There is no love lost between Obama and Netanyahu, but there is hope, says Samir Ghattas No sooner did the recent mid- term congressional election results come out in the US than they unleashed widespread debate over their impact on a broad array of contentious and pending issues, especially as regards the prospects of peace talks in the Middle East. In this latter context, the impact of the results on the already difficult relationship between US President Barack Obama and Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu begs immediate attention. Netanyahu had been keeping close track of the minutest details in the recent campaigns in the US. The lights stayed on in his home in Balfour Street, Jerusalem, until he received the last results from his ambassador in Washington and international news broadcasts. The late hours could also be due to the fact that election day in the US fell on the same day that the Balfour Declaration was issued 93 years ago, 2 November 1917. One imagines that PA President Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) was equally conscious of the historic coincidence, but probably experiencing completely the opposite emotions towards both the election results and that anniversary. It would be interesting to compare the expectations that Netanyahu and Abu Mazen have of their relationship with the US president following the defeat the Democrats suffered in the midterm elections. For Netanyahu's part, expectations would not only be based on previous episodes in his relationship with Obama but also on his no less difficult relationship with former president Bill Clinton. He would, therefore, be more acutely aware of the extent to which his perpetuation in office is effected by maintaining smooth relations with the US president or, conversely, setting his government on a collision course with the administration in Washington. After all, Netanyahu paid dearly for having failed to grasp the lesson that a former US president, Bush Senior, had imparted on prime minister Shamir in 1991. Netanyahu's misreading of the Clinton administration precipitated the collapse of his government in its first term (1996-1999) and early Knesset elections. Netanyahu's political rise in Israel was an unprecedented phenomenon. The first candidate for the premiership who was younger than the Israeli state beat the seasoned veteran Peres in the 1996 elections. Steeped in Likudist rightwing ideology and in American media culture, he proclaimed his rejection of the Oslo accords. He ended up butting heads with president Clinton who twisted his arm, firstly, into signing the Hebron (Khalil) agreement with the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and then the Wye River understanding with Arafat. A blend of impetuousness, vindictiveness and inexperience lured him into an attempt to meddle in US domestic affairs by turning his friends in Congress against the US president. He only succeeded in bringing his first term as premier to an early close, after which he lost in 1999 Knesset elections to Ehud Barak. A number of reputable US sources testify to the strains in the Clinton-Netanyahu relationship. In The Much Too Promised Land, Aaron Miller quotes Clinton following his first meeting with Netanyahu in 1996, "Who does he think he is? Who's the super power around here?" In The Missing Peace, the veteran Jewish- American diplomat Dennis Ross recalls Clinton describing Netanyahu's behaviour during a sensitive negotiating meeting as "outrageous" and "despicable" after which the president left the table where Netanyahu was sitting in a fury, saying, "I'm not going to put up with this nonsense." Admittedly, Netanyahu has grown up quite a bit since then. In the ten years that he sat in the shadow and in the Knesset opposition seats, he acquired no small degree of political acumen and sense. On the surface, in his second term as prime minister, he behaves as a responsible statesman who knows his limitations, at least in his relationship with President Barack Obama. However, in his first meeting with Obama in the White House on 18 May 2009, Netanyahu clearly failed to generate a good chemistry. The following day's press in Israel was gloomy. Yediot Aharonot announced that in their three- hour meeting Netanyahu and Obama agreed over virtually nothing. Maarev confined its headline to a single word "Disagreement". Netanyahu then swallowed, as best he could, the sting of the American president's first tour to the Middle East and his historic speech from Cairo without passing through Tel Aviv on the way to or from the region. He needed to avoid an early facedown with the new administration in Washington so, instead, he opted for a policy of containment. A subsequent strategic report issued by the National Research Institute at Tel Aviv University revealed the pressure that Obama had exerted on Netanyahu in their first meeting, as a result of which the Israeli prime minister shifted sharply away from his original positions. In his foreign policy speech at Bar Ilan University on 14 June 2009, Netanyahu agreed to a Palestinian state on the condition that it was unarmed and recognised the Jewish and democratic character of Israel. There was nothing new in the conditions, themselves. They had been stated by Barak, Sharon and Olmert. However, in merely saying that he would recognise a Palestinian state Netanyahu had departed from his party's electoral platform and the programme of the ruling coalition that he heads. Nor was this Bibi's only deviation from his declared positions. On 25 November 2009 he announced a ten- month freeze to new settlement construction in the West Bank. Whatever criticisms one might voice of the actual substance of this freeze, it stands out as an exception to long-standing Israeli policy. It had only a single precedent: the three-month freeze that Manachem Begin declared after Camp David I. However, Netanyahu's retractions were not sufficient to ensure the success of his second meeting with Obama on 25 March 2010. Once again Israeli headlines proclaimed the meeting a complete failure. So strong were the differences between them that they could not even issue a joint statement at the end. One of Israel's leading political commentators, Shimon Schiffer, observed in Yediot Aharonot, "A deep mistrust hangs between Netanyahu and Obama." Netanyahu continued to avoided an open confrontation with Obama. But suddenly, at least much to Abu Mazen's surprise, Obama's turn came to depart from his original line with Netanyahu. In the summit that brought them together in Washington on 6 July 2010, Netanyahu was accorded a remarkably warm and hospital welcome, leading the Israeli right to boast of a Netanyahu victory. In an attempt to find a rational explanation for Obama's shift, some held that he was only changing tactics. He switched from exerting pressure to applying praise, while continuing to work in the same direction. In support of this argument they point to the press conference in which Obama said, "I believe that Netanyahu wants peace and that he will take the risks to achieve that aim." Then, in his speech before the UN General Assembly, Obama expressed his hope to see a Palestinian state become a member of that assembly in the following year and he openly called for a continuation of the freeze on settlement construction. Afterwards, he began twisting Abu Mazen's arm to enter into direct and intensive negotiations with Netanyahu, because the proximity talks were going nowhere and he wanted to produce some tangible progress towards and agreement, instead of mere token gestures. Direct negotiations ran into a wall less than a month after they started. That wall was Netanyahu's refusal to extend the settlement construction freeze beyond 26 September, leading Abu Mazen to break off the process unless the freeze was reinstated. Meanwhile, the countdown to the US congressional elections was picking up pace, which undoubtedly encouraged Netanyahu to refuse any formulas that the Obama administration offered to end the standoff and bring the parties back to the negotiating table. Whereas the Israeli right was satisfied that Netanyahu did not offer what they would have seen as a hypocritical gift to Obama, many in the US saw Netanyahu's refusal to extend the freeze if only for a few months as a deliberate slap in Obama's face, delivered at a critical time in the run-up to the congressional elections. Indeed, Thomas Friedman's commentaries to this effect were published in Israel's most widely distributed newspapers. For the most part, the American electorate was not interested in the settlement freeze question and Netanyahu's position had no influence on the polls worth mentioning. However, it is certain to leave scars on the already troubled relationship between him and the US president. It should be added, however, that Netanyahu did not ride the crest of the wave of schadenfreud that swept the Israeli right as the US electoral returns came in. But then he probably has reason to keep the smirk off his face and to keep his attitude toward Obama under control. For one, it was not all that long ago that President Clinton lost the Democratic majority in both houses during his first term but, nevertheless, succeeded in regaining the initiative and getting elected to a second term. Theoretically, at least, there is nothing to prevent Obama from doing the same. In addition, Netanyahu is aware, as is everyone else in Israel, that a Republican-dominated Congress, as useful as that might be, can do little to tie Obama's hands in the exercise of his extensive powers in the conduct of foreign policy. He must also realise that Obama has not ventured beyond his predecessor, Bush, as far as the peace process is concerned. In fact, Obama has not asked for more, but rather for less than the report that Middle East envoy Mitchell submitted to Bush. It was Bush, moreover, not Obama, who was the first US president to officially unveil a "vision" for a two-state solution, and the "roadmap" and the "Annapolis" process all bear the Republican Party trademark. At the same time, Netanyahu cannot expect Obama to easily relinquish the role of midwife determined to bring a Palestinian state to life, because it is perhaps the only role that will qualify him, albeit retroactively, for the Nobel Prize he obtained before having built up a record of achievement. As important as such considerations may be, an even more powerful check on Netanyahu's behaviour toward Obama, even after the Democrats' congressional defeat, is the Iranian question. Netanyahu knows perfectly well that Israel cannot work alone against Iran and, indeed, that it is better for Israel to work behind the Americans in this domain, rather than taking the lead with only an American green light and some support. He is also aware that the Iranian question is almost certain to be resolved during Obama's term in office. Israeli military intelligence chief Amos Yadlin recently told the Knesset's Security and Foreign Policy committee that Iran has enough refined uranium to produce its first nuclear bomb. Most likely, too, Netenyahu has been closely following strategic analyses that suggest a possibility of the US administration relaxing its stance towards Tehran and allowing it to enter the nuclear club or, at least, remain on the threshold. Clearly then, the Iranian nuclear question is now the key to regulating Netanyahu's behaviour toward the Obama administration following the loss of the democratic majority in the House of Representatives. At the same time, we should not rule out the possibility of Obama switching course on the Palestinian-Israeli negotiating process. Instead of spending too much time and effort on the search for a lasting solution to this conflict, he might now, especially in light of the Democratic setback, prefer to broker an interim settlement. Dennis Ross has already given indications of such a possibility as has Secretary of State Clinton who said, "There is hope for progress, if not in our lives then at least in the lives of our children." If he does move in this direction, Obama will nevertheless work to link an interim settlement with the second phase of the roadmap and particularly that provision that calls for the "creation of a Palestinian state with provisional borders and attributes of sovereignty," and that states that Quartet members will "promote the international recognition of the Palestinian state, including possible UN membership". If he succeeds in doing this, Obama will have fulfilled, in his own way, his pledge to introduce a Palestinian state as a new member in the UN by next year. In light of the foregoing considerations, it appears that the strains in the Obama-Netanyahu relationship will be kept under control in the forthcoming phase. That is unless Netanyahu reverts to the impetuosity and megalomania that characterised his "Bibi" phase when Bill Clinton was president. If he does, the cold war between him and Obama will erupt into a seething confrontation. The write is director of the Maqdis Centre for Political Studies, Gaza.
