The June challenge

The June 1967 War lasted minutes for some, years for others. Thirty years later, in 1997, commanders and soldiers told Galal Nassar their stories, piecing together fragments of the tragedy: men lost in the desert, messages sent and never received, and the bitter taste of defeat that was to last six long years. Marking the 40th anniversary of the tragic events of that war, Al-Ahram Weekly revisits the voices of the vanquished yet defiant
The three-year
The late General Mohamed Fawzi , former minister of defence, was chief of general staff of the Egyptian forces in June 1967 during what is known as the six-day war. Fawzi's first words are a correction of dates: the war, he considers, lasted not six days but three years
"The war started 5 June 1967 and ended in August 1970. Israel, however, had been preparing for war for 10 long years before June 1967, and the US, Israel's active ally, supported these preparations. Although the US had forced Israel to withdraw from Sinai in 1956, a secret document that was revealed 11 years later underlined the nature of the alliance between the two countries. In a letter addressed to the Israeli government, President Eisenhower wrote: 'The United States pledges to keep the Gulf of Aqaba open for navigation as an international waterway.'
"The document was concealed from all parties, including Egypt, until May 1967 when it was made public by Washington. But why was it made public at that particular time? The goal, which we learned later, was to provoke Egypt into reacting violently, thus turning international public opinion against it.
"After 1956, Israel formulated a plan for a comprehensive war against Egypt, the largest Arab state and the main threat to Israel's future. Ben Gurion believed that striking at the top would improve conditions for Israel, particularly since Egypt had made substantial progress in its first five-year plan (1962- 1967).
"As part of the indemnities for Nazi war crimes, Israel concluded a number of arms deals providing it with Mirage-3 and Mirage-5 planes from France. Upgrading its air force was part of a military plan known as 'Zion', which consisted of a vast air strike against Egypt, to be followed by a massive advance of its land troops. According to this plan, Israel trained its pilots in low-altitude flying, at 30 metres above sea level, to gain skill for staging an air strike that would wipe out Egypt. The Zion plan entailed 10 years of training and preparation.
"A US intelligence warship sailed from the western coast of Africa and docked off Port Said. The ship sent information about the Egyptian military situation to Israeli planes coming from Tel Aviv to Sinai and Port Said. Starting 4 June, the US warship had been providing Israel with intelligence on Egypt's main units in Sinai, particularly the 4th Armoured Division. Interference by US intelligence was so damaging that when the war broke out 5 June, wireless communications between the Egyptian command and ground forces were impossible. This crippled Egyptian management of the war. US Air Squadron 66, stationed in Britain, also participated effectively in the war by carrying out reconnaissance for the Israelis. The Sixth Fleet, meanwhile, was guarding Israeli waters. Nasser knew exactly what he was talking about when he accused the US of participating in the war.
"The June war was a premeditated military aggression planned since 1957. The Israeli commander of the south zone, in a press conference after the war, said: 'My conscience can no longer bear this burden of silence, nor the perpetration of deceit and dishonesty. I must admit that the June 1967 war was an offensive planned and premeditated by Israel, precisely since the end of 1956. Provoking the Arabs was part of the plan.'
"The Israeli general resigned from the military and joined the Peace Now movement. 'We spent 10 long years with nothing on our minds but the Zion plan, for every eating, drinking, sleeping and waking hour. Finally, it was executed in 80 decisive minutes,' the Israeli commander stated.
"The Israeli plan was founded on three factors: surprise, deceit, and applying Israel's military principle of pushing any battle beyond the enemy's borders. In the first part, the air force was to act; once its task was accomplished, the ground forces were to move in. In the event that the air force failed to accomplish its task, the entire plan would be cancelled.
"The second part of the plan pertained to how Israel would deal with Egyptian forces. Al-Qaher, Egypt's defence plan, ratified in 1966, was conceived as the military dimension of the decision taken by the Arab Summit meeting in 1964, to prevent Israel from expanding into Arab territory. The Egyptian plan focussed on defence and deterrence techniques, while Israeli forces were trained in attacks and raids."
In the wake of Nasser's political victory in 1956, the Egyptian armed forces were regarded as important actors in the movement to free Egypt from imperialism, Nasser the champion of Arab nationalism. Nasser provided political, financial and military assistance to independence movements in Africa and Asia. Fawzi, who was entrusted with the affairs of African states, says that by 1966, 19 African states had gained their independence with Egyptian assistance. The Egyptian role led to the erosion of the French and British colonial presence in these countries.
