The recent proclamation of a federal system in Yemen continues to reverberate throughout the country. The Houthis in the north are adamant in their opposition, and many southerners are demonstrating for the re-establishment of an independent state in the south. In short, the federalist formula appears to have created more problems than it has solved. Two weeks ago, Yemeni President Abd-Rabbou Mansour Hadi unveiled the decision to transform Yemen into a federal state of six regions. These consisted of two in the south – Aden and Hadramawt – and four in the north – Azal, Saba, Al-Janad and Tahama. Each region is to consist of four provinces. Hadramawt, with its capital in Makalla, is to be made up of the provinces of Hadramawt, Al-Mahra, Shebwa and the island of Socotra. Aden will comprise the capital of the former southern state, now the regional capital, together with Abyan, Lahej and Daleh. Saba will include the provinces of Al-Jawf, Mareb and Al-Bayda and have its capital in Saba itself. The fourth region, to include Taez and Ibb, will be named Al-Janad and have its capital in Taez. Azal, the fifth region, will have its capital in Sanaa and will be comprised of Dhamar, Amran and Saada. The sixth region, Tahama, will take in Hudaydah, Rima, Mahwit and Hajja and have its capital in Hudaydah.
FEARS AND DOUBTS: The announcement of the federal plan has triggered a wave of anxious questions. Will the transformation to a federal system reflect the democratic urges of the country's revolution? Or is it an attempt to divide and conquer the democratic forces that were previously unified and are now being submerged in tribal, sectarian and regional conflicts? Will the decision enable Yemen to become more effective in handling the terrorist threats that have been striking the capital? Or will it merely pass on such problems to the armies and militias of the new federal states and provinces? So far it appears that the decision has not resolved the problems of the south or the Houthis. It may even aggravate and complicate these problems. Some observers believe that the federalist move in Yemen is part of a regional trend relating to the Iranian-Saudi conflict. The real aim, they say, is to marginalise Iran's allies in the south-western corner of the Arabian Peninsula. Other observers see a connection with a scheme for a Greater Middle East that would capitalise on the weak points in the Arab world and inflame fault lines created by authoritarian regimes and tribal and sectarian disputes. Still others counter that the plan is a foregone conclusion, resulting from an already existing state of disintegration and that it has needed no foreign conspiracy to give it impetus. To a large segment of public opinion in Yemen, the six-region federal plan that has resulted from the special regions committee that the president formed in late January at the end of the country's national dialogue clearly diverges from the platform of the Yemeni Revolution epitomised by its calls for bread, justice, dignity and freedom. These slogans, which expressed the pressing needs of the Yemeni people, unified millions across the country throughout all its governorates. The Revolution's platform offered a real alternative to the divisive forces of tribalism, regionalism and secessionism, as it was thought it would open the way to full and equal citizenship for all peoples and all provinces. There could have been a politically and geographically different federalist project that drew on this spirit and these principles, effectively mobilising Yemen's resources towards the defeat of terrorism and the realisation of comprehensive development. However, a federal “solution” that emerges from the very regional and social divides that riddle the country seems likely to compound Yemen's already existing problems, and this has lain at the root of the objections to the plan raised by the country's Socialist Party and Southern Movement and the Houthis in the north. The project has been greeted with opposition by influential opposition forces in the north and south, and the country's security establishment has been reeling beneath power conflicts, terrorist strikes and the push and pull of tribal influences. The opposition in the south has cried foul because the new federalist formula has stripped the region that formerly made up south Yemen of the province of Hadramawt, which is rich in oil and mineral and fishing wealth and is also strategically important because of its position at the entrance to the Gulf. Some fear that the division will sow the seeds for future conflicts. Hadramawt, the birthplace of the former president of south Yemen Ali Salem Al-Beidh, accounts for a third of the surface area of Yemen as a whole and 10 per cent of its population, while it sits on more than half of the country's oil wealth. This region therefore appears to be the winner of the federal plan in view of its natural resources and relatively small population. However, it remains to be seen how the division will impact other portions of the country that stand to be deprived of the oil revenues that once filled the national coffers and how this will effect relations between Hadramawt and the other regions.
