has been given to formulating any Palestinian proposal for a settlement has left the initiative in the hands of others. At present Palestinians have been presented with several initiatives -- the roadmap, the Geneva Agreement and Sharon's disengagement plan. The latter appears to be the scheme that has the best chances of being put into effect. The Palestinian Intifada cannot afford to adopt such a passive position on the question of a political settlement. Rather than concealing this behind the blare of slogans calling upon all to rally behind the resistance, the Intifada must take immediate action to clarify its objectives. It has three basic choices: the creation of a single, modern liberal state for all its citizens, a dual-national state, or the two-state solution. And in the course of clarifying its objectives, the Intifada must also determine whether it will accept any of the above-mentioned plans or, instead, emerge with proposals of its own. The foregoing represents possible starting points for the much needed process of introspection. That process must begin urgently for any commemoration that ignores the need for progress, assessment and self-criticism, is both detrimental to the Intifada and insulting to those who have made such heavy and noble sacrifices on its behalf. * The writer is the director of the Maqdis centre for political studies in Gaza.