Egypt's union with Syria consolidated the dream of Arab solidarity but, three years in, the arrangement fell apart. Just as the union with Syria crumbled, dealing a crushing blow to dreams of Arab unity, revolution broke out in Yemen. Nasser's backing for the republican regime was prompted by his determination, first, to back and encourage national liberation movements; second, to foster Arab solidarity; third, to deal a blow to imperialism in one of its last strongholds; and fourth, to show the world that the United Arab Republic (the name kept after the break with Syria) was still a power to be reckoned with.
Egyptian support for Yemen meant sending forces as far as 2,600 nautical miles south, but in Fawzi's words, it was originally conceived as "a limited action comprising political, moral and material support -- by no means was it envisaged as an action that could drain our resources." Two battalions of Special Forces and an aircraft squadron were sent to Yemen to reinforce the nascent republican government and consolidate the revolution. Nasser himself referred to the support he sent to Yemen as "symbolic". Egyptian military presence in Yemen, however, reached 70,000 servicemen in 1964.
According to Fawzi, although this contribution was made at a time when Israel seemed to be preparing for war, the political leadership in Egypt was not pessimistic enough to plan accordingly. Although Egyptian military strategy was focussed on the north-eastern axis, no significant effort was made to prepare for war in terms of equipment or training of military cadres. Fawzi acknowledges the enormous error committed by expanding operations in Yemen, with its difficult mountains, vast deserts and tribal conflicts.
"Our involvement had become a show, staged by 70,000 men. If we had taken control of three cities only -- Sanaa, El-Hodaida and Taiz -- that would have done the job. Yemen, however, did not drain our resources to the extent that writers like to imply. We never sent Yemen any of the new arms of heavy weaponry we had obtained from the Soviet Union, such as Mig-21 planes or T-55 tanks. The basic error, no doubt, was that our strategy lost its focus and looked south instead of north. This caused an imbalance in the focus of the military command responsible for national security.
"The truth is that on the morning of 5 June all Egypt's military forces were in Egypt, with the exception of one infantry brigade and two battalions of Special Forces. The problem with the armies being away in Yemen has more to do with the troops' lack of training and the lack of modern arms. The Egyptian forces came back from Yemen and were sent to Sinai immediately, where they met a well-armed and highly trained enemy.
"The Egyptian military command was handicapped by its lack of strategic reconnaissance facilities. Israel knew everything about us, while we knew nothing about its military might. Another problem was the complete separation between the political and the military leaderships in Egypt in the period preceding the war.
"In December 1966, Nasser received a coded message from Field Marshal Amer, who was on an official visit to Pakistan. He wrote: 'It is our duty to consider ending the task of the United Nations emergency forces [stationed along the Egyptian-Israeli borders in Sinai]. Certain neighbouring Arab countries are accusing Egyptian forces of hiding behind the emergency forces and refusing to lend other Arabs a hand.'
"This was the earliest sign of discord between the two top leaders of the country. Amer claimed to be representing the views of the high-ranking military, but this was not necessarily the case. He was speaking his own mind, and his decisions were arbitrary. The differences between the two men were to grow deeper over preparations for battle.
"The second important issue which highlighted Nasser and Amer's conflicting standpoints surfaced during a meeting attended by ministers and high-ranking officers. Amer insisted on the closing of the Tiran Straits, a proposal opposed by all those attending. He demanded: 'How can an Egyptian soldier bear to see the Israeli flag in the gulf?' The decision to close the Straits was taken at this meeting. Preparations and public mobilisation were stepped up, troops were moved, and the media captured the mood with excessive zeal.
"Nasser, however, did not wish to be distracted by side issues. He wanted to focus on the threat Israel posed to Syria. He was aware that Egypt had hardly been able to provide the basics for the implementation of the Al-Qaher plan.
"But Israel and the US would have gone ahead on 5 June whether the straits were closed or not, and whether the emergency forces remained in place or not. While the threat to attack Syria seemed imminent, the plan for war against Egypt was ready.
"The decision to close the gulf had several negative consequences. Executing the decision required enormous human and material resources, which compromised the effectiveness of Egypt's defence plan. As a result, Amer had to withdraw part of the forces in Sinai to station them in Sharm El-Sheikh, but when he could no longer find forces, he began to draw on strategic reserve forces, first a brigade of paratroopers and then the 4th Armoured Division, which is the strategic reserve of the state. Therefore, the war started without a strategic reserve.