PIPELINE ARMIES: There are already signs that Hadramawt will not voluntarily serve as the chief funder of the new federal budget. Because of heavy losses in lives and equipment sustained in battles in the hills and valleys of Hadramawt, the Yemeni army has had to call in large reinforcements from other provinces in operations personally commanded by the country's minister of defence. Still, this “pipeline army,” as some observers have wryly referred to the government forces in the civil war in the south-western region, still appears to be unable to defend itself in many areas. To complicate matters further, the province of Al-Mahra, which the new federal plan has attached to Hadramawt, also appears to have ambitions of its own, aiming to capitalise on its strategic advantage as a window on both the Gulf and the Indian Ocean. Southern critics of the federal plan also argue that it will destroy the unity that had been achieved in the south in 1967 after long and bitter battles between diverse sheikhdoms and sultanates. The south, inclusive of both Aden and Hadramawt, had remained unified until assimilation with the north in 1990. The Socialist Party holds that what is required now is to rectify the course of this integral unity, which had failed to take into account the specificities of the south. South Yemen, which had focussed on the promotion of social and economic rights (though at the expense of civil and political freedoms), had engaged in a network of Arab, regional and international relations that was different to that of the north. When the south was unified with the north following the collapse of the international socialist camp to which the south had previously belonged, it took a “leap into the unknown,” according to party spokesmen. At that time, it was believed that a federal solution could be a more appropriate option, in view of the fundamental differences between the northern and southern outlooks and systems. However, the south fell in with the plan for all-out integration. Yet, as that plan unfolded the south was systematically marginalised, eventually triggering the civil war in 1994. That war was settled militarily with the fall of the Al-Anad base that controlled the route to the southern capital of Aden and the subsequent defeat of the south. While there is some overlap in the outlooks of the Socialist Party and the Southern Movement, there also remains a fundamental difference. While the latter calls for southern secession, the former subscribes to continued unity with the north but in a manner that reforms the former system. The Socialists believe that a federal system should be introduced in Yemen, but on the basis of two regions – the north and south as geographically defined until 1990 – and in a manner that observes the economic, cultural and political rights of the south. They reject the formula that has emerged from the presidential regions committee, which is to say the division of the north into four regions and the south into two. They argue that this formula will open the way to subsequent partitions in both the north and south, and instead they advocate democratising local government, a process that would be very different from the current federal project.
HOUTHI OPPOSITION: The Houthis in the north are also adamantly opposed to the federal plan, which not only deprives them of a Red Sea port, but also attaches them to the region of the capital. Otherwise put, it traps the Houthis in the midst of a Salafist and Wahabi majority and dilutes their area of influence by submerging it in a broader administrative environment. Houthi influence has long prevailed in Saada, from where they have waged six wars against the central government. It has also extended into Saudi territory, and for some periods the Houthis controlled the Al-Dukhan Mountains. Under the current federal partition formula, the Houthis will be attached to the Azal region that includes the capital Sanaa, the Houthi bastion Saada, Amran and Dhamar. Because Al-Hajja will be attached to Tahama, they will lose the access to the Red Sea which they had through that province. The Houthis will also lose their influence in the oil-producing area of Al-Jawf, which has been included in the region of Saba. Voicing Houthi objections to the federal plan, Mohamed Al-Bakhiti, a spokesman, said that “we reject [this partition] because it divides Yemen into poor and rich. Proof of this is to be found in the fact that it combines Saada with Amran and Dhamar, whereas Saada is culturally, geographically and socially closer to Al-Hajja and Al-Jawf, which are oil-producing areas with outlets to the sea.” He said that the formula had been deliberately designed “to serve the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia by providing it with a large tribal and oil space along its border.” He also explained that the oil-rich regions of Saba and Hadramawt were adjacent to Saudi territory and had close tribal and kinship bonds with the country.
