Egypt's vote in favour of the French and Russian draft Security Council resolutions on the situation in Aleppo triggered fury in Riyadh. Immediately after that session, the Saudi ambassador to the UN held a press conference in which he lashed out at the “painful”Egyptian position, which he contrasted to the votes of Malaysia and Senegal that he praised as “closer to the Arab position”. Many took the official Saudi statements as a green light to unleash a barrage of accusations against Egypt for being an “ingrate”or even a “traitor”or “deviant from the Arab consensus”. The Egyptian media naturally responded in kind, giving rise to a verbal brawl between the Egyptian and Saudi media domains. A few days after that Security Council session, the Egyptian president brought up the subject in the course of a public occasion that was broadcast live. After explaining the Egyptian position on the Syrian crisis and why Egypt voted the say it did in the Security Council, President Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi declared: “Egypt will not kneel before anyone but God.”He repeated this more than once with visible fervour. Although Al-Sisi did not mention Saudi Arabia by name, the implication of his remark was obvious: Saudi Arabia is exploiting Egypt's economic plight in order to twist Cairo's arm into adopting Riyadh's positions on international issues and the Syrian question in particular, but that Egypt will not bow to such pressures. The effect of the speech was to pour more fuel on the fire and throw into relief a deep crisis in the Egyptian-Saudi relationship. I, personally, do not believe that the Egyptian vote in the Security Council was the actual source of the crisis. It merely exposed its existence. The time therefore has come to take a closer look in order to identify the real causes, since it is essential to learn these first if we want to remedy the crisis properly, rather than aggravate it or allow it to resurface in the future. I fear that if the two brother countries are unable to contain this crisis, it will spiral out of control and perhaps lead to a complete rupture between them, which would be extremely dangerous. I am fully aware of the shortcomings of the governmental structures of both countries and I am convinced that their policies have yet to rise to the level of the current challenges and, therefore, are part of the problem rather than the solution. Nevertheless, I still believe it's necessary to support and strengthen the relationship between the two countries in all fields and at all governmental and non-governmental levels. I will take this opportunity to remind readers of an observation I have discussed in previous articles on this subject. The ruling elites of both countries are caught between two approaches in their search for an ideal formula for a fruitful relationship between them. One is the bilateral approach. It proceeds from the premise that the ruling regimes in Egypt and Saudi Arabia differ almost to the degree of contradiction, regardless of the common bonds and shared interests between their peoples. Therefore, according to proponents of this approach, the ideal formula for a fruitful bilateral relationship is for each side to take into account the other side's perspective on its needs from this relationship. Accordingly, the relationship will revolve around precise calculations based on types of bartering and negotiation, reciprocal arrangements and deals, and a general process of “give-and-take”. In order to put this mode into effect, the two sides need to be able to identify exactly what they need from —and what they can offer to —the other side so that they can strike a kind of balance or appropriate degree of reciprocity. The second approach is essentially pan-Arab. It proceeds from the premise that Egypt and Saudi Arabia combined form the backbone of an Arab regional order which, in turn, is vital to their survival. However, at present this regional order is in a critical condition and needs a powerful boost that can only come through a strategic alliance between the two countries. Accordingly, advocates of this approach believe that the best way to promote a fruitful relationship between the two countries is to base it on the prerequisites of Arab national security and how each of these two countries can contribute to realising these prerequisites. In order to put this mode of relationship into effect, the two sides must come to an agreement on a detailed definition of Arab national security, the nature of the threats and challenges it faces, and the mechanisms capable of addressing these threats and challenges. Anyone who has studied inter-Arab relations will be able to appreciate the magnitude of the difficulties involved in implementing either of these two approaches. Perhaps the foremost obstacles are the lack of objective conditions and the conflict between declared policies and those that are drawn up behind closed doors. Arab regimes have an instinctive tendency to behave publicly one way and behave exactly the opposite in private. Publicly they act as though the support they give to their “brother”Arab nation is motivated by an unshakeable faith in Arab brotherliness and the desire to promote solidarity among Arab peoples. Yet, behind the scenes they are driven by unmitigated egoism and practice every form of blackmail and contempt for “others”. Worse yet, the regimes that are rivalling to lead the Arab order rarely respect the institutions that have been created for collective Arab action or try to promote decision-making through those mechanisms. Most frequently Arab regimes simply present others with a de facto reality when they take decisions in accordance with calculations based their own or their own country's narrow interests, regardless of how they might try to market those decisions as in the interest of all Arab peoples. The examples are innumerable, but here are two of the most notorious: Sadat consulted no one before heading off to Jerusalem, and Saddam Hussein never consulted anyone before taking the decision to wage war against Iran. Naturally, every Arab country has a different perspective on the sources of threat to its national security on the basis of its particular geopolitical position and the nature of regional or international alliances this might call into play. Accordingly, the way Saudi Arabia perceives threats to its national security, which is influenced by the expansion of Iranian influence in the region, will inherently differ from the way Egypt perceives those threats. In like manner, Egypt's perception of the potential dangers arising from Ethiopia's construction of the Grand Renaissance Dam or Libya's transformation into a failed state will differ from the way that Riyadh perceives those same dangers. However, if we grant that the Arab order as a whole has begun to collapse and that this will lead to the collapse of every Arab state, since none can survive on its own, and if we simultaneously grant that Egypt and Saudi Arabia form the backbone of the entire Arab order and that the only way to salvage this order is for these two countries to forge a solid and genuine strategic relationship, then the actual forging of this relationship must be perceived as a matter of life and death, not just for Egypt or Saudi Arabia but for the entire Arab order. I realise that all who hate the Arab order and are conspiring to inherit its pieces after it dies will do all in their power to promote the idea that the Arab order is merely an illusion, a baseless fiction, a mirage that has only led people to waste a lot of time running after it. I also realise that those people (and they are many) will try to persuade Riyadh that Egypt is too dilapidated to be of much use to Saudi Arabia as a friend, or of much harm as an enemy, and therefore that an alliance with Turkey would be stronger, more reliable and more rewarding. In like manner, they will try to persuade Egypt that Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries are artificial states led by royal houses and dominant tribes that have no future, especially now that the US has decided to gradually withdraw from the region, and that, therefore, an alliance with Iran would be a stronger, more reliable and a more fruitful alternative as it would (or so they claim) put an end to Egypt's chronic problems and, simultaneously, put Egypt in a position to inherit a share of the influence over the entire Arab Gulf. For either Riyadh or Cairo to fall in with such notions is the route to certain disaster. On the other hand, the current crisis might offer the path to a solution if Cairo and Riyadh see it as an opportunity to initiate a strategic dialogue that will permit them to reach a consensus on a common vision for rescuing the Arab order and rebuilding it on new foundations. Does my advice rest on any realistic foundations or is it the wispy tissue of dreams that are impossible to realise in these wretched times? Let it be heeded and we will see. The writer is professor of political science at Cairo University.