"At this point, I can assert, looking back 30 years after the battle took place, that we were doomed to lose before a single shot was fired. It was not the best time for Egypt to fight, and the situation was aggravated by total discord between the political and military leaderships. The military leadership had separated itself from the constitutional organisation of the state, a situation that can lead to nothing but failure. The proof is that only one side fought the battle: Israel. A staggering 75 per cent of Egypt's ground forces did not even see the enemy. The death toll among the Egyptian forces was only 10,000 men: 1,000 died in confrontations in Rafah and Gaza, and 9,000 were victims of the 'wrong and arbitrary decision of one man'.
"On the evening of 6 June, hardly 24 hours after the beginning of the war, Amer ordered the forces to withdraw to the west bank of the canal, and to leave their weapons behind. He repeated the same order on 7 June, and it wreaked havoc. A stampede took place in the narrow mountain passes. Thousands found their death there.
"Why did Amer not consult anyone before giving this order? There is some background to the story. Before the war, Amer had issued Presidential Decree 118, merging the post of chief of staff of the armed forces into a new administration, to be named the Supreme Armed Forces Command. But this new body was established on paper only, without terms of reference, so that, as chief of staff of the armed forces, I was not assigned any field operation in the 1967 battle. My functions were transferred to the commander of the ground forces, and I, like all the rest of the able commanders, became nothing but onlookers.
"Despite the debacle of the sixth day, it is impossible to say exactly when the war ended. On 10 June, the decision for a ceasefire on the Arab front was issued, yet the Ras Al-Esh battle was fought on 1 July, by the very forces which had withdrawn, carrying the weapons which had not been used in June. Naval battles raged on after 5 June 1967. On 5 June, Israel was far from scoring a decisive victory.
"Egyptians did not consider themselves to have fought a war and lost it; the term defeat did not seem to apply. To be defeated implies the collapse of the regime, but this did not occur. The people's overwhelming rejection of Nasser's resignation is proof that the regime had not collapsed in the least. The June experience was therefore referred to as 'the setback'.
"After the war, the people started to play an active role in the affairs of their country and to speak their minds. A new strategy was adopted, not for the defence of the land, but for its liberation. Liberation was a national cause defined in the resolutions of the Khartoum Summit held on 27 September 1967.
"It was time to change the leadership and to break free from the shackles of a divided command. The armed forces were to be reformed, and new scientific techniques were introduced to upgrade performance. From there, we fought the War of Attrition, then the October War, and we were victorious."
Fatal mistakes
Retired Lieutenant-General Safiyeddin Abu Shneif , commander-in-chief of the Egyptian armed forces and former director of the Military Intelligence, recalls one incident from 1967 that illustrates the confusion and chaos prevalent in the Egyptian forces, and remembers his encounter with Moshe Dayan, Israel's late minister of defence
"One morning an officer brought a letter sealed with red wax to the commander of an infantry division. The division had just been moved from the western bank of the Suez Canal to El-Gisna in track vehicles. The officer presented himself to the commander of the division and handed him the letter. On reading the letter, the commander said nothing, but an expression of astonishment and sorrow crossed his face.
"He handed the letter to the commander of operations of the division, Colonel Ahmed Badawi, who later became the minister of the defence and led the 7th Infantry Division (the first to cross the Canal in the October war).
"No sooner had Colonel Badawi set his eyes on the letter than he flew into a rage, and demanded bitterly: 'How can the division be moved again across another 160 kilometres on wheeled or track vehicles, on a rugged road, to a station in an open desert with no air cover? Why weren't we given the chance to explore the region, study its terrain and see how our defences would be established?'
"After a while, he asked the commander of the division: 'What about air defence; who will provide it?' But he soon understood that nothing more could be said. The 7th Infantry Division took to the road again; several thousand men, poorly trained, ill equipped, with no notion of their task, lost in the heart of Sinai, with no air defence against the enemy. Even before the battle started, defeat was a fait accompli.
"The 7th Division suffered heavy losses, and the survivors and their colonel returned weak and broken-hearted, choking on their bitterness and their shame.
"In 1973, the approach was totally different. It was the victory of the scientific approach to the art of war. Planning, strategy, control, discipline and accountability at every level and coordination between the different forces and their wings were the elements that made victory possible. In 1973, tasks were clearly defined, the goal was one, morale was high and confidence in victory was absolute.
