Al-Ahram: A Diwan of contemporary life (601) Behind the doors The 1936 negotiations between Egypt and Britain, which ended in rare agreement, was closely followed by Al-Ahram. The newspaper did not dwell too much on the substance of the talks; that it left to academics. Instead it focussed on the human element of the story. Professor Yunan Labib Riz looks past the details to developments on the sidelines that few people were privy to The many rounds of Anglo-Egyptian negotiations precipitated by the 1919 Revolution advanced to a level of a different order with the Declaration of 28 February 1922, in accordance with which Britain officially recognised Egypt's independence. Independence was not complete, however, for in the declaration Britain retained four prerogatives, which it termed "reservations", and which formed the substance of negotiating rounds over the next decade. All of these collapsed for various reasons. The Nahhas-Henderson talks of 1930, for example, came the closest to an agreement until it ran aground on the question of Egyptian rights to Sudan. It is not difficult, therefore, to see why the 1936 negotiations riveted the attention of contemporary politicians and have been closely studied since by historians of modern Egypt. This was the only round that concluded with an agreement, the first between Egypt and Britain since the British occupation 54 years earlier. Perhaps the best-known work on these negotiations is The Egyptian-British Treaty from the Academic Perspective, by the noted Wafd Party leader Mahmoud Suleiman Ghannam. Among the plethora of other studies on the subject are The History of Anglo-Egyptian Negotiations by Mohamed Shafiq Ghorbal and The 1936 Treaty, a doctorate thesis by Mohamed Farid Hashish. The first of these is noteworthy for having been the first major study on the subject and an indispensable resource for subsequent studies. The second is valuable for its exhaustive treatment of every phase of the negotiating process, beginning from the letter of 12 December 1935 from the national front to the British high commissioner in Cairo to the signing of the treaty in London on 26 August of the following year. Focussed as these and other works were on the diplomatic relations between Egypt and Britain and the give-and-take at the negotiating tables, they accorded little attention to developments and reactions on the sidelines. This is where the contemporary press comes in, especially Al-Ahram which presents a vivid picture of the human side of the story, of which one only gets the scantiest glimpse in academic studies. Therefore, if Al-Ahram can add little to these studies' treatment of the negotiations in Saffron Palace, or the meeting between the negotiating delegations in Antoniades Palace in Alexandria on 12 August 1936 where they signed the military protocols, or the meeting in the British Foreign Office two weeks later where the two parties signed the treaty itself, it has much to contribute with regard to the events that took place on the fringes of these three meetings. The first issue which struck Al-Ahram as odd was the delay in announcing the members of the Egyptian delegation. The composition had already been agreed upon by the members of the National Front; however, at the last moment pressure was brought to bear to add two more members: Abdel-Fattah Yehya and Hamdi Seif El-Nasr. Al-Ahram believed that the additions came as a response to an essential difference in the Egyptian and British negotiating teams. All the members of the Egyptian team, with the exception of one, were civilians. "The British negotiators, on the other hand, are mostly military men. This difference in character is not to be shrugged off lightly. In the courts, vying counsels have the opportunity to reject judicial panels on various grounds. Were this principle to be applied to diplomacy, the Egyptians would reject most of the British negotiators on the grounds of incompatibility with the Egyptian negotiators." The military mindset, in the opinion of Al-Ahram, was, by virtue of training, much more cautious and less willing to compromise. At the same time, the civilian members of the British team were for the most part government employees in Egypt with a vested interest in perpetuating their status and influence. Once the membership of the delegation was set, other preparations had to be attended to. Firstly, there was the task of forming the secretariat. Amin Othman, Mohamed Salaheddin and George Domani were chosen, respectively, as secretary-general, assistant secretary-general and head of the translation and editing department. In addition, Al-Ahram relates, "some members of the delegation asked for personal secretaries, a request to which their colleagues agreed. Mohamed Mahmoud appointed Kamel Abdel-Rahim as his secretary and Ismail Sidqi appointed Ali Murie as his. The rest of the delegation members will rely on the services of the general secretariat." Then there was the question of remuneration. The government appeared ready to entertain a number of possibilities: to pay the delegation members salaries at the grade of minister plenipotentiary, to pay them "representation allowances" calculated at the grade of minister plenipotentiary first class, or to remunerate them for each negotiating session. Wafd Party leader Mustafa El-Nahhas rejected the first alternative "because