Beyond Shenouda III

Will a new patriarch bring a different approach to the concerns Egypt's Coptic community has about issues of citizenship, integration and co-existence?

It is the end of an era and the beginning of another for Coptic Christians in Egypt, who are now without the patriarch who has headed their church for four decades.
Pope Shenouda III, whose death at the age of 88 was announced on Saturday evening, was made patriarch of the Coptic Orthodox Church of Egypt in November 1971.
Over the past four decades, both supporters and critics agree that the late pope became identified as the Coptic face of Egypt and a synonym of the church, which has around 10 million followers in Egypt.
Today, Coptic Christians are wondering what will become of their church, and for that matter, of their many concerns, from compromised citizenship rights to faith practices.
For the endless thousands of mourners who flocked to the Coptic cathedral to mourn, Pope Shenouda III was more than just a patriarch - he was a father, the head of a community and a spokesperson.
Today, as Copts consider Shenouda's successor, they also consider the fate of their church and whether or not it will adopt the same style and performance that the deceased patriarch had favoured.
"Ultimately there would be some changes and ultimately the establishment, in other words the church, remains bigger than any individual, even a patriarch like Pope Shenouda III, who has so much support and faith from the Copts of Egypt for four decades," said Soliman Shafiq, a commentator on Coptic affairs.
In Shafik's assessment, Pope Shenouda has managed over the last few years to "expand" the status, profile, influence and properties of the church considerably.
It is another question, according to Shafiq, whether or not the deceased patriarch had equally expanded the legitimate citizenship rights of Egyptian Copts.
There is also the perplexing issue, argues Shafiq, of whether or not Pope Shenouda has left a church and a community that can cope with the daunting moment of political transition that the nation is undergoing. The first post-Mubarak presidential elections are scheduled to start in May.
"Away from the matters of faith, which remain immune, there are serious questions as to how the Coptic Orthodox Church and Copts would attend to their role in a country undergoing transition, because during his years Pope Shenouda decided and the congregation of Copts followed," Soliman suggested.
To judge by the debate inside the Church, among the religious leadership and the youth, Shafiq is convinced that the all-encompassing presence of Shenouda III had unwittingly masked or deliberately contained a diversity of affiliations, which must now emerge – sooner or later.
"Even as the medieval style of hierarchy within the church will continue, at least during the years of this coming pope, the diversity of views within the church would have to be accommodated by the pope and by the leadership of the church, no matter how conservative it remains to be," Soliman argued.
As such, Soliman is not very concerned about the choice of the next patriarch because whether it is a confrontational like Bishop Bishoy – whose candidacy is still pending a potential amendment of the election regulations – or a more conciliatory candidate like Bishop Moussa "the 118th patriarch would have to bow to the new diversity within the church."
This diversity, Soliman predicted, is unstoppable, to the point by which the next patriarch might well be one of the Egyptian-American bishops.
In addition, Soliman does not see an end to the political role of the Church vis-a-vis the state. "This role was there during the times of Pope Kyrillos (Shenouda's predecessor) but it was compatible with the style of things during the rule of Gamal Abdel-Nasser," Soliman suggested. While Pope Kyrillos was "on good terms with President Nasser, Nasser for his part did not challenge the uncontested authority of Kyrillos over the entire Coptic domain – or almost," he added.
The evolution of church-state engagement under Shenouda was not only a by-product of the choices of the deceased patriarch who, according to Soliman did actively pursue a more political involvement than his predecessor; it was also a by-product of the attitudes that Nasser's successors, Anwar El-Sadat and Hosni Mubarak, took towards the church.
So the relation between the state and the church in the future is not only something for the next patriarch to decide but also for the next president, Shafiq insisted.
For Youssef Sidhom, editor of Watani, a newspaper focused on Coptic affairs, irrespective of the profile or the style of engagement between the next president and the next patriarch, the church needs to step back, at least a little, from direct engagement – some suggest hegemony – in relation to Egyptian Copts and the state.
"It is true that during his years, Pope Shenouda upgraded the engagement of the church in national affairs," said Sidhom. He added, however, that this "nationalist or patriotic role of the church that was established by Pope Shenouda" should not undermine the exercise of citizenship on the part of Copts.
"We are hoping that the next patriarch will keep the national role of the Coptic Church," said Sidhom. However, he added, that "after 25 January it can no longer be acceptable that the Church is the single body that speaks for the rights of Copts, simply because this runs counter to the adequate exercise of citizenship."
Sidhom is particularly aware of the concerns that many Copts shared with each other related to their fate and interests in the country during the current rise of political Islam.
The way to attend to these concerns, Sidhom insisted, is not a job for the church or the new patriarch to worry about but for Copts to manage through political participation in parties, syndicates and across society in general.
"We want the church to retain its unique role as a spiritual leader and we want to build on the political momentum that we initiated on when we took part in the January 25 Revolution and even when we demonstrated against sectarian discrimination (last October) and martyrs," said Sameh, a young activist.
"The youth is not willing any more to accept any barriers between them, as Egyptian citizens, and the nation; Copts are not a different species from the rest of Egyptians and they can and they should be more integrated within society – with all its functions," Sameh insisted.
Sameh, however, is convinced that a lenient patriarch could help this aspired integration, while a more "orthodox" patriarch would find it hard to accept the change.
"I think it was very symbolic that Pope Shenouda passed away at this time of national resurrection; there is a new country being born out of the January 25 Revolution and along with it a new approach on the part of the church and the Copts towards the country should be developed," Sameh said.
Shafik, Soliman and Sameh agree that it is up to the state and the rest of Egyptians to encourage this positive evolution by reaching out to Copts.
"Obviously if Copts felt that the state is giving equal attention to Muslim citizens they would not feel the need to turn to the church," argued Labiba, a 67-year-old Coptic lady.
As a member of the more economically privileged part of society, Labiba says that it is too optimistic to suggest that the "isolation of Copts behind the walls of the church is coming to an end with the death" of Pope Shenouda.
"It is much more complicated because it is not true that all Copts were hiding behind the walls of the church; this was not the case for the rich and the well-educated; it was the case with the poor and the illiterate who felt twice marginalised – once because they are poor and ignorant and another because they are Copts, a minority in an otherwise Muslim state," Labiba said.
The evolution within the Coptic Orthodox Church is judged to be more complicated, according to the reading of Kamal Ghubriel, a secular Copt with considerable criticism for the style of Pope Shenouda.
In his book Copts and Liberalism, the first edition of which appeared in 2009, Ghubriel argued that the exclusion of Copts from the public sphere was the by-product of the systematic immigration of a good part of middle-class Copts whose education and openness would have made them immune to the fears, phobic or justified, that come along with the rise of political Islamic trends. It is also, he added, the outcome of an "ultra-central" style of administration of the Church and Coptic affairs that Pope Shenouda adopted.
For Sidhom, this ultra-central style was more often than not inevitable for Shenouda, who headed the church at times of increased signs of discrimination and targeted attacks against Copts.
"When he took matters in his own hands Pope Shenouda exercised restraint at times where the lack of a strong Coptic leadership could have meant direct civil confrontations as Copts and churches were being attacked," Sidhom said.
The next patriarch, Sidhom added, will have to play the same role, should the worst occur, but he too would have to get Copts to freely express themselves and to pursue their rights, "as Egyptian citizens – not as Copts."
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