"After the peace treaty with Israel, a joint Arab-Israeli committee was established to recover a part of Sinai which extended until the El-Arish/Ras Mohamed line. I was the head of the Egyptian delegation, and my rank at the time was brigadier. One evening, after supper, I was told by the Israeli major who was at the head of the Israeli delegation that General Moshe Dayan was in the region and that he wished to see me. I was very keen to meet the man who, although greatly weakened by illness and by our October victory, had had a brilliant career in the wars of 1956 and 1967. I was eager to hear his reaction to the October War and its consequences.
"I said to him: 'With your knowledge and experience in warfare and your military record, I would like to hear your opinion, plainly and frankly, about the October War.' After thanking me for my 'courageous compliments as an Egyptian officer' he said: 'I will tell you my opinion frankly, but do not get upset. We believe in realistic planning, based on clear and accurate information. We believe in clear goals and easy and feasible methods of execution. We study our enemy thoroughly. We assess his resources, capabilities and intentions. For example, if we compare our strengths, we can say that our air force is superior to your air force, our land forces, tanks, armoured vehicles and track artillery are qualitatively superior and we possess sophisticated and advanced weaponry. We had qualitative and quantitative information about your weapons. No sane person would have launched an offensive with such a capability as yours, but you went against all logic and indulged in war.'
"'War in the desert depends primarily on the air force to secure the battlefield, furnish the forces with the latest information about the enemy and inspire much-needed confidence in the troops. Your air force did not have the capability for this task. In a desert war, the air force's function is to provide protection to the forces on the ground. Your air defence force was unable to defend your forces against our planes, particularly when your forces went eastward, yet you took your chances and succeeded to some extent.'
"'We constructed the Bar-Lev line on the eastern bank of the Canal as a fortified line, structured at an angle which renders it impossible to climb. The fortified posts were equipped with a complete defence system that enables a longer duration of combat and resistance to any kind of missile. Mines were planted throughout in the region so that any attempt to cross the line would be virtually impossible. We planned that if you would consider an offensive action, you would certainly resort to the Canal to set up bridgeheads for your forces to cross. But instead, you crossed the Canal in dinghies and climbed the eastern sand barrier by rope ladders that we had not seen since the Middle Ages. You attacked our fortifications heedless of the losses and succeeded.'
"'We had expected that endeavours to cross the Canal would be undertaken by the infantry to secure the bridges, and that the tanks would not appear until at least six hours later. I am sorry to say that in the past, whenever our tanks appeared, your infantry soldiers either fled or were crushed by our tanks. But in 1973, we found an infantry that fought fiercely, resisting the tanks with their own bodies and with anti-tank "suitcase missiles" carried by single infantrymen. This also seemed contrary to common sense and to what we had been used to from Egyptian forces. Any army preparing for war would necessarily have a strategic reserve of equipment and ammunition or would be supported by an ally to supply its needs, but you had no strong ally since the West was not on your side, and you had expelled the Russians from your country before the war. Worse still, you did not have a single factory to supply you with even one tank, one plane or one armoured vehicle, yet you fought and won.'"
Picking up the pieces
In the immediate aftermath of the June war, Amin Howeidi was appointed both minister of defence and chief of General Intelligence. Commissioned by Nasser to rebuild the armed forces, his may be the most informed account of events during and following the war. Howeidi was also responsible for investigating the causes of defeat, and was directly involved in events leading to Amer's forced resignation
"Actually, nobody knew anything about the true level of military preparedness of the armed forces, not even the political leadership. Had it known, the assumption is that something would have been done to avert the crisis and matters on the political side would not have gone as far as direct confrontation.
"Prior to June 1967, the armed forces were a grey area that no one could penetrate. The commander of the armed forces was not accountable to any authority in the state.
"In terms of organisation, we had no Ministry of Defence in the proper sense of the word. The office of minister of defence is political; he is responsible for preparing the state for war, including the armed forces. The military leadership, on the other hand, represented by the chief of general staff, or the commanding general, is responsible for military readiness during peacetime and only takes responsibility for the war if the political situation so dictates. Confusion between these responsibilities is a violation of the constitutional legitimacy of the state, and makes the state's monitoring and control functions over the armed forces meaningless.
