Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who passed away last week, was an eminent Egyptian academic and prodigious scholar who enriched the Arabic library with his many outstanding works on international law and political science. It would not be an exaggeration to say that all contemporary Egyptian professors of political science and international law were his students, whether directly in the classroom or lecture hall where he taught, or indirectly, through the vehicle of his numerous published studies. While Boutros-Ghali longed to serve directly in a political role, he remained an academic to the core and his quest for political office was actually driven by a desire to hone his skills and test his theories in the crucible of reality and direct contact with the obstacles that might obstruct application of his theses. This is a quality that I sensed in him through my personal contact with him, limited though it may have been. I was not among those who had the good fortune to attend his classes or lectures. I graduated from Alexandria University and by the time I was appointed at Cairo University, after obtaining my doctorate at the Sorbonne, Boutros-Ghali had left academia to devote himself full time to the post of minister of state for foreign affairs. But by a curious turn of fate, my first meeting with him was at his request. A few months after my return from Paris and my appointment at Cairo University, I received a phone call from his office inviting me to meet with him. I naturally accepted without a moment's hesitation. That first meeting with Boutros-Ghali afforded me the unique opportunity to gain insight into aspects of his character that one would never be able to appreciate from merely reading his works. I discovered, for example, that he was a very modest man, despite his sharp intellect and great repute, and that he had the playful sense of humour of ordinary Egyptian folk, despite his aristocratic background and French culture and education. In addition, I immediately felt that generous warmth that makes you quickly grow comfortable with your host and instills in you a strong fondness for him. I was flattered by the way he opened the conversation. He said that he had read the article about my doctorate thesis in Le Monde Diplomatique (September 1977) and that he personally heard it praised by the French professor who headed the viva voce committee and who was a personal friend of his. He then asked me to write a chapter on the “democratic socialist experiment” in France for a volume on democratic socialist experiences in the world that was being compiled by Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies, the preparation and publication of which he was supervising personally. I accepted the offer enthusiastically and looked forward to working on that project even though I disagreed with some of his publicised views at the time, and especially his support for the “peace” process with Israel. In all events, I emerged from that meeting thoroughly convinced that Boutros-Ghali's political mantle could not conceal his academic essence and his thirst for research and scholastic study. I was also convinced that his political positions were inspired by a purely patriotic vision informed by a firm belief in plurality and respect for opposing views. Because of my professional and academic specialisation, I kept track of Boutros-Ghali's political activities and career. Years went by until eventually he was nominated and elected as UN secretary-general, the first Egyptian, Arab and African to occupy that prestigious international position. I realised immediately that this was the golden opportunity for which he had long waited and that now he would have to prove that he was worthy of it. This meant much more to him than a “reward after a long period of service”. He was profoundly aware that he stood at the helm of the UN at a time when the international order was preparing to embark on a new and entirely different era following the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. This would compound the challenges he faced in reviving the role of the international organisation that had been virtually paralysed by the Cold War. Hardly had Boutros-Ghali taken his seat than the UN Security Council met at the summit level and on 31 January 1992, for the first time in its history, assigned the secretary-general the task of preparing an analysis and recommendations for ways to enhance and augment the peace-making and peacekeeping abilities of the UN, within the scope and provisions of its charter. Boutros-Ghali was acutely aware that it was now in his power to leave his imprint not just on the annals of Egyptian policy, but also on the annals of global policy. He was therefore determined to ensure that the report he would submit to the Security Council would mark a turning point in the history of the UN and simultaneously embody the sum of his academic and political knowledge and expertise. The “Agenda for Peace” that Boutros-Ghali submitted to the Security Council on 17 June 1992 was anything but another one of those documents added to the untold volumes of UN archives that have accumulated over the years. The comprehensive vision that it contained truly proved not only that its author was fully qualified to serve as secretary-general, but that he deserved a place among the most celebrated individuals to have occupied that post. That vision emanated from the premise that the world should not wait for the UN to act only after crises erupt. The role of the UN must begin before that. It needed to work to prevent crises, whenever possible, or to contain them and keep them from spiralling out of control if they do erupt. In addition, the UN's role should not stop at intervention to deter aggression or to punish the aggressor. Rather, it should extend to the post-crisis phase, where it should function to reshape the environment that had engendered the conflict, so as to avert the eruption of future conflicts. From this standpoint, Boutros-Ghali, in this highly crucial document, took pains to differentiate between the concepts of “preventive diplomacy”, “peace-making”, “peacekeeping” and “building peace”, and he proposed specific measures to enable the UN to perform each of these functions at the required time in the development, outbreak or aftermath of an international conflict or crisis. The pioneering ideas in that document stimulated the General Assembly's thirst for more. That UN body asked Boutros-Ghali for similarly innovative ideas to strengthen the role of the UN in the field of development. The result was his “Agenda for Development”, submitted to the General Assembly in May 1994. In this groundbreaking document, he identified the various dimensions of the question of development in its capacity as the other side of the question of international peace and security. The document thus speaks of “development as a security issue”, “development as an economic issue,” “development as an environmental issue”, “development as a social issue” and “development as a comprehensive societal issue” and proposes a series of measures the UN could take, in coordination with the relevant agencies, to promote development in a way that realises stability and security in the world. However, the ideas in these two important documents — “An Agenda for Peace” and “An Agenda for Development” — were not of the sort that aroused the interest or appreciation of the US which, at the time, was manoeuvring to create a new world order characterised by America's sole hegemony following the collapse of the Soviet Union — or at least by Washington's exclusive and unrivalled international leadership. The US was not keen to encourage any initiatives that might strengthen the role of the UN and empower it at the helm of the international order. As a result, differences between Washington and Boutros-Ghali began to mount, soon reaching the point where the US vetoed the Security Council resolution backing Boutros-Ghali for a second five-year term, despite the fact that all other members of that council voted in favour of him. Because of that single veto, Boutros-Ghali became the first and only UN secretary-general not to be elected to a second term. Many attempts have been made to explain that controversial vote. Some have suggested that Madeleine Albright, the US ambassador to the UN at the time, was uncomfortable with the outlook of a “francophone” person who she felt might be inclined to favour French sway over the UN. Others have held that the Washington's opposition to him stemmed from his allegedly having leaked a UN report holding Israel responsible for the Qana massacre in southern Lebanon in 1996. In my opinion, Boutros-Ghali incurred Washington's antipathy because, like Dag Hammarskjöld before him, he tried to work independently, for the benefit of the international community as a whole, and he sought to leverage the UN to a position in which it could be an effective player in the international order. Washington, meanwhile, wanted a secretary-general that behaved like a tame employee, working exclusively on its behalf as leader of the world. May God bless Boutros-Ghali, whose presence at the helm of the UN opened an opportunity for the international community, only for the US — true to form — to quash it. The writer is a professor of political science at Cairo University.
