In yet another fiery speech, Iran's supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei ripped into the United States on 17 August. “If we want to make a case for [who this enemy is], it would be the United States of America regime, [which] is the manifestation of the domination order par excellence,” Khamenei said. Khamenei's approach towards the US is, of course, familiar. What made this speech worth noting was its timing. Two days before the speech, the Iranian newspaper Kayhan ran an op-ed article headlined “The Sole Option Ahead.” In it, the newspaper's editor in chief, Hossein Shariatmadari, wrote that the supreme leader is “fully aware of the deal's inadequacies and its disastrous consequences.” He continued, “It can be said with certainty that [Khamenei] is not happy with the existing draft of the deal.” Many observers consider Shariatmadari to be Khamenei's representative at the influential newspaper, as well as his mouthpiece and his informal spokesman. The office of the supreme leader did not deny Shariatmadari's claims. Additionally, Khamenei referred to the nuclear deal as a deal whose “fate and its endorsement or rejection is neither clear here nor in America.” Can the association between the editorial and the speech be seen as the launch of a plan to scuttle the nuclear deal? Despite the precedent of the supreme leader's office in issuing denials, in this case the most prudent position for the leader to take would be an ambiguous one, particularly if he is in agreement with the deal. The agreement is now at the heart of a fierce battle between the two camps of the moderates led by Iranian President Hassan Rouhani and the hardliners (conservatives). The supreme leader's open support for the deal could humiliate and damage the confidence that the conservatives, the true supporters of the revolution and the nezam (Iranian establishment), have in Khamenei. But had Khamenei stood against the deal, he would not have allowed the Iranian negotiating team to sign the agreement, nor would he have supported and praised them throughout the talks. In statements carried on the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) website on 1 August, but which disappeared several hours later, Abbas Araghchi, Iran's senior negotiator, asked, “How is that possible that he [Khamenei] takes an indifferent stance if the red lines were crossed? He would have certainly reacted if they had been?” Ali Akbar Nategh-Nouri, the head of the Inspection Office of the supreme leader, has said that the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported “every single detail” of the talks to Khamenei. Additionally, the idea that Shariatmadari is the informal spokesman of the supreme leader is flawed. Western observers give too much credit to Shariatmadari as Khamenei has overruled his views in important cases. For example, Shariatmadari had earlier considered as a permanent red line any talks with the Americans. “Talking to America,” he once said, “is [tantamount to] shaking hands with the devil and dancing with the wolves.” He has argued that Iran's resistance to the US has made it the role model for all freedom fighters in the Islamic world. As he said, “America's intention is to break this model apart by talking to Iran … It wants to give this impression to movements in the Islamic world that the Islamic of Republic of Iran, a strategic and ideological ally … [after long years of resistance] has finally had no choice other than to sit beside America and talk to America.” However, Khamenei himself put forth the doctrine of “heroic flexibility,” and lengthy diplomatic talks were then realised between Iran and America. Yet the question arises of why it is that when Iran's leader talks about the nuclear deal he consistently attacks the United States and Israel. Khamenei's chief goal here is to convey the message that Iran is not accepting the deal from a position of weakness. This message could be targeting two groups. The first group consists of hardliners and Israel supporters in the US establishment, mainly in Congress, who argue that the US is capable of forcing Iran into more concessions by exerting more pressure. Khamenei's fierce attacks seek to discredit this view. The other group that Khamenei's anti-American statements are aimed at is the radicals in Iran itself who view the negotiations and compromise with America as the beginning of the erosion of the “anti-arrogant” (a term used in Iran interchangeably with “anti-imperialist”) characteristics of the revolution. Because they loyally support him, Khamenei always considers their views in the positions he takes. But in his 17 August speech, he brought up another issue to address the biggest concern for the conservatives in Iran: that relations with the US may be restored once the deal is finalised. They fear that the Americans will aggressively enter the Iranian market, side-line all the other industrial countries and become the dominant actor in the Iranian market, giving rise to the arrival of pro-American white-collar workers and technocrats. This development could lead to US influence within Iran and threaten the authority of the religious establishment. A recent rumour about the fast-food chain McDonald's, a symbol of US pop culture, opening branches in Iran added to the conservatives' anxiety. American pop culture, according to Joseph Nye, a professor at Harvard University in the US and inventor of the term “soft power,” is an important element of America's global influence. Mohamed Mohammadi Golpayegani, the supreme leader's chief of staff and an influential cleric, remarked on 21 August, “Today the threat is about influence. [The] enemy, with a polite and pleasant appearance, seeks to gain influence in any possible way. It [wants to] send its economic institutions such as McDonald's [to Iran] to promote corrupt American culture.” Addressing the issue of such influence, Khamenei has said the US intends to take advantage of the nuclear agreement to gain influence in Iran. “But we have decisively closed this path. We will allow neither the Americans' presence in Iran, nor their economic influence, nor their political influence, nor their cultural influence,” he said. Regarding the fate of the agreement, as far as Iran is concerned there are indications that it may not be sent to the majlis (Iran's parliament), although 201 of the 290 members of this have signed a letter demanding that the government submit the agreement to them for approval. But the Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) is working on the agreement in cooperation with a parliamentary commission. If it is approved by the SNSC and endorsed by the supreme leader according to Article 176 of the Iranian constitution, it becomes law. There is no need to get the parliament's approval. Even if the agreement is taken to parliament, it is unlikely to be rejected, considering the sensitivity of the issue. Is it possible that Khamenei will suddenly oppose the deal? If, due to some developments in the US, the finalisation of the agreement becomes questionable, it is likely that Khamenei in a pre-emptive action will oppose the deal. Familiarity with the intricacies of the mind-set of the Iranian leadership suggests that Israel's intense objection to the deal, as well as that of its supporters in the US Congress, has most likely convinced it that the deal is in the Islamic Republic's interests. Among clerics there is a highly regarded principle that has a practical value attached to it. This principle states, “Things become distinguishable through their opposites.” On that basis, and from the Iranian perspective, if Israel and its supporters are against the deal, then the agreement is in the interests of the Islamic Republic. The writer is a political analyst writing on Iranian domestic and foreign affairs and co-author of Iran and the United States: An Insider's View on the Failed Past and the Road to Peace.