"In 1967, Field Marshal Amer was, as many would admit, lacking in experience. He was appointed to his post at the beginning of the revolution, simply to safeguard it, but he should not have remained, let alone been promoted for political reasons to become commander-in-chief. Chief of General Staff Fawzi, who had no powers, was accused by his colleagues of ignorance, and even said the same about himself in 1967. His role was nonexistent, yet was made to rival the commander of the ground forces, Lieutenant- General Mortagi, who was at the time the secretary of one of the sporting clubs! Lieutenant-General Sidqi Mahmoud, who was the commander of the air force, had performed badly in 1956, causing the destruction of his forces, but was retained, performing even more disastrously in 1967. The same may be said of Admiral Suleiman Ezzat.
"The supreme military commander also had other occupations. Amer was vice-commander in chief, chairman of the High Dam Authority, the Public Transportation Authority, and chairman of the committees for the liquidation of feudalism. The other high-ranking military officials were secretaries of sporting clubs.
"Another factor in the defeat of 1967 is that the military high brass had held their posts since 1952. By comparison, in Israel, no chief of general staff maintains his post for more than three years, or four at most.
"As a result of this policy, the military command in Egypt felt themselves to be above and beyond the framework of the state. Amer's case is one example: when he was asked to relinquish his military functions and act as vice-president (the proposal was another mistake), he refused! Thereupon Nasser was compelled to force him to resign, placing him under house arrest in Giza, where he remained until he committed suicide. It may well be said that the military command conducted the war in 1967 with the same mentality as they did in 1948.
"Nasser, however, was totally detached from all that went on within the army. When Nasser asked Amer about the condition of the army, Amer swore on his own life that it was in perfect condition. The Egyptian military command firmly believed that it possessed the largest military force in the Middle East. This gross error generated pretentious and groundless self- confidence. This mood was fanned by a stupid media campaign which some have justified on grounds of its effect in intimidating and possibly deterring the enemy. But we knew that Israel was not deceived by our propaganda. It possessed accurate and precise information about the true condition of our armed forces.
"It is astonishing that we went into war without a plan. Al-Qaher was a plan in the sense that it showed the distribution of the forces on the ground, but that doesn't mean anything in terms of training the troops to allow them to perform their tasks effectively. Would anybody believe that the Egyptian forces had not conducted a single manoeuvre since 1954 when the manoeuvre known as 'Intisar' was conducted on the Cairo- Alexandria desert road? No trenches, defence fortifications or any such facilities to simulate a battlefield had been set up. Fuelling and preparing aircraft for each sortie required 45 minutes on average for the Egyptians. The Israelis completed the task in five minutes. In other words, one Israeli plane was worth nine Egyptian planes.
"Training also requires information. Troops should be trained with some target in mind. Unfortunately, when I was appointed to the general and military intelligence services, I found no information that was confirmed or valid. The proof is that the information available had set the range of Israeli planes no further than the Suez Canal. But when the war began, these planes easily reached Beni Sweif. Even the air force attempted no reconnaissance of any Israeli positions. The only time photos were taken, they were supposedly of Bir Sheeba, but we discovered later that they were photos of Aqaba!
"Israel claims that the war began on 18 May, the day the Gulf of Aqaba was closed. This was in keeping with Israel's previous confirmations that it would consider the war declared in any of three conditions: the closing of the gulf, an Arab assault on Jordan, or a direct attack on Israel. We, on the other hand, declared that the war had started at 8.45am on 5 June with the air strike. Israel was careful to exonerate itself from the aggressor's role. It claimed it was engaged in a defensive war and thus, as Begin said, had the right to keep territory it had seized in the process.
"Arguments which ascribe the defeat to the fact that the forces were in Yemen are false. I admit that it is not the best situation to be fighting on two fronts, but the forces in Egypt were quite sufficient to implement the Al-Qaher plan. I was responsible for the forces in Yemen, which became one of the excuses for the bitter defeat of the generals. The mistake to be acknowledged is that the offensive force was in Cairo, not in Sinai, which may not have been all bad, since the planes, tanks and air force defence forces which were in Cairo were saved, and we had some infrastructure with which to resume the fighting.
"In his resignation speech, Nasser said that no war in the proper sense had taken place. Weapons were not used but were lost in the withdrawal. When the airfields were struck, he said, we abandoned 13,000 trucks, hundreds of tanks, armed vehicles and artillery.