the negotiators have been charged with a unique national mission," and the third alternative, "because that is the system used by boards of directors of commercial and financial enterprises." It was therefore decided that the delegation members would be awarded a "representation allowance" as minister plenipotentiary first class, which was LE150 a month. Another item of business was the inaugural ceremony. The main reception hall on the ground floor of the Saffron Palace was considered the most appropriate venue, "the upper rooms being too small to accommodate the number of guests, whereas the reception hall can accommodate more than 100 people." Also on the ground floor, a reception room was accorded to El-Nahhas, a second to the rest of the Egyptian delegates, a third to British delegation leader Sir Miles Lampson and a fourth to the rest of the British delegation. The negotiations would take place in another large room on the ground floor. The rooms on the upper floor would serve as offices, one for El-Nahhas, two for the other Egyptian delegation members, two for the British delegation secretaries and the rest for the Egyptian secretariat. It was further decided to allocate three cars and two motorcycles for the use of the Egyptian delegation and two cars for the use of the British delegation. Once these arrangements were established, Amin Othman moved all the relevant documents from the Senate building to Saffron Palace. The bureaucracy of the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian negotiations was now installed in its new headquarters. On 2 March 1936 the members of the two negotiating delegations, senior officials and other dignitaries arrived at the palace for the inaugural ceremonies. El-Nahhas and Lampson delivered the customary addresses, both upbeat and optimistic as expected. A week later, on 9 March, the negotiators held their first session, which was veiled in secrecy as were all the other sessions. The most Al-Ahram was able to learn from the first session was that the two sides agreed to hold talks in Arabic and English, with translators on hand to interpret. The newspaper added that this decision did not rule out the use of French, which most of the members of the Egyptian delegation spoke fluently and which would also be translated into English. Al-Ahram had no alternative but to rely on its special correspondent in London, who would relay the reports in the British press on developments inside the palace that was only a stone's throw away from the newspaper's office in Cairo. Thus, from the Times it learned that in one of its recent meetings on procedural matters the Egyptian delegation ruled out the idea of forming technical committees. "Language difficulties would render such committees unfeasible as many British experts are not sufficiently proficient in French while many of the Egyptian delegation members are not sufficiently proficient in English," Al-Ahram related from the British newspaper, which added, "The Wafd Party wishes, indeed insists that it make up the majority in every committee. Therefore, it has been resolved that technical matters as well as general principles will be discussed by both delegations in full session." From the Observer, it relates that in spite of all the secrecy, the Egyptian position is well-known. The Egyptian delegation would not accept the continued permanent presence of British soldiers in Egyptian cities. Simultaneously, the modifications that the British delegation hoped to introduce into the military protocols that had been agreed upon in the 1930 negotiations would encounter stiff Egyptian resistance in view of the recent events in the Mediterranean. On 12 April, a month after the negotiations began, the Al-Ahram London correspondent reported that the Times had observed that the Egyptian negotiators appeared optimistic. This optimism, according to the British newspaper, had more to do with the general spirit of the negotiations rather than the actual substance. "The willingness of Sir Miles Lampson and his advisors to demonstrate their appreciation for the Egyptian point of view has had a very positive effect on the Egyptian negotiators. They, in turn, have been keen to reciprocate this consideration through the demonstration of moderation so as to better enable the two sides to bridge their differences. If this spirit continues to prevail, the Egyptians believe, the negotiations stand a good chance of reaching an agreement." A week later, negotiations broke for the Easter weekend. El-Nahhas took advantage of the holiday to host an outing for the two delegations to Suez. That occasion, of course, was not cloaked in secrecy, and Al-Ahram seized upon the opportunity to cover this social event. This it did down to the minutest detail, including a description of the menu, elegantly printed in English and embellished with Pharaonic designs. The dishes had clearly been selected and named with the negotiating event in mind: Red Sea fish à l'anglaise, stuffed vine leaves au saffron, Fayoum Turkey à la Kom Oshim, les glaces de success, friendship cheeses and Egyptian coffee. The negotiations resumed -- still behind closed doors -- although it eventually slipped out that an agreement was impeded only by the difference of a military matter. In the 1930 negotiations the two sides had agreed that there would be no further expansion