Pundits reacted with horror to the idea that the Arab nation should forge ties with its near neighbours, though the vision is overdue and correct, writes Mustafa El-Labbad* Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa's initiative, unveiled at the Arab summit in the Libyan city of Sirte, to create an "Arab Neighbours League" threw the Arab press into pandemonium. The proposal is still being barraged with criticism from many quarters, even though it appears that the Arab commentators' familiarity with it goes little deeper than the general heading. It also underscored divisions in the Arab world. From the outset, Algeria, Libya, Syria, Yemen and Qatar proclaimed their support while Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the rest of the Arab nations rejected the proposal out of hand. The idea is to create a framework for regional cooperation and mutual defence that would include the countries of the Arab world, Iran and Turkey from Asia, and Senegal, Guinea, Niger, Chad, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya and Uganda from Africa. The countries in the latter group border the Arab world south of the Sahara or are situated along the Nile -- that vital artery for Egypt and Sudan. It therefore seems only logical to welcome these countries into a framework that would serve higher Arab interests. It would simultaneously serve the interests of these countries themselves, which remain individual entities that have been unable to impose themselves as geopolitical forces in the manner of Turkey and Iran. The inclusion of the latter two countries in the proposed league also seems sensible from the standpoint of their markedly increasing influence in and impact on the Arab world, not to mention their deep historic and cultural bonds with the Arab world. Obviously, the two countries should not be placed in a single basket, simply because they border the Arab world. For one, the character of Turkey's policy towards this region is very different from that of Iran. It is, therefore, curious why Arab leaders did not welcome Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's statement approving the initiative only moments after Moussa announced it. Less surprising is the reaction regarding Iran, which many Arab countries fear is acquiring too much power in the Arab world and is using its leverage to drive larger and larger wedges between Arab peoples and their governments. Opponents of the initiative held that it would legitimise Iran's presence in the Arab world and throw open the doors to the expansion of Iranian influence in Arab affairs. This position jars with the fact that many Arab governments are engaged in talks with the Zionist occupation power, which flagrantly scorns international resolutions and violates its contractual obligations with the Palestinian Authority, and seek Arab League resolutions effectively aimed at covering up the scandals of Israeli policy. This inconsistency on the part of the official Arab order is precisely the type of behaviour that lends itself to attempts to turn the initiative into an instrument for broadening the gap between Arab peoples and their governments. If the governments opposed to the initiative wanted to persuade Arab public opinion of their views it would have been better for them to declare their approval of Moussa's proposal up to the inclusion of Turkey, which many regard as a counterweight to Iranian presence in the region, while registering a strong reservation against the inclusion of Iran until explicit conditions and requirements are drawn up to clarify the nature and limitations of the relationship with Iran within the proposed regional framework. However, to totally reject an initiative that takes into account the current balances of power in the region solely on the grounds of concerns regarding the inclusion of Iran forfeits in advance a valuable opportunity for the Arab world to build stronger and closer bonds with its neighbours that will fortify both Arabs and them. Balances of power in the region drastically altered in the wake of the occupation of Iraq. Iran and Turkey have become weighty geopolitical presences and it is pointless to continue dealing with this reality by burying our heads in the sand. We should also recall that the campaign to occupy Iraq passed through Arab land, airspace and territorial waters and that Iranian expansion into this region is the consequence of Arab failures above all. With regards to the inclusion of Iran specifically, we should bear in mind that the reason countries engage in dialogue is to sort out differences. If they agree on everything surely there is no need to parley. Also, talks are a means for one party to influence the other. If the Arabs are correct in boycotting Iran, what alternatives do they have for dealing with the Iranian presence in the region? Although the US administration is currently campaigning to impose tougher sanctions on Iran, deep down it knows that sanctions are not a very effective way to handle the Iranian position on the nuclear question. This is why it is simultaneously considering the alternatives of making a deal with Iran that would recognise and codify an Iranian regional role and delivering a military strike. While the likelihood of the latter option now appears fairly remote, Washington has yet to make up its mind on which course to choose. What should the Arabs do, given their meagre capacities for influencing Washington? Would it not be wiser for the Arabs to engage in talks with Iran now while Tehran is under tremendous strain and facing possible threats than to try to talk with Tehran after it had received America's blessing as a regional power? * The writer is director of Al-Sharq Centre for Regional and Strategic Studies.