"The basic, self-evident truth which we seem to have overlooked is that the command is the head, the soldiers are the body, and the facilities are the tail. If the mind dies, the head is damaged and ceases to function, then the body and the facilities necessarily became useless.
"We may have entered the war in what seemed like a paradoxical condition, but why was the withdrawal so disastrous? The problem is that nobody objected or gave advice concerning the withdrawal, but merely made statements and boasted. The executive authority (the Council of Ministers and the Executive Committee) did not object, nor did the legislative authority, or the Committee for National Defence and Security. Instead, they endorsed the decision. None of the Arabs I visited with Zakaria Mohieddin in Kuwait, Iraq, Syria and Algeria objected, which only reflects the fragility of those regimes.
"As a result, two important matters became evident. The defeat did not involve Egypt and the frontline states alone, but all the Arabs, and it was inconceivable that a state like Israel would defeat the entire Arab nation. The defeat in 1967 led to the occupation of Arab territory and the loss of our strategic position (which we are still unable to retrieve). Israel is using demilitarised zones, joint security patrols, and the confusion between political and security zones so that, in time, the strategic advantages of the pre-1967 years will never be recovered.
"After the defeat, I was entrusted with the function of changing the military commanders and rebuilding the armed forces. I found the struggle at the top military levels as strong as ever. The commanders who had been responsible for the defeat had been discharged, and those who remained fought fiercely to deny responsibility. I asked them to present me with written statements about their role.
"Among the generals were Mortagi, Salah Mohsen, and Hassan and Hussein Mutawe. At this point, I became convinced that all those who had been responsible for the outcome of the war had to resign. I introduced some changes, whereby the chief of general staff would be given the powers of the commander- general, a post that was cancelled. Lieutenant-General Abdel-Moneim Riyad was appointed to the two positions. I then turned my attention to establishing the defensive line west of the Canal. The air force was to be rebuilt by Lieutenant-General Madkour Abul-Ezz. The western defence line was ready in March 1968. Defensive and offensive operations continued until I left the Ministry of Defence to lead the intelligence service again, and devoted all my time to this work.
"As chief of the Military Intelligence, I had to rely primarily on information, not news. Secondly, I focussed on the state of the combating forces, not in terms of weapons but the efficiency of the troops on the battlefield. It must be remembered that, in the October War, it was the quality of the soldiers that won the war.
"Moreover, there should be no declaration of any intended movements. On 7 October, Sadat wrote to Kissinger asserting that Egypt had no intention to move deeper into Sinai. Kissinger took the message to the members of the US National Security Council, who had been confused about the intentions of the Egyptian troops until Sadat gave them this assurance."
Dereliction of duty
As commander-in-chief of the air force and air defence, late Air Vice-Marshal Abdel-Hamid El-Dighidi 's task was to repel the first air raids and strike back hard. If implemented, this plan would have changed the war. Everything was ready; information about enemy strategy was pouring in, yet El-Dighidi was taken by surprise when Israeli aircraft struck. Within 80 minutes most of his aircraft and defences were destroyed. No counter-attack was attempted
Air Vice-Marshal El-Dighidi was twice tried and acquitted by a military court. He withdrew from public life in shame, and died without leaving a written record of what had really happened. He spoke of the war, however, in an interview conducted by Mohamed Uda and Abdallah Imam and published in the weekly Al-Ahali on 29 June 1983.
"The tragedy of the 1967 war," he said, "is that it began and was lost within a few hours, without leadership or command."
"Field Marshal Abdel-Hakim Amer, the commander-in-chief of the armed forces and chief of staff, was not at his post on the morning of 5 June when Israel struck. Nor were any of the high-ranking officers. They were all with Amer, in his plane, flying over Sinai and reviewing the positions of the troops. Those officers who were not on the plane were waiting on the ground, ready to give Amer an official military salute!
"The tragedy is that this was taking place despite messages that had been sent to commanders, the field armies and military intelligence, warning them to be on alert. A message had been delivered at 10.30pm on 4 June, sent by the commander of the intelligence service in Arish. It read: 'The enemy has occupied the line joining El-Fateh, Birein, Rafah and Sheikh Zayed, and is expected to launch an attack on the land forces in Sinai at dawn on 5 June.'
"This message notwithstanding, all the commanders had abandoned their posts to wait for Amer. Some, positioned at a long distance from the meeting place, had abandoned their posts since the previous night in order to be on time for the general's arrival in Beir Tamada early on 5 June. Lieutenant-General Salah Mohsen was also to blame.