of British military bases in Egypt. Now, the British wanted to retract on that point on the grounds of the growing spectre of war and the Italian presence in Libya. It was rumoured that one of the solutions proposed to overcome the impasse was to upgrade the Egyptian armed forces so as to put them on a preparatory footing in the event of an Italian encroachment into Egyptian territory. Al-Ahram 's source for this rumour was the London Times, which featured a lengthy commentary on the subject. Egyptian nationals, wrote its Cairo correspondent Greeves, had given full range to their imagination. "One effendi suggested enlisting the student classes in the army in order to raise its intellectual and moral standards. Another proposed creating a 50,000-soldier mobile mechanised force supported by air power of commensurate size. A third bek urged that the edifice of the Egyptian air force be crowned with a modern navy. They were also of the opinion that coming up for the expenses for these improvements would present no problem. Once the Capitulations System is abolished, it would be possible to raise LE4 million through tax levies on Egyptians and foreign expatriates alike. Also, if the government needs a large sum of cash to defray the large initial expenses, it can take out a loan against the prospect of the future revenues of the Suez Canal, the concession for which is due to expire in 1968 at which point the Egyptian government will be in a position to purchase this highly profitable enterprise." As acerbic as his tone was with regard to the Egyptians' high hopes for their army, the Times correspondent put his finger on a crucial point. Egypt could afford to spend much more on its armed forces than it was currently spending, and if this money was wisely spent there would be nothing to prevent the creation of a powerful, well-equipped modern army, especially in light of the historical record of this army and the established calibre of its soldiers. As Greeves reminds his readers, this, after all, was the army that had conquered Sudan, achieved an astounding victory against the formidable and tenacious Wahabi uprising in the Arabian Peninsula and had only been kept from the gates of Istanbul and deposing the Ottoman sultan by the last-minute intervention of European powers. Greeves omitted mention that Britain was the driving force behind this European policy. On the calibre of Egyptian soldiers themselves, he observes that they were well clothed, well fed and properly attended to medically. In addition, they were well trained in various military manoeuvres, inculcated with a proper sense of cleanliness and order and demonstrated an impressive degree of physical strength and agility. "They are also reputed for their obedience, poise, courage and stamina." As for the officers, they were dedicated, diligent and concerned for the welfare of the men under their command. Their major shortcoming, in his opinion, was an excessive dependency on orders issued to them from above, which impeded the performance of their responsibilities. In mid-June, it appeared that the negotiators were on the point of a breakthrough on the military issue. According to the Daily Telegraph, the Egyptians acknowledged that Egypt was the gateway separating Britain from the rest of its empire and that this gateway had to remain open. They conceded that 8,000 British forces stationed in the Suez Canal zone were not sufficient to safeguard Egypt's territorial safety and that this army should not be regarded as an occupation force or manifestation of foreign sovereignty but rather as a force for defending Egypt's security and independence. The British, for their part, acknowledged that the Capitulations System was incompatible with the spirit of the age, that sufficient guarantees had to be provided to ensure the efficacy of a new police force and judicial administration, and that Britain should strive to promote Egypt's admission into the League of Nations. On 28 July 1936, the negotiating parties reached an agreement on the military issues. Because of gruelling summer heat, it was thought that this was an appropriate time to move the negotiating centre from Cairo to the Antoniades Palace in Alexandria. There, in that cooler seaside location, the negotiators could initial the points that had been agreed upon, then get down to work on the subject of Sudan. Al-Ahram did not approve of the venue. That luxurious palace, "situated in a garden described by the director of London parks as one of the most beautiful in the world, is not a summer residence in which cool breezes frolic. The government cabinet palace in Bolkly is much more preferable in this respect." The newspaper was even less pleased by the fact that the negotiations were just as firmly closed to the public as they had been in Cairo. The most it could learn was that the negotiators were now focussing on Sudan and that the British had submitted a proposal to the Egyptians offering to share the administration of Sudan with Egypt and to open the doors to Egyptian immigration into Sudan. It was not surprising that, as the newspaper reported, the British governor-general of Sudan, Sir George Stewart Simms, flew to Alexandria to take part in this last round of the negotiations. A few weeks later, the negotiators flew to London to iron out a few remaining details, then hold the signing