BETRAYED REVOLUTION? Yemen could have taken a different course, one in which federalism would have been a solution rather than the source of new problems. It could have followed through on the Yemeni Revolution of February 2011, capitalised on the collective outpouring of popular sentiment to realise its agenda for justice and democracy, and dismantled the networks of tribal influence and favouritism in order to lay the foundations of a citizen state. The tribal establishment in the country has long served as one of the authorities' chief mechanisms for suppressing dissent. The alliance between the Hashed and Bakil tribes was one of the cornerstones of the former Ali Abdullah Saleh regime, for example. These tribes had arms and militias, and the former regime showered military rank, medals and money on them. They were also closely connected to the influence and money of the Saudi regime. This establishment remains intact. The revolution could have led Yemen to a brighter future had there been serious efforts to sustain the impetus of its democratic spirit and youthful energies in order to break the chains of sectarian, regional and tribal allegiances and rally the country behind the cause to build a prosperous and democratic Yemen and a government dedicated to this cause. Unfortunately, the revolution fell prey to the political alliance that had ruled the country under the former regime and that continues to do so under the current president. This alliance consists of the General People's Congress (GPC) and the Islah (Reform) Party, the political wing of the Yemeni chapter of the Muslim Brotherhood. That fact that Yemen is situated at the gateway to the Gulf has rendered its revolution vulnerable to designs to undermine it, using violence followed by political machinations. Prime among these have been the Gulf Initiative that secured a safe exit for ex-president Saleh and simultaneously secured the perpetuation of the cornerstones of his regime. As a result, the ruling GPC is now playing a key role in the so-called national unity government, Saleh's vice-president has been elevated to president, and when early presidential elections were held he was the only candidate. With the Islah Party (the GPC's chief partner) being ever willing to appease the weight of Saudi and Gulf interventions and the continued support of most leaders of the military establishment for the regime, it was difficult for the Yemeni Revolution to attain a tangible victory. Unlike the revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia, the military establishment in Yemen remained solidly behind the old regime. There were only minor defections, such as that of General Ali Mohsen Al-Ahmar who for family reasons connected with the succession split away with a unit from the Republican Guards that was subsequently joined by units from the First Armoured Division. There is no other explannation for the Gulf Initiative, and it was clearly designed to back the regime after repressive measures had served their purpose. The former Yemeni president returned from Saudi Arabia in September, following his convalescence from the wounds he received in the bomb attack against the Presidential Bein Al-Nahdein Mosque in June 2011. He then kicked off his resumed campaign with another bloodbath, recalling the massacre he perpetuated during the “Friday of Dignity” demonstrations in March 2011 and which caused more deaths and wounded than the “Battle of the Camel” incident in Egypt the previous month. Since Yemen first joined the Arab Spring revolutions, a fierce battle has raged, both locally and regionally, over the best formula for a federal system for the country. The anger of the southerners, the majority of whom have come to favour secession after years of marginalisation and discrimination, could have been assuaged with a two-region federal plan that retained the unity of the south. However, some parties apparently feared that such a scenario would prelude another secession of the south and the revival of the independent state that was socialist in its heyday. According to Yemeni affairs expert Arib Al-Rantawi, “the most important factor that propelled the imposition of the six-region formula was not local, but rather consummately regional. The Arab countries neighbouring Yemen were the parties that encouraged, pushed and rallied support behind this formula, which is designed to weaken the southerners and isolate the Houthis in the Yemeni interior without access to the sea.” “As a result, there are many in Yemen who believe that the Arab governments do not want to see Yemen stand on its own two feet and prefer to deal with six mutually antagonistic ‘governments' rather than one strong central government or with a south Yemen that is not under its control and subject to its dictates.” “This is an open secret, as every Yemeni can tell you.” Regardless of how it came about, the 2014 federalist plan is as much an “escape forward” as the unification plan of 1990 was. Both were designed as exits from a situation of crisis, but both only precipitated, or only will precipitate, more crises in a country in which the state does not hold a monopoly on arms and the means to maintain law and order. Yemen is fracturing, yet the new federal project is likely to inflame rather than subdue regional, ethnic and sectarian divides. The potential power and identity conflicts that lie on the horizon can only benefit regional and international powers and interests.