"I received orders from Nasser to be on alert on 14 May 1967 and for all the military forces to be fully mobilised on 17 May. On 30 May, the political and military leaders held a meeting to review different scenarios and to assess the consequences of finalising military mobilisation and preventing Israeli ships from entering the Gulf of Aqaba."
According to military documents, President Nasser had estimated that there was a 90 per cent chance that Israel would be the first to strike. On 2 June, Nasser held a meeting attended by all the officers in the general military command. He assured them that, "since a war cabinet has been formed under Moshe Dayan, there is a 100 per cent chance that Israel will strike in two or three days, on 4 or 5 June."
"Israel, Nasser said, would strike at both our air force and our air defence forces to incapacitate the air force, and eliminate it from the battlefield. He demanded that measures be taken to minimise predicted losses and enable Egypt to strike back forcefully, dealing Israel a decisive blow."
On 5 June, Egyptian radar screens showed a large number of aircraft on the Jordanian front, on their way to Egypt. The information was immediately conveyed to Nasser and the general military command in Egypt. The Agloun message, as it is known, could have been the turning point in the war. This information went for nought. El-Dighidi blamed the military commanders who had attended the meeting with Nasser, but claimed never to have received either the Agloun message or Nasser's instructions. Lieutenant-General Mortagi, the commander of the Egyptian front, Lieutenant-General Abdel-Moneim Riyad, the commander of the Jordanian front, and the commander of the Syrian front were never informed.
El-Dighidi ascribed the cause of the defeat to the inefficiency and ignorance of high-ranking military personnel who were not qualified to manage a battle of such magnitude. But he excluded from this judgement Abdel-Moneim Riyad (who had been assigned to the joint defence command, possibly to deny him the post he deserved), Field Marshal Ahmed Ismail and Abdel-Ghani El-Gamasi, whose superiors were in control at the time.
El-Dighidi, however, claimed full responsibility for the battle from the first sortie to the last, and the lack of essential equipment, mainly low- flying radar detection systems. He claimed that the Egyptian air defence shot down 73 Israeli planes (one third of the total number of Israeli planes which took part in the war).
"Evidently, if we had received some sign that the war had begun, many more planes would have been shot down. I had 300 planes on the ground waiting on first, second and third-degree alert, and 150 planes were ready with their pilots strapped into the seats, ready for the signal. They could have been in the air in three minutes, and the rest of the planes would have followed 10 minutes later.
"The intelligence service in my command station, however, were spying on me, not for me. Their information was often contradictory because they were fighting for power. I discharged the entire intelligence service only days before the war broke out. I therefore depended on my own men, but one of them betrayed me and did not perform his patrol sortie at the designated time. He had left the command office and gone home. Hours later, the air strike took place.
"But one man's betrayal does not tarnish the rest who performed their duties, nor should we forget the heroes of the air force. I believe there is some relation between the failure to execute the patrol and the advent of the Israeli planes. They had been assured that the skies were clear of Egyptian aircraft. To say the least, it was a betrayal."
El-Dighidi denied information revealed after the war that all Egyptian aircraft had been destroyed by the very first Israel air strike. He claimed that the rumour had reached headquarters, and this explains the reaction of the military command, which, he said never commissioned the air force to engage in any operation, because they seemed to have believed the rumour.
"The Egyptian forces did not withdraw, but fell into a state of confusion which rendered it impossible to provide them with any air protection. The men moved in all directions in Sinai, without any order or command. Each was running for his life. No air protection was requested from the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, or from the commander of the front.
"The planes were ready but I had no authority to impose air protection. The commander-in-chief never issued any orders to engage the 212 planes under his command that had been waiting for his orders. The higher ranks were the first to leave Sinai. The decision to withdraw was communicated to us by Field Marshal Amer, and whether it had come from Nasser or not, nobody knows. As commander-in-chief and chief of staff, however, Amer had the right to object to or postpone the orders of the president until a plan for withdrawal was formulated to guarantee a more organised withdrawal and to minimise losses.
"Israel had full information about our forces. Leadership and command no longer existed as soon as the borders were crossed, so within two or three hours, the enemy had penetrated into Egyptian territory to a distance that would normally take a day or two. The military commanders who had abandoned their posts were not able to return immediately and so completely lost control of their forces and their command of operations."