Ominously back in the region, the US vice-president, running out of time in Washington, may well roll the dice for another military misadventure, writes Hassan Nafaa* According to the advanced billing, Dick Cheney's Middle East tour would comprise four countries: the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt. No mention was made of the fact that the first stop would be Iraq, which is where the US vice- president made his first appearance. The reason that this titbit of information had not been released beforehand is obvious: not even the occupying power and ostensibly the greatest military force on earth can ensure the safety of its people -- not even its vice-president -- in Iraq. This truth was driven home with stunning clarity by the televised images of the UN secretary-general ducking under a table after explosions reverberated overhead during a press conference in the Green Zone attended by most members of the Iraqi "government". Nothing so untoward disrupted the first leg of Cheney's itinerary, after which he set off on the officially publicised stops. Cheney is no ordinary vice-president. If he had been, few would attach great importance to the movements of the occupant of an office that is often referred to as the fifth wheel in the American administration. Cheney's expertise in foreign affairs, however, combined with Bush's lack of such expertise (not to mention other qualities) and a range of other factors has elevated him to the Bush administration's chief foreign policy architect. In all his previous tours of the Middle East, this dangerous man, who maintained a broad network of connections in the region since he served as Bush Senior's secretary of defense, was used to getting what he wanted. This time, however, it looks like he's in for disappointment. In order to understand what the vice-president aimed to achieve from this trip we must consider the Bush clique's worldview since the collapse of the Soviet Union. This administration had a very clear vision for reshaping the world, a distinct perspective on how this administration fits into this enterprise, and a set of plans that had already been drawn up and were only awaiting the right moment to be put into effect. That moment presented itself on 11 September 2001. Although the Bush team has finally begun to realise the magnitude of the difficulties that stand in the way of its designs, it nevertheless still believes these designs are viable. Bush and Cheney also think that the fact that neither of them will be running in the next presidential elections gives them greater manoeuvrability and a certain amount of time to accomplish their objectives. However, the clock is ticking. They have at most a year in which to take some critical decisions. This is where the danger lies, and this is why Cheney was back again. Since coming to power in January 2001, the neo- conservatives, especially the ultra-neoconservatives championed by Cheney, were obsessed by a single goal: reordering the world in a way that would establish Washington's global hegemony for the 21st century and ensure that no other power, such as China, could contest America's perch at the pinnacle of the new order. The key to accomplishing this goal, they thought, lay in seizing control over the world's major oil reserves, and Iraq, which sits atop one of the largest oil reserves and which was crippled by a decade of sanctions, was the obvious place to start. Of course, they had the minor problem of having to take a detour through Afghanistan due to that country's immediate connection with 11 September, but they dealt with that as quickly as possible and, as soon as they toppled the Taliban, redirected their guns towards Iraq. Then, following the occupation of Iraq, they shifted their sights to the Iran-Syria-Hizbullah- Palestinian resistance axis, which they felt formed a major impediment to their designs to reshape the Middle East to their liking. Moreover, such was their hubris that they imagined they could cajole, blackmail and twist the arms of the US's European and Arab allies into the service of their policy. Despite the rapidity of the rise of the Iraqi resistance and the recalcitrance of the resistance on the Lebanese and Palestinian fronts, the Bush administration remained convinced that its plans were proceeding as intended. All these mere glitches meant was that implementation would take a little longer than expected -- a reading of the situation that seemed confirmed by the assassination of Rafik Al-Hariri that set into motion dynamics that would lead to Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon and pressure to disarm Hizbullah, the Iranian nuclear crisis that opened an avenue to clamp down on Iran politically and economically, and Sharon's massive offensive against Palestinian resistance factions. For a short time, the Bush administration felt smug in the assurance that the days of the anti- American camp in the region were numbered. But when those days began to grow longer and more numerous than expected, and as US forces sank deeper and deeper into the mire in Iraq, it began to explore various options, including military ones. Specifically, it began to coordinate with Israel over plans to strike nuclear facilities in Iran and to destroy the military infrastructure of Hizbullah in Lebanon. The opportunity to put the latter into action presented itself last summer when Hizbullah staged a cross-border raid and captured two Israeli soldiers to use as bartering chips for the release of Hizbullah detainees in Israel. It escaped no observer of the Israeli assault on Lebanon that, in contrast to its reactions to previous Israeli-Lebanese confrontations, Washington had been itching for the war and did all it could to prolong it until Israel accomplished its objectives. Many were also struck by Washington's persistent attempts to form a "Sunni axis" of "moderate Arab states" that could be pitted against a looming "Shia crescent" of Muslim "extremists". Few were taken in by the jargon. If the war in Lebanon had ended as planned with the dismantlement of Hizbullah's infrastructure, the US would have translated this victory into the momentum needed to overturn the Syrian and Iranian regimes. But the plans backfired, drastically. Rather than marking the beginning of the end of the "extremists", the war strengthened the position of Hizbullah inside Lebanon and elevated its star among the Arab public at large, while the pro-American camp cringed in embarrassment and scrambled to distance itself from the disaster. Soon afterwards there followed the midterm congressional elections in which the situation in Iraq proved the major determinant and the results of which came as a slap in the face to the Bush administration and a disaster for the Republican Party. It is against this background that Cheney's "vital" -- as Bush put it -- visit to the region took place. Despite severe setbacks to the neo- conservatives' enterprise to secure America's global hegemony, indeed signs that this enterprise is unachievable, the fanatical neo- conservatives led by Cheney, at least, have given no indication whatsoever that they have learned a single lesson or changed their views in any way. On the contrary, it appears as though they still believe that they can win in the end. But because the options that are now open to them are so few as to be virtually non-existent, the chances are high that they will resort to extreme measures. Cautioning them that the military operations they are planning are guaranteed fiascos will do little good. The world has already had ample demonstration of their mindset: it is rash and fanatic and until now refuses to admit defeat and it is becoming more desperate. Some commentators have suggested that the purpose of Cheney's tour is to solicit help for an honourable exit strategy from Iraq. I doubt that this is really the case, or if it is, I doubt it will work. The current US administration will never take the decision to withdraw US forces from Iraq. The most it will agree to is a withdrawal of US forces from Iraq's major cities, redeploying them in and around various military bases where it hopes to keep them for a long time to come. This is hardly the type of solution that is likely to gain enthusiastic support from the governments whose help Cheney is soliciting. In fact, it is not a solution at all, but rather a thinly disguised and foolish bid to accomplish the neo- conservatives' original aims by different means. In addition, the countries that Cheney is appealing to have little impact on the situation inside Iraq. The ones that do have influence and, therefore, the ability to help the US withdraw with "honour" are Iran and Syria, but the current administration does not want to pay, or perhaps cannot afford, the price these countries would ask in return. Some might counter that the US has not yet lost hope of driving a wedge between Damascus and Tehran, which is why the US secretary of state met with the Syrian foreign minister but not with the Iranian foreign minister during her recent visit to Sharm El-Sheikh. However, at the present moment, the practical conditions do not favour the success of such a ploy. The current Israeli government is too weak and, in all events, unprepared to take the necessary step of withdrawing from the Golan Heights, which is what it would take for Syria to make the type of pact with the US that the Bush administration is angling for. The most likely purpose of Cheney's tour, therefore, is to lay the diplomatic groundwork and secure support for a military strike against Iran. Cheney undoubtedly thinks that there is enough anti-Iranian paranoia in the region to facilitate his task. However, he also knows that the Arabs will also want to see some progress on the Arab-Israeli front, so he certain to perform the types of gestures that we have seen from the Americans before when they were gearing up for a war in this region. Today, in order to show how serious he is about getting the negotiations ball rolling again, he will give some play to the Arab peace initiative. But play is about as far as it will go; firstly, because Cheney is mostly interested in playing for time and, secondly, because an acceptable settlement has never been more out of reach than it is at present. So probably the most we will see will be some preliminary talks while preparations are put into place for a strike against Iran, which could take place much sooner than many imagine and probably no later than October or November. It was not just for show that Cheney climbed aboard an American aircraft carrier in the Gulf and shouted threats at Iran. * The writer is a professor of political science at Cairo University.