ceremony in the British Foreign Office. At 4pm on Thursday 28 August, the Foreign Office officially announced that the Anglo-Egyptian treaty had been concluded and that its text would appear simultaneously in the British and Egyptian press the following day. On Thursday evening, Al-Ahram representatives raced to Alexandria airport where a British flight was scheduled to arrive. To their great consternation, there were only 12 passengers on board, none of whom were carrying the official Arabic translation of the treaty. Nor was there any indication that it had arrived in the post the airplane was carrying. After Reuters had broadcast a précis of the treaty at 10am on Friday, Al-Ahram aired its surprise at the fact that the treaty had not been publicised in Egypt simultaneously. "Could it be that the official document that we were awaiting was buried somewhere in the mail bags, and as no one had been informed of this, there it remained in order to be distributed today along with the ordinary mail? Perhaps, this riddle will be solved later in the day." As matters stood, Al-Ahram had no choice but to translate and publish the Reuters summary of the agreement. Among its most salient points were that neither party could pursue a foreign policy or enter into a treaty that conflicted with the Egyptian- British alliance and that in the event of war or international military emergency, Egypt would make available to Britain its ports, airports and transport facilities. The treaty acknowledged that the Suez Canal was an international maritime route that was an integral part of Egyptian territory but also vital to the communications of the British Empire. It would thus be defended jointly by British and Egyptian forces and Britain would have the right to maintain an armed force in the Canal Zone not exceeding 10,000 ground troops and 400 air force troops. Under the agreement, Egypt also agreed to construct additional barracks for British forces in the Canal Zone. These accommodations would come complete with catering and leisure facilities, as well as emergency water supplies. In addition, Egypt committed itself to the construction of a network of roads linking the Canal with Alexandria and Cairo. The British air force would have the right to fly anywhere regarded as necessary for the purposes of training and to prepare the ground for landing strips as it saw fit. The Egyptian army, meanwhile, would have the right to benefit from the advice and training supplied by the British military delegation that London pledged to send to Egypt. On the question of Sudan, it was decided to adhere to the provisions of the agreement of 1899 regarding the administration of Sudan and the appointment of the governor-general. However, Egyptian forces would be attached to the British and Sudanese forces at the disposal of the governor-general who would "study in consultation with an Egyptian officer the necessary number of Egyptian soldiers." The treaty determined that upon ratification the Egyptian government would be responsible for the safety of the lives and property of foreigners on its territory and that the European administration for public security would therefore be abolished. In addition, Britain acknowledged that the Capitulations System was no longer in keeping with the spirit of the age and Egypt's current status. "Therefore, it will support Egypt in its forthcoming attempts to broach other nations with the intent of reaching an agreement with them to eliminate these privileges over an unprotracted transitional period." Finally, the treaty stated that the two countries would be represented at the ambassadorial level and that the British ambassador to Egypt would be accorded preferential treatment over the diplomatic representatives of other nations. In addition, the British government would support Egypt's request for admission into the League of Nations. The following day -- 29 August -- Al-Ahram unveiled the mystery behind the delay of the official Arabic translation of the treaty. It had been sent aboard a plane belonging to the Imperial Transportation. It had arrived in Ras Al-Tin Airport in Alexandria at 5pm on 27 August. "Postal officials had not received instructions on the matter and therefore did no more than their regular duty, which was to forward the letter marked "post haste" to the government's headquarters in Bolkly. As those offices were closed, postal officials dispatched the document at 9am the following day to the prime minister's office in Cairo." Al-Ahram expressed its opinion on the incident with the headline: "Delay in publication of the Treaty in Egypt sets new record in tardiness." An Al-Ahram correspondent had been on hand to witness the delivery of the "missing envelope", which he described as "a large white envelope, addressed in green ink to the 'official Egyptian delegation,' and containing a typewritten copy of the Arabic text of the treaty." He adds, "the articles of the treaty run across five foolscap pages and its appendices take up another 20 pages of the same size." Prime Minister Mustafa El-Nahhas had issued instructions from London to have the document copied and distributed as soon as it arrived. In the upper corner he had written, "all is well here and best wishes to all." Al-Ahram commented, "this greeting seals this historical document." That proved not to have been the case.
