Henry Kissinger said the United States had no foreign policy -- only domestic politics. That seems true when it comes to Iran, writes Graham Usher On 24 May Iran formally submitted its nuclear fuel swap agreement with Brazil and Turkey to the United Nations International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna, a move Tehran hopes will help defuse the crisis with the West over its nuclear programme. "We want to open a new chapter of cooperation... away from confrontation, resolutions and sanctions," said Ali Asghar Soltanieh, Iran's ambassador to the IAEA. Confrontation is likelier. Iran's submission came less than a week after the United States tabled a new draft Security Council sanctions resolution against Iran's nuclear programme. It's the toughest package yet, expanding the number of Iranian personnel and companies liable for penalties and calling on states to block financial transactions that could be linked to Iran's nuclear and ballistic weapons programmes. There's also a tougher cargo inspections regime for ships bound for Iranian ports. The US draft has the support of fellow UNSC permanent members and nuclear weapon states: Britain, France, China and Russia. It is currently being circulated among the UNSC 10 non-permanent members, including Turkey and Brazil, signatories to the nuclear fuel swap agreement or Tehran Declaration (TD). Neither will support sanctions as long as Iran adheres to the agreement. Nor will Lebanon, another non-permanent member, weakening the authority if not legality of any new SC sanctions resolution. The US, France and Britain dismiss the TD as a "sideshow" for a regime they believe is bent on building the bomb. In fact, the TD revives an offer made last October by the IAEA with Russia, France and the US. Under it Iran was to deposit 1,200kg or 75 per cent of its low-enriched uranium (LEU) in France and Russia in return for 120kg of nuclear fuel needed for a civilian research reactor in Tehran. The deal was supported by the five permanent members plus Germany (the so-called 5+1 countries) as a confidence builder for negotiations that would also reduce an Iranian LEU stockpile they feared could be used for a warhead. It snagged on Tehran's insistence that any nuclear fuel exchange be simultaneous and occurs inside Iran. The new deal has lost some of its allure, at least for the 5+1. Turkey is now to be the repository state for the LEU, not France and Russia. And 1,200kg now represents about 50 per cent of Iran's estimated LEU due its ongoing enrichment of uranium. In fact, the TD enshrines Iran's right to enrich uranium under the Non-Proliferation Treaty while ignoring four UNSC resolutions calling for its suspension, the issue at the crux of Iran's dispute with the 5+1 countries. But -- as Turkey and Brazil averred -- the TD represents a huge "leap forward" in terms of Iranian concessions. For the first time Tehran has signed on to a deal in which it sends most of its LEU abroad, agrees that it can stay out of the country for a year and pledges a dialogue with the 5+1 countries based on "common concerns and collective commitments". Nor is there any illusion (including by the 5+1) that the latest sanctions resolution will prove more effective in changing Iran's behaviour than three previous rounds have been. While tough, the new penalties are a long way short of the "crippling" sanctions wanted by Israel, for instance. To win China's backing, which has huge investments in Iran, the US had to forego all meaningful sanction of Iran's energy sector and Central Bank. And to gain Russia's consent the US had to accept a partial rather than full arms embargo, exempting, for instance, Moscow's sale of S-300 anti-aircraft missiles to Tehran, a contract Washington and Tel Aviv wanted scrapped. But more important than the substance of the new resolution is its timing. Why did the Obama administration move so swiftly to scupper "the most important diplomatic initiative by Iran in 30 years of disputes with the West", asks Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, who helped negotiate the TD. The short answer is domestic politics. Sources say it was no coincidence Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced the draft while testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 18 May. She was there to urge ratification of the new START arms control treaty with Russia against Republican opposition. The sweetener for Senate Republicans was to assure them that "you're going to punish Iran yet again", said a source. Nor only they: the American-Israeli Public Affairs Committee and other pro-Israeli lobby groups have rushed legislation through an otherwise divided Congress that would punish foreign companies, local authorities and shareholders for dealing with Iran, particularly in the oil sector. Congressional sanctions have bipartisan support and are urged publicly by the Israeli government. But the legislation has been blocked by Obama, wary it could complicate efforts to muster Russian and Chinese support for UN sanctions. The last thing Obama wanted was thus an Iranian-backed agreement that could delay any UNSC sanctions resolution or, should it have meat, detach Russia and China from the other permanent members. With mid-term elections in November, he knows some form of congressional sanctions against Iran will have to be approved, lest he be charged with appeasement. In other words -- for Obama no less than for his predecessors -- when it comes to Iran, domestic considerations in Congress trump international consensus at the UNSC.
