Before the region declines more into chaos, it is imperative that the Arab states rally and define their mutual security interests, writes Ayman El-Amir* The war of words between the Bush administration and Iran has escalated into a physical show of firepower that is making the jittery Gulf and Middle East region ever more edgy. In addition to its huge military presence in most of the Arab countries of the Gulf, the United States has built a naval armada in the Arabian Sea that is reminiscent of 19th century "gunboat diplomacy". In response, Iran's firebrand president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, has upped the ante with more defiant statements about his country's pursuit of nuclear capacity. He also ordered three days of missile-testing manoeuvres. As a result of these confrontational postures, the Middle East/Gulf region is now skirting the precipice. With the situation in Iraq deteriorating further and US casualties rising, congressional and popular opposition to President Bush's policies is reaching an all-time high. To seasoned analysts, the US campaign in Iraq is petering out. On the other hand, Turkey, which has been nervously watching the re-awakening of Kurdish nationalism in northern Iraq, is getting into the melee, not so much to protect the Turkoman minority in Kirkuk but as much to avert the resurgence of the nationalist ambitions of its own Kurds. Instability is rocking the region and Israel is playing the éminence grise. Nothing short of new, region-specific security arrangements will stop the confrontation and the slide towards war and restore stability to this turbulent area. Regional security in the Middle East and Gulf has been undermined by the US invasion of Iraq and Israel's occupation and decimation of the Palestinian territories and people. This has radicalised the region, unleashing indomitable forces of resistance and dividing states into pro- US "moderates" and anti-US policy "radicals". Political polarisation of the region has, in turn, fuelled internal dissension, curbed civil liberties, increased state repression, and arrested the growth of democratic institutions and practices. The trouble with regional security alliances in the Middle East is that they are historically notorious. The Baghdad Pact, the Central Treaty Organisation and the Middle East Defence Organisation of the 1950s, as well as the Soviet Union's alliances of the 1960s, were never completely Arab-focussed . They were mostly Cold War shadowboxing that stymied the revival of Arab nationalism. By the end of the Cold War, bipolar spheres of influence and alliances melted into US hegemony in the Middle East, with Israel as the chief US surrogate. The US invasion of Iraq that is now foundering left Arab regimes in the Gulf and the Middle East completely helpless, except for some political bleating here and there. Leading Arab countries were cowed by the overwhelming force of the invasion and the much-mooted "New Middle East" initiative, which called for democratic reforms, implying regime change. The recent lip service support by some leading Arab countries of President Bush's last-ditch endeavour to save the US from itself -- code-named the New Way Forward in Iraq -- is more like a tacit recognition of US failure than an effective show of solidarity. Inevitable US withdrawal will leave Iraq worse off than it was before the invasion, with continued sectarian violence and political uncertainty. It will also leave behind a dangerously unstable region. Hence, the region needs a new, home grown security regime. The collapse of the former Soviet Union that marked the end of the Cold War left US interventionist policy carrying no legitimacy. There was no threat to its oil interests or impediment to access to growing markets. The 11 September 2001 attacks on the US created new momentum for the launching of a global war against terrorism. However, the campaign against Iraq shifted that focus and did not inhibit terrorist activities. Its style did not persuade anyone that it was designed to liberate Iraq or to protect the US against weapons of mass destruction that in any case were never there. It appeared, at least to Arab nationalists, a reincarnation of 19th century colonial conquests and thus provided ideological ammunition for resistance that was peppered with terrorist attacks on a much wider scale. President Bush and his key lieutenants have reiterated that the US cannot afford to fail in Iraq because the consequences would be catastrophic. They are right, except that the US is losing dramatically. So before exiting Iraq, President Bush's hawkish strategists might be tempted to take on Iran as both political cover for US failure in Iraq and a consolation prize for a disgruntled US public that is increasingly leaning towards investigating why the US went to war there in the first place. A military strike against Iran would please Israel, shore up sagging US prestige, and impress Arab sceptics that the US is still the only superpower that can save them from the evils of regional radicalism. The US has come a long way in preparing the Arab Gulf and Middle Eastern states for this possibility. Backed by Israeli intelligence, it launched a psychological campaign aimed to trigger Sunni-Shia rivalry and a fratricidal war. It used the misguided statements of Iranian President Ahmadinejad to paint Iran as the worst threat the Arabs could face after the demise of Saddam Hussein. It started an estimated $20 billion arms race in the Gulf states to help them build defences against a potentially nuclear Iran. At least six Arab countries are now seriously contemplating the development of nuclear technology. Egypt, one of the first signatories of the UN Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty when it was adopted in 1968, and that has for almost three decades promoted the idea of a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction, is now revisiting the issue of the development of nuclear technology for stated peaceful purposes. Washington and Tel Aviv want to ignite the region before America exits. The problem is that the impact of a strike on Iran is as unpredictable as the possible retaliatory reaction, both immediately and in the long term. US strategic assets and alliances in the region would suffer and radicalism would become rampant. And it would not spell the end of Iran's nuclear ambitions. Destabilisation of the region would best serve the interests of Israel in sidetracking the Palestinian question. There is no consensus in Israel on replicating the land-for-peace formula, which served as the basis for peace with Egypt, to attain an honourable and secure peace with the Palestinians. Arab Middle Eastern and Gulf countries need a region-based new paradigm for collective security. It would be founded on the primary and collective interests of these countries, to the exclusion of foreign powers. The Arab League's Collective Defence Agreement is a dead horse that has never been seriously activated and cannot be revived or built upon. Past experience with colonial-era defence pacts with foreign powers has left bad memories that have been further exacerbated by the US's "you are either with us or against us" polarisation strategy. Countries of the region, with the exception of Israel, need to convene a conference that would negotiate and draft a blueprint for regional security. Israel could not be associated with any such arrangement until it has concluded peace treaties with all Arab countries on the basis of a satisfactory settlement of the Palestinian problem. While Israel is geographically located in the Middle East, its neighbours perceive it as a foreign and aggressive military power that occupies Arab territories and seeks expansion, not peace. The status of Turkey as a potential partner would be determined by the nature of its relations with NATO and the European Union. The lessons of the conquest and destruction of Iraq have yet to sink in. When they do, Arab countries of the Middle East and the Gulf will realise that being politically and militarily embedded with the US is a recipe for durable instability and chaos. * The writer is a former correspondent for Al-Ahram in Washington, DC. He also served as director of United Nations Radio and Television in New York.
