When US partners in the international coalition to fight the Islamic State (IS) group met in Washington in July, one of their main goals was to collect billions of dollars to provide desperately needed humanitarian support to address the expectedly grave conditions in the aftermath of the campaign to liberate Mosul from the militants. The delegates convened as Iraqi security forces, aided by the coalition, were preparing to launch a long-awaited offensive to retake the key northern Iraqi city and IS stronghold, a move widely trumpeted as a final blow to the terror group in Iraq. As the summit wound up, the Obama administration announced it had secured aid pledges totalling about $2.1 billion from some 26 countries to support a UN humanitarian response plan in addition to other international organisations providing aid in the country. Part of the financing, it was announced, would be used to fund a stabilisation programme and one year of demining activities in cities and areas retaken from IS. In all cases, the US State Department, which hosted the conference, made it clear that “all the money” was going to the United Nations and its agencies working for humanitarian assistance in Iraq, virtually blocking access to the funds by the Iraqi government and national NGOs. As part of the operation the UN appointed one of its top officials in Iraq, Lise Grande, as head of its Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), taking full responsibility for the task. So far, it is not clear if the donors have come through with their pledges. But as the battle of Mosul proceeds it has become clear that the military operations have led to a dramatic humanitarian crisis which could impact as many as one million civilians. After nearly two months of campaigning, questions are being raised about the failure of the Iraqi government, the UN agencies and international aid groups involved to prevent the humanitarian crisis which many now fear could spiral into a catastrophe. Despite assurances from the Iraqi government to the contrary, there is no evidence that it has addressed the crisis effectively in spite of warnings before it initiated the military campaign that it should be prepared for the impending challenge. The Baghdad government did not provide sufficient funding nor the necessary logistics, especially for temporary housing and food and other humanitarian supplies. But its worst shortcoming was its failure to work in collaboration with Iraqi NGOs and national relief and social services through shared responsibilities to address this urgent humanitarian need. These groups could have shared the financial and logistical burden with the government, which faces a huge budget deficit and is grappling with low oil revenues and the heavy cost of the war with IS. More importantly, the participation of Iraqi cross-sectarian NGOs in relief efforts for the displaced people could have provided an ample opportunity for national healing. As a result, Iraqis may once again miss an opportunity to engage directly in an interactive process to bridge the sectarian gap and initiate the much-talked-about national settlement programme in the post-IS era. But the Iraqi government's gravest mistake remains asking the population in Mosul to stay in their homes while fighting with the IS militants proceeds. The government did not elaborate on this strategy, but it apparently hoped that residents in Mosul would rise up against the militants and thus help defeat the group. On the other hand, by accepting to take charge of the relief programme in Mosul, the UN and its specialised agencies have taken full responsibility for the international operation while they were not fully ready for the predicted humanitarian crisis. Under the so-called Rapid Response Mechanism, several UN agencies are working closely with a consortium of foreign non-governmental organisations which are supervising a multi-million-dollar effort to support internally displaced people in Iraq. But despite the international contributions, there is no evidence that the agencies are dealing effectively with the ongoing humanitarian emergency or providing the highly needed short-term solution to the crisis. The battle of Mosul, which started on 17 October, aims to evict IS from its last major stronghold in Iraq. But civilians, both escapees and residents, who are trapped in the city are paying a high price. Before the Iraqi security forces launched the Mosul offensive, the UN and international relief agencies estimated that as many as one million people would be displaced and would need humanitarian assistance. Up until now, the campaign has displaced more than 80,000 people, but as the attacks on Mosul intensify more civilians are fleeing the city as fighting continues to inflict violence on the population. Even though they are a small portion of the exodus expected before the offensive, civilians who are escaping their homes in the city are leaving both the government and humanitarian organisations looking for ways to protect them. The journey from Mosul is fraught with challenges. Escapees have to walk long distances before they reach assembly areas, mostly arriving hungry, thirsty and exhausted. The authorities are requiring fleeing civilians to stay in camps, even if they have family outside, so that men can be checked for ties to IS. Many families arriving at camps set by Iraq's Ministry of Migration and Displacement or international relief agencies are offered shelter and food. But with more and more flowing out of combat zones each day, many of these camps have reached full capacity, and organisers are forced to lodge the newcomers into extension sites which are not suitable for housing. As winter sets in, freezing temperature is increasing the suffering of the people in the camps, who lack enough heating equipment, mattresses and blankets. The other main concern is that the camps are not properly built and equipped to resist the heavy rain which is expected soon in northern Iraq. Meanwhile, the numbers of the escapees are likely to continue to rise, as the fighting moves into the more densely populated urban areas of Mosul. The carnage has brought into question the government's strategy of asking Mosul residents to stay in their houses during the offensive. It has also raised eyebrows about whether the US-led coalition and the UN relief agencies sanctioned the Iraqi government's controversial decision. The Iraqi move has prompted speculation that the government of Iraqi Prime Minister Haider Al-Abadi might have wanted the population to stay in the hope that it would rise up against IS during the offensive. Of course, there has been no rebellion, and instead families have been used by IS as human shields. Indeed, IS militants have reportedly forced thousands of families to march to Mosul from nearby towns before the Iraqi forces' advance. Now these civilians are reportedly suffering, with many dying at home, some from IS shelling. The media has quoted Iraqi officials as saying that the security forces have found graves in many gardens in liberated neighbourhoods in Mosul. Hospitals in nearby cities are overflowing with casualties, as civilians wounded in the crossfire in densely populated Mosul face risks from the continued fighting and contamination from improvised explosive devices and pollution from burning oil fields in the area. In the newly retaken areas, civilian facilities like water and power supplies, schools and hospitals have been severely damaged, and medical services often are unavailable. As the fighting rages and Iraqi military officials are reportedly reconsidering their strategy and more people are expected to flee, the humanitarian situation is fuelling concerns that the Mosul offensive could become a quagmire. But there are few signs that the Iraqi authorities and international agencies are showing any real urgency in staving off the possible turmoil if life for camp-dwellers becomes unbearable and the war against IS drags on and on. Much of the stabilisation effort in post-IS Iraq will depend on how the Iraqi government and the UN agencies will manage the humanitarian situation in Mosul. If they fail, humanitarian suffering will increase and a much-needed and lasting political settlement for Iraq's conflicts will be in doubt.
