In 2014 the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafist movement lost the social backing they had built up over decades. Facing political upheavals, the Muslim Brotherhood and its jihadist and proselytising Salafist allies squandered whatever popularity they once enjoyed. Even groups that had parted ways with the Brotherhood were affected. The public does not draw subtle distinctions. It lumped together everyone who had sought to use Islam as a weapon in contests over power, social status and wealth. The Muslim Brothers' and Salafists' alienation of the public was the result of many factors. There was a general waning in the perceived appeal of Islamist rhetoric. Brimming with Quranic verses, excerpts from Prophetic Hadith, sayings and deeds of the Companions of the Prophet and allusions to ancient works on jurisprudence and exegesis, the Islamists' rhetoric had once reverberated not only among the general public but also among intellectuals, academics and social elites. It was instrumental in attracting people to the ranks of the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafist groups and won the trust of a wide spectrum of sympathisers. In the wake of the 25 January 2011 Revolution, the gap between this rhetoric and the actions and behaviour of those who coined slogans such as “Islam is the solution,” “Participation not domination,” and “We do not want to govern by Islam; we want to be governed by Islam,” grew more obvious with each passing day. Seemingly pious words were exposed as propaganda, as nothing more than a political ruse used by the Muslim Brothers during their so-called “phase of patience.” In a similar manner, Salafist rhetoric lost its attraction once its pundits, preachers and proselytisers entered the political fray and the spotlight began to shine on the flaws and failings in their private lives. The Muslim Brothers and various jihadist organisations had long taken advantage of the tens of thousands of zawiyas (small mosques without minarets) that proliferated in the 1990s (tax breaks were offered to the builders) to disseminate their radical beliefs in Friday sermons and on other religious occasions. The Ministry of Awqaf (Religious Endowments) is now asserting its authority over mosques and zawiyas. Extremists have been ejected from the pulpits they once occupied and replaced by moderate preachers and imams. Surveillance has been tightened to forestall any infiltration by extremist organisations. The Muslim Brotherhood had built up a huge social service network, much of it outside the control of the state and the reach of the law. As the government's provision of social services shrank, the Brotherhood poured in huge sums of money to fill the gap. It used this network, fronted by charity organisations and philanthropic societies established over the decades, to disseminate its political propaganda. The Muslim Brotherhood's political rivals became acutely aware of this after the January revolution. The referendum on constitutional amendments held on 19 March 2011 — the point at which it might be said the civil democratic revolution was derailed and hijacked by the Muslim Brotherhood — showed an organisation bent on using its charitable activities to promote a self-serving theocratic agenda. Many among the well-to-do became aware that these networks provided funding to the Muslim Brotherhood and its allies and stopped donating to charities whose raison d'être was to serve the Muslim Brotherhood's political and economic ends. These networks were subsequently placed under surveillance. Their activities were restricted following the promulgation of new legislation, and ground to a halt when the Muslim Brotherhood was declared a terrorist organisation. The terrorism that the Muslim Brotherhood is accused of perpetrating, being in collusion with or providing a political cover for, not only targeted state authorities. Bombs planted in schools, metro stations, train carriages, streets and squares target civilians, as does the takfiri rhetoric that justifies this violence on the grounds that the people are heretics or members of a jahili (pre-Islamic) society. The public, suddenly awake to the threat of the material and verbal violence spouted by the Muslim Brotherhood and jihadist groups, rallied against the threat. This was demonstrated most dramatically when tens of millions of Egyptians responded to then Defence Minister Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi's appeal to give the army a mandate to fight terrorism. People responding to his call became proactive players in the fight against terrorism in many ways. They have staged demonstrations to counter marches organised by the Muslim Brotherhood and its allies and held conferences and mass rallies for the same purpose. They have challenged Muslim Brotherhood bloggers and propagandists on social networks. They have boycotted Muslim Brotherhood newspapers, television channels and other propaganda outlets and regularly lobby the government to be more resolute in its confrontation with the Brotherhood. Just as telling, and perhaps even more efficacious, they made the Muslim Brotherhood and its allies the butt of their jokes. The Islamists' loss of the social capital they had patiently and steadfastly built over the years has had many repercussions. Before the January revolution, many people perceived the Muslim Brothers as victims, martyrs or — a result of the imprudent policies of the Mubarak regime towards them — as freedom fighters. By cultivating this image the Brotherhood reaped political and social dividends. Following the January revolution the group's actions undermined the image that had long prevailed in the public imagination and accelerated the organisation's loss of popularity. The public discovered that Salafist sheikhs and pundits who had long cultivated an image of pious purity, presenting themselves as venerable religious scholars and ascetic worshippers, were all too human. Their carefully airbrushed images were shattered when their political adversaries began to scratch beneath the surface, exposing the true natures of the individuals behind them. Many Salafists facilitated this task with their unbridled tongues and displays of opportunism and arrogance. The ability of the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafists to mobilise, let alone recruit, melted away. The endless demonstrations they have staged against the authorities following the fall of the Muslim Brotherhood served only to foreground their marginalisation. Salafists, whether organised in political parties such as the Nour Party or not, now harbour grave doubts about their ability to muster the kind of popular support that saw them do so well in the 2012 parliamentary elections. The behaviour and actions of the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafists not only lost them popularity and sympathy among the general public but impacted on their membership bases. Many Muslim Brothers now blame their leadership for the disasters that led to the demise of the organisation. After refusing to take part in the violence that the leaders insisted on fanning, many young Brothers eventually split off from the organisation and resigned from its political wing, the now dissolved Freedom and Justice Party. The Salafists have experienced similar rifts. The Watan (Homeland), Asala (Authenticity) and Fadila (Virtue) parties allied with the Muslim Brotherhood to defend the “legitimacy” of their regime before and after it fell. The Nour Party, or at least its leadership, moved in the opposite direction. Salafists have been left confused and uncertain: should they support or oppose the Muslim Brotherhood, or should they remain neutral? After winning the second largest bloc of parliamentary seats in the 2012 legislative elections, the Salafists now fear they will be punished by the voters at the polls. The writer is a novelist and socio-political researcher.
