Iran's 11th-hour agreement on nuclear enrichment created confusion in New York, Moscow and Beijing Victories of sorts Israel was the loser at the NPT conference; Iran the winner, writes Graham Usher at the United Nations After three weeks of fraught negotiations at the United Nations, member states of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) on 28 May agreed a consensus document to take the Treaty forward, including a landmark proposal to hold a regional conference in 2012 on a nuclear weapon free zone in the Middle East. The conference probably won't happen. Israel -- whose undeclared nuclear arsenal would be exposed at such a meeting -- said it would not attend. The United States too cast doubt on its occurrence, despite approving it in the consensus document. Why? The short answer is Barack Obama could not risk failure of the NPT, the world's main legal instrument for preventing the spread of nuclear arms. He has made non-proliferation a centrepiece of his foreign policy and a reinvigorated NPT its "cornerstone". He also wanted to marshal a maximum of NPT member states behind his policy of sanctioning Iran for its nuclear programme at the UN Security Council. In New York, the US called for a tougher international inspection regime on non- nuclear weapon states and penalties for any country that withdrew from the treaty, two reforms tailored to curb Iran. But success in NPT requires consensus across the 189 member states. And led skilfully by Egypt's United Nation Ambassador Maged Abdel-Aziz, the Arab states tied consensus to concrete steps towards a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons, an NPT resolution passed in 1995 but left since to fester. "We put them [the Americans] in a corner," said one delegate. The consensus document calls for a conference to be convened in 2012 "on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction". It also explicitly called on Israel -- as the only nuclear armed state in the region -- to accede to the NPT as a "non-nuclear weapon state" and place "all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] safeguards". In a shift of policy the Obama administration agreed to the call. But its officials fought tooth and nail to have all mention of Israel removed. The Arabs said no, since for all the main point of the conference is to begin the process of Israel's nuclear disarmament. To keep consensus, Obama refrained from casting a veto. But he was furious. The US "strongly opposes efforts to single out Israel, and will oppose actions that jeopardise Israel's national security," he said in a statement on 28 May. Israel was also rattled by America's failure to protect it, an apparent break from past policies of supporting Israel's "nuclear ambiguity" in which its possession of nuclear weapons is neither confirmed nor denied. Condemning the NPT's call for a Middle East conference as "flawed and hypocritical", Israel would "take note of the important clarifications that have been made by the US regarding its (nuclear) policy", said an Israeli government statement on 29 May. These reportedly include no pressure on Israel to join the NPT and no Middle East conference without Tel Aviv's consent. This is why few delegates think it will happen. "I don't know if Israel will attend or whether there will be a conference", said one. "All kinds of things can happen before 2012. There could be a war, or another Cast Lead, in which case none of the Arab states would attend. But we've kept the idea of a Middle East nuclear weapon free zone alive. It can't be buried". American and Israeli anger was compounded by the consensus document's failure to mention Iran's nuclear programme or its violation of successive UNSC and IAEA resolutions. Iran did not get everything it wanted in New York: in particular a legally binding commitment from nuclear weapons' states not to use them against those without, like Iran. But, unlike Israel, it was not singled out for condemnation. Nor was there support from non-aligned and non-nuclear states for stronger inspections or punishments for any country that withdrew from the treaty. "Iran was the real winner at the NPT," admitted one delegate. Were there any others? Long time observers of the NPT said after a decade of deadlock the very existence of an agreed consensus document is a victory of sorts. But the consensus expresses only impasse. The nuclear weapon states refused any binding, concrete timetable for disarmament. And the non-nuclear weapon states refused any intrusive, compulsory inspections of their nuclear programmes. And aside from an improbable conference on a Middle East free of nuclear weapons, there was no agreement over what to do with the so-called "outlier" states: powers with nuclear weapons but who exist outside the treaty like Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea. Forty years after the NPT's establishment the division between the nuclear haves and have-nots is as entrenched as ever, admitted nuclear analyst and campaigner Rebecca Johnson. "The old NPT machinery is broken. If we are going to take real steps to global nuclear disarmament, we will need new machinery